Israel鈥檚 conduct of the war in Gaza threatens its ties to the US
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
This week鈥檚 urgent push for a cease-fire in Gaza has underscored a paradox that is straining America鈥檚 most important alliance in the Middle East: its bond with Israel.
As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized to reporters on his latest Mideast mission, Washington鈥檚 commitment to Israel鈥檚 security has remained rock-solid since Hamas鈥� killing and abduction of more than 1,000 Israeli civilians last Oct. 7.
But the war raging in Gaza for the past 10 months has pushed that relationship in a different direction, adding significantly to political tensions that have been building during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 16 years in power.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onThere is no doubting Washington鈥檚 commitment to Israel鈥檚 security. But the war in Gaza has sharpened political tensions between the two partners, which could weaken their broader relationship.
The result could be a lasting redefinition 鈥� and a loosening 鈥� of a decades-old partnership.
Much will depend on how long the war lasts, how it ends, whether the plight of Gaza鈥檚 Palestinian civilians can be relieved, and whether a wider regional conflict can be averted.
Also decisive will be whether Mr. Netanyahu remains in power, and whether U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris retains the Democratic Party鈥檚 hold on the White House this November. Both of those outcomes look decidedly more possible than they did just a few weeks ago.
But while America鈥檚 security commitment is not about to weaken, the broader fabric of a relationship that both sides have defined as resting on shared values, as much as on common interests, is showing every sign of fraying.
One reason for Washington鈥檚 reinforced military support since Oct. 7 鈥� some $14 billion, in addition to the nearly $4 billion in annual U.S. assistance 鈥� has been President Joe Biden鈥檚 emotional attachment to an earlier period of political kinship with Israel.
But the security connection runs far deeper. It has been built on years of close cooperation on military matters, intelligence, strategy, and technology 鈥� buttressed by shared security priorities during the Cold War and, more recently, the threat posed by Iran and its allies.
As Mr. Blinken stressed this week, the bond also serves an immediate U.S. interest: to deter any Iranian move that could spark direct conflict with Israel and a regional war.
And the security commitment retains broadly bipartisan support in the United States.
But that鈥檚 become less true of the wider U.S.-Israeli relationship. And the growing political strains between Washington and Israel over Gaza could bury the prospect of such a consensus for the foreseeable future.
That鈥檚 a change that began to take root more than a decade ago, in which Mr. Netanyahu played a central role.
While the U.S. was the first nation to recognize Israel in 1948, the partnership that both sides came to see as a 鈥渟pecial relationship鈥� began after the Six-Day War of 1967, in which Israel defeated the armies of three Arab neighbors that rejected its right to exist as a state.
There have been periodic strains since then. But Israelis on both left and right, along with the country鈥檚 military and security establishment, always agreed on the importance of safeguarding the broadest, strongest possible partnership with its most important overseas ally.
That began to change under Mr. Netanyahu, especially during Barack Obama鈥檚 presidency.
Where Israel had previously cultivated bipartisan U.S. ties, Mr. Netanyahu focused on galvanizing support from America鈥檚 political right and from Republican leaders in Congress.
The most dramatic sign came as Washington was finalizing a multilateral agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear program. Mr. Netanyahu accepted a Republican invitation to address a joint session of Congress, where he argued against the deal.
The tension that caused with Washington resurfaced more recently, when Mr. Netanyahu chose in late 2022 to rely on a pair of anti-Arab parties for his parliamentary majority. That obliged him to support permanent Israeli rule over the occupied West Bank and to seek to limit the independence of Israel鈥檚 Supreme Court.
The war in Gaza has further exacerbated the strains.
Late last month, Mr. Netanyahu again accepted a Republican invitation to address a joint session of Congress, amid election-year divisions within Mr. Biden鈥檚 party over policy on Gaza.
There has also been growing tension over the urgency of securing a cease-fire, the level of civilian casualties, and, above all, Mr. Biden鈥檚 longer term vision for Gaza and the Middle East.
Mr. Biden is determined to forge a joint project with Israel and key Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia, to reconstruct Gaza, reopen the possibility of an eventual two-state peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and cement a regional partnership to constrain Iran and its allies.
With Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 majority dependent on his extreme-right partners, it is far from clear he鈥檒l be willing to give the ground necessary for that to happen.
Instead, he could be counting on being able to avoid difficult policy choices should Donald Trump return to the White House.
That could repair relations with Washington, as long as both men remain at the helm.
But it might also cement a lasting change in the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
The term both sides sometimes used in years past 鈥� 鈥渟pecial relationship鈥� 鈥� had echoes of America鈥檚 ties to Britain. That bond has endured regardless of which party is in power in Washington or London, because it is based not just on security interests, but also on history, culture, and shared political institutions and values.
The security bond between the U.S. and Israel does still seem likely to stay strong.
But just how special the relationship remains could now be at the mercy of the political winds blowing in both countries.
