Why Hezbollah fighters are embracing an unpopular and costly war with Israel
| London
The Hezbollah special forces fighter could be any Lebanese man in Beirut鈥檚 southern suburbs.
Stocky and with a reddish beard and short hair, he is clad in civilian clothes to avoid detection from the Israeli drones that fly constantly overhead.
But this Hezbollah veteran is part of a leaner and more potent Iran-backed force that he says is committed to a long-awaited 鈥渇inal battle鈥� against Israel 鈥� opening a second front as the United States and Israel attack Hezbollah鈥檚 patron, Iran.
Why We Wrote This
In Lebanon, Iran ally Hezbollah has plunged into a battle with Israel that its rank and file has embraced as existential. Yet the regional conflict involves far larger powers with much higher stakes, and how Hezbollah emerges and what it achieves might be out of its hands.
Lebanon鈥檚 Shiite 鈥淧arty of God鈥� remains the most powerful of Iran鈥檚 regional allies, despite its drubbing at the hands of Israel in late 2024, and even though it withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, as required by a November 2024 ceasefire agreement.
But instead of disarming, as required, it reformed, rebuilt, and rearmed, despite 15 months of near-daily Israeli airstrikes aimed at preventing exactly that.
鈥淗ezbollah is definitely back on its feet,鈥� says the fighter, who gives the name Ahmad.
鈥淲e were definitely preparing and restoring our capabilities鈥� since the 2024 ceasefire, he says. 鈥淲e knew that the Israelis are not done with [Hezbollah], so we played the 鈥榮trategic patience鈥� card, and it paid off.鈥�
Indeed, two days after the U.S. and Israel launched a Feb. 28 surprise attack against Iran 鈥� assassinating supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was also Hezbollah鈥檚 spiritual guide, in the first wave of strikes 鈥� Hezbollah joined the war.
Yet, after its plunge into a battle that its rank and file has eagerly embraced as existential, the organization finds itself embroiled in a conflict in which far larger powers are bent on a high-stakes bid to remake the Middle East.
How Hezbollah emerges from the battle almost certainly depends in large part on how Iran fares in the fight, analysts say. While the militia is likely to survive, they add, it can exact only limited harm upon arch-foe Israel, achieved at very high cost to itself and Lebanon.
Since joining the war, Hezbollah has kept up missile and drone launches into northern Israel, triggering Israeli airstrikes on militia strongholds, and in central Beirut. Israel鈥檚 response has killed more than 1,000 Lebanese 鈥� a figure that doesn鈥檛 differentiate between civilians and fighters 鈥� and displaced some 1 million people, about one-fifth of the country鈥檚 population.
Israel has also ordered the evacuation of southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, but Hezbollah units have emerged there, reportedly stalling Israeli ground advances with fierce fighting in three locations.
An unpopular war
鈥淲e do see this as the 鈥榝inal war,鈥� because the Israelis want to finish Hezbollah,鈥� says Ahmad, in Beirut. As he speaks, the rattle of AK-47 assault-rifle fire signals an Israeli evacuation order for a nearby building, before striking it.
鈥淥ur families and friends have a strong faith in us, but I can tell you one thing: They were upset with us, because we waited so long to retaliate,鈥� says the fighter.
Nevertheless, the resumption of war in Lebanon is widely unpopular 鈥� even among many of Hezbollah鈥檚 Shiite Muslim supporters 鈥� because of the costly scale of destruction wrought by Israel.
It is a fight that many Lebanese blame on Hezbollah, yet it is a fight that analysts say might well have been ordered by Iran, bypassing Hezbollah鈥檚 more cautious political leadership.
The Lebanese government has tasked the Lebanese army with disarming the militia. The army declared the region south of the Litani River free of Hezbollah last November.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that Israel was 鈥渄efeating鈥� Hezbollah. 鈥淲e鈥檙e not talking about the same Hezbollah anymore,鈥� he said, noting an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles before Israel鈥檚 2024 offensive, 鈥渁nd terrorist infrastructure right next to our border, along our fence and underground, ready to invade.鈥�
鈥淲e pushed them back. We destroyed the bulk of their missiles in six hours. We eliminated [former Hezbollah chief Hassan] Nasrallah,鈥� he said of 2024. 鈥淥bviously, our No. 1 effort is geared toward Iran. If the regime goes, you know that Hezbollah goes.鈥�
Rebuilding efforts
Days before Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 comments, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem promised 鈥渧ictory,鈥� saying in a statement read on Hezbollah鈥檚 al-Manar channel that 鈥渢he final word will be on the ground.鈥�
He praised Hezbollah鈥檚 鈥渓evel of preparedness,鈥� and said, 鈥渉istory will record that you resisted the enemy under the worst conditions.鈥�
Indeed, Hezbollah鈥檚 rebuilding and rearmament efforts over the past year have been effective, though only up to a point, says Nicholas Blanford, a Beirut-based expert for the Atlantic Council.
鈥淭he Israelis seem surprised that Hezbollah still has these capabilities to fight back, [but] it was clear that Hezbollah still retains some powerful military strength, in terms of remaining rockets and precision-guided missiles that they鈥檝e got stashed away,鈥� he says.
鈥淭he fighting force itself is highly motivated鈥� and was 鈥渄elighted鈥� to get orders to fight, after absorbing 15 months of Israeli strikes, says Mr. Blanford, author of 鈥淲arriors of God: Inside Hezbollah鈥檚 Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel.鈥�
鈥淭hey鈥檝e thrown themselves into what they call the 鈥楲ast Battle,鈥欌�� says Mr. Blanford. 鈥淭hey are not going to defeat Israel. They can inflict damage and harm on Israel, but I think this is being led by the Iranians. If the Iranians are able to get something out of this, even at the expense of their Lebanese ally, then so be it.鈥�
Political-military divide
Iran appears to have bypassed Hezbollah鈥檚 political leadership, including Mr. Qassem, and has gone straight to commanders to open the second front, says Mr. Blanford.
鈥淚 think the political leadership didn鈥檛 want to get into this fight, because they could see that it was potentially existential,鈥� he says. In the first week of battle, Hezbollah鈥檚 military leaders delivered an open letter to fighters, extolling the virtues of jihad and martyrdom.
鈥淗ezbollah will definitely be weakened, because they are being degraded every day 鈥� even though they are hitting the Israelis 鈥� and they are expending ordnance that I don鈥檛 think they can replenish,鈥� says Mr. Blanford. 鈥淭hen you may come to a crunch moment, where the Hezbollah as we know it may change [and] can no longer play the same deterrence role on behalf of the Iranians as before. ... That鈥檚 why they see this as the last fight.鈥�
The previous climactic battle between Hezbollah and Israel took place in 2006, when Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill over 33 days.
When Iran-backed Hamas in Gaza launched a cross-border attack against Israel in October 2023, Hezbollah joined in solidarity. Tit-for-tat exchanges escalated in 2024 into a full Israeli offensive. Now, the Iran war is transforming the Middle East even further, with previous calculations changing.
鈥淗ezbollah is convinced that if it loses, it will have to disappear 鈥� not only as a military force but even as a political entity,鈥� notes an analysis in Beirut-based news outlet L鈥橭rient Today. 鈥淭herefore, what is at stake today is its very existence, which is why it is determined to commit all its resources to the fight.鈥�
What does Israel want?
Israel, for its part, also wants to decisively end the threat along its northern border, and has raised the possibility of mobilizing up to 450,000 soldiers for a possible ground incursion. But top of mind for Israel will be lessons from the 鈥渟ecurity zone鈥� it occupied for 18 years, until 2000, which provided limited security.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not absolutely clear what the Israelis want to do,鈥� says Michael Young, the Beirut-based senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center. 鈥淚f it鈥檚 a buffer zone, how do the Israelis manage it?鈥�
鈥淚 don鈥檛 see any decisive outcomes here; I see more of a long stalemate,鈥� says Mr. Young, author of 鈥淭he Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon鈥檚 Life Struggle.鈥�
鈥淚 don鈥檛 really think the Israelis are going to disarm Hezbollah in a systematic way,鈥� he says. 鈥淚f they don鈥檛 do that, and the Lebanese army can鈥檛 do that, we鈥檙e going to be in a prolonged situation, a deadlock with no easy solutions.鈥�
That might also explain why there is still apparent debate in Israel about how much to intervene in Lebanon.
鈥淲e have to understand what this war is teaching us, across the board,鈥� Mr. Young says. 鈥淭hat there are limits to what you can do with military power.鈥�
A researcher in Beirut contributed to this report.
