To project power, and disarm Hezbollah, Lebanese state needs guns and butter
| Beirut
The military checkpoint south of Sidon is flanked by armored vehicles mounted with machine guns and concrete blocks painted in the colors of the red and white Lebanese flag, with a green cedar tree.
That鈥檚 like any other Lebanese Army checkpoint in southern Lebanon.
But, here, the soldiers are working on the optics of their expanded mission: to ensure the disarmament of Hezbollah 鈥� the powerful Iran-backed Shiite militia battered by a 14-month war with Israel 鈥� and establish a state monopoly on arms.
Why We Wrote This
The government in Beirut has committed itself to disarming Hezbollah and exercising a monopoly over the use of force in Lebanon. But political and economic reforms that curtail the power of corrupt, sectarian elites are no less vital to its success.
One smiling soldier, a rifle slung over his shoulder, walks from car to car, handing out window stickers with the crossed-bayonet insignia of the Lebanese Army. Leaflets with the words 鈥淔ollow Us鈥� include a QR code that links to army social media accounts.
The Lebanese Army has long been the most respected institution in Lebanon. But it has not been the most powerful military force in the country for decades 鈥� a fact that an unprecedented Cabinet decision to disarm Hezbollah last August, based on an American proposal, is meant to change.
On one hand, the army鈥檚 fresh deployment of 10,000 soldiers and the creation of 200 checkpoints between the Litani River and the Israeli border to the south 鈥� territory previously controlled by Hezbollah 鈥� points to progress, and completes the first phase of the disarmament plan.
On the other hand, disarmament is just part of a broader set of government reforms necessary to reverse years of financial malaise, attract critical foreign-donor and International Monetary Fund support, and quell the pervasive power of corrupt and sectarian elites. The scale of the crisis was clear during widespread anti-corruption street protests that erupted in October 2019.
The measures seek to transform governance in Lebanon, where warlords and their armed militias have ruled along sectarian lines, dividing the nation for half a century, and corrupt elites have eroded state and financial institutions from the inside.
鈥淢ake sure the state wins鈥�
The government in Beirut is now working to stand itself up. First by taking advantage of a rare window it sees to rein in the arms of the last 鈥� and most powerful 鈥� of those militias, at a time Hezbollah is weakened and its Shiite support base has been devastated by war. And no less important, by taking the difficult steps to finally emerge from years of financial failure.
鈥淭here is the issue of government legitimacy, in terms of having enough money to win over the population,鈥� says Mark Daou, a member of the 13-seat reformist bloc in Parliament. 鈥淩econstruction, supporting people, actually taking charge 鈥� not only of the military, but of the entire rebuilding, so that people will be betting on the state.鈥�
Basic services such as water and electricity, as well as roads, schools, and hospitals need to be provided 鈥渟o it will be worthwhile for people to rebuild their homes,鈥� Mr. Daou says. 鈥淗ezbollah and the state both promise their ability to rebuild, but nothing is happening yet 鈥� so we need to make sure the state wins.鈥�
The World Bank estimates that the Hezbollah-Israel war caused $11.1 billion in damage and losses in Beirut and across southern and eastern Lebanon. That follows six years of debilitating economic crisis.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think Hezbollah has sustainable supply lines, whether to rebuild militarily, or to provide enough financial support to compete with the state,鈥� says Mr. Daou. 鈥淭his is where military supplies and financial supplies to the state will outpace Hezbollah. If the state is fulfilling its responsibilities, Hezbollah will be outpaced and basically done, because the need is now.鈥�
A hunger for change
Indeed, polling shows that the Lebanese people are hungry for change, and for real governance.
A published on Thursday found that 79% of all Lebanese supported weapons being held exclusively by the army. But among the country鈥檚 large Shiite population, that figure is just 27%.
Still, despite 鈥減erceived state weakness,鈥� Gallup found that 94% of all Lebanese 鈥渉ave confidence鈥� in the army, including 98% of Lebanese Shiites.
鈥淔ollowing its war with Israel, Hezbollah finds itself in a difficult strategic position and its interests at odds with Lebanese public opinion,鈥� Gallup reports. 鈥淭he main pillars of Hezbollah鈥檚 influence in Lebanon that once insulated its arsenal are under strain,鈥� it concludes, such as lost military strength and weak or lost foreign backers in Iran and Syria, on top of 鈥渟ignificant challenges鈥� to Hezbollah鈥檚 local legitimacy.
On Friday, a U.N. Security Council delegation toured southern Lebanon, and heard from President Joseph Aoun that U.S. and Western pressure was required on Israel to withdraw and stop its attacks. Mr. Aoun 鈥� himself a former commander of the army 鈥� has stressed that Hezbollah disarmament should be by negotiation, not by force.
A tense ceasefire has prevailed for about a year. It requires Hezbollah鈥檚 complete disarmament and Israel鈥檚 full withdrawal. But analysts say Israel鈥檚 continued strikes at suspected Hezbollah sites across the country have complicated an already difficult situation for the government. The strikes, which also have targeted construction equipment, have prevented rebuilding while giving weight to Hezbollah arguments that it must keep its weapons to defend Lebanon when the army cannot.
The United States has pressed the government to speed up both army deployments and economic reforms, and to complete Hezbollah disarmament by the end of the year. Last month, it showed its frustration at what it deemed slow progress by canceling a day of meetings in Washington scheduled with Lebanese Army commander Rodolphe Haykal.
The U.S. has supported the army with arms and training, and has invested more than $3 billion in Lebanon鈥檚 armed forces since 2006, according to the State Department.
Hezbollah鈥檚 stand
But how much further the army can disarm Hezbollah unopposed remains untested. Hezbollah says it will keep its weapons, as long as Israel continues to occupy border areas and conducts near-daily strikes against Hezbollah operatives and suspected sites 鈥� and until there is a Lebanese 鈥渘ational defense strategy.鈥�
鈥淲e cooperate with everyone to build the state and liberate the land, and our record of actions prove it,鈥� Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said during a speech on Friday.
鈥淎merica has nothing to do with [our] weapons, nor with the defense strategy, nor with Lebanese disagreements,鈥� he said. 鈥淭hey want to eliminate our existence entirely. ... Are we supposed to believe that the issue is simply removing the weapons, and then Lebanon鈥檚 problems will be solved?鈥�
The Lebanese Army public relations efforts extend beyond receiving car stickers or QR codes at checkpoints. Billboards in southern Beirut show a soldier saluting a Lebanese flag, with the words in Arabic: 鈥淲e are all with you.鈥�
Not far away, a large Hezbollah banner lionizes its fighters, portrayed as among the underground roots of a tree. Yet, in a subtle nod to the evolving relationship between Hezbollah and the state, the tree root fighters hoist a Lebanese flag, not a yellow Hezbollah one.
When Hezbollah鈥檚 military chief was assassinated on Nov. 23 by Israeli drones flying over Hezbollah鈥檚 stronghold in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanese Army troops were allowed to secure the area, with little friction.
The price of assistance
But in parallel with the army expanding state power, legal steps that signify changes in governance also are required.
鈥淲hat鈥檚 undeniable is that the new government has accelerated the progress of making the economic reforms that the IMF has been demanding. 鈥� But there are still clear tools available to derail the process,鈥� says David Wood, the Beirut-based senior Lebanon analyst for the International Crisis Group.
鈥淭here are clearly still outstanding bones of contention and outstanding pockets of resistance to those sweeping structural changes, which would change the face of how Lebanon works,鈥� he says.
鈥淲hile it鈥檚 a hopelessly broken system, it has worked perfectly well for select political and financial elites for decades,鈥� he adds, noting that only effective reforms will enable cash-strapped Lebanon to receive critical outside help.
鈥淭his is the situation Lebanon finds itself in. It needs a lot of help, and it鈥檚 not going to get that help for free.鈥�
