海角大神

President Obama has hardly been a 鈥渢ransatlantic鈥� president. His administration has 鈥減ivoted鈥� to Asia, turning away from the Europe-focused mindset of many earlier presidents and showing a dislike of the clubby summits that had become a mainstay of US-Europe relations.

But now, Mr. Obama has some catching up to do. The Ukraine crisis has brought Europe back to the center of US foreign policy concerns, and a long-planned trip to Europe this week for a summit on nuclear security has become something more consequential: A chance for the US and Europe to work together on Russia.

Already, at Mr. Obama鈥檚 urging, the Group of Seven nations on Monday suspended Russia鈥檚 participation and moved the group鈥檚 June meeting from Sochi, Russia, to Brussels. But if Obama is going to get Europe to commit to further penalties against Russia for invading and annexing Crimea, he is going to have to make a deep commitment to ramping up transatlantic diplomacy, analysts say.

Much of Western Europe is frustrated with the US, disappointed in Obama鈥檚 record, and suspicious of his foreign policy priorities. Motivating European leaders to move with unity on Russia 鈥渋s going to require an enormous amount of American leadership in Europe, [something] we have not seen for the last five years,鈥� says Heather Conley, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. 鈥淭his is exactly the moment, as historically has been the case, that the United States needs to exert strong leadership within the transatlantic alliance.鈥�

This week鈥檚 trip is Obama鈥檚 first to Brussels 鈥� arguably the capital of Europe, where both the European Union (EU) and NATO are headquartered. He will take part in a US-EU summit 鈥� something he has not approached with enthusiasm in the past 鈥� and he is scheduled to deliver a major policy speech.

Some question how much Obama can really accomplish. For example, NATO鈥檚 debates about America鈥檚 transatlantic commitment and the alliance鈥檚 post-cold war purpose have been going on 鈥渞oughly speaking, forever,鈥� says former Obama administration official Jeremy Shapiro.

NATO鈥檚 struggles suggest 鈥渁 sort of structural problem which transcends the presidency, and which I don鈥檛 think has to do with the personality of the president,鈥� says Mr. Shapiro, now a visiting fellow in foreign policy at Washington鈥檚 Brookings Institution.

But others note that Europe has long required American leadership to move forward on crises in its own backyard 鈥� such as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Organizing similar unity on Ukraine today will be more difficult, because many of possible economic measures to punish Russia will require more sacrifice from Europe than from the US.

On Monday, after a meeting in Amsterdam with Dutch Prime Minster Mark Rutte, Obama insisted that Europe and America 鈥渁re united in imposing a cost on Russia for its actions so far.鈥澛犅�

But Russia plays a significantly larger role in the European economy 鈥� especially as an energy supplier 鈥� than in the US economy.

鈥淚t鈥檚 going to take an enormous amount of personal time for the president working with [European] leaders鈥� to get tougher sanctions rolling, says Ms. Conley of CSIS.

She suggests that European companies, in particular, are going to resist 鈥減ainful鈥� measures. Many are still affected by the lingering effects of a deep economic crisis.

Obama will have to demonstrate that the US is ready to pay a part of the price, Conley says.

But European leaders have been alarmed by the implications of Russia鈥檚 unchallenged actions in Ukraine, and they are prepared for some 鈥渂urden-sharing,鈥� says Tamara Cofman Wittes, a senior fellow at Brookings who has been meeting with officials in Western Europe.聽

Shaken by Obama鈥檚 plans to 鈥減ivot鈥� America鈥檚 interests toward Asia and his perceived lack of interest in the EU, European leaders are eager to engage Obama. This is especially true, since Europeans are broadly more comfortable with Obama鈥檚 foreign-policy approach than that of President George W. Bush, says Ms. Cofman Wittes. They recognize that a more modest America abroad means Europe might have to pick up more of the burden at times.

The 鈥渃osts鈥� that the US and Europe aim to impose on Russia will be 鈥渄ifficult鈥�and contentious,鈥� Cofman Wittes says.

But 鈥淚 have not heard a lot of complaining about American leading from behind or stepping back or being weak,鈥� she adds. 鈥淭here鈥檚 a great deal of appreciation here still of the fact that this is a more self-restrained superpower than the behavior that they saw under the last US president.鈥�