How Turkey鈥檚 use of military power furthers Erdo臒an鈥檚 ambitions
| LONDON
The cease-fire agreement ending six weeks of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh was greeted in Turkey as a 鈥渟acred success鈥� for 鈥渂rotherly Azerbaijan鈥� in its fight with Armenia.
But the elation in Ankara was not simply due to its ally鈥檚 battlefield gains, which reclaimed ground lost to ethnic Armenian separatists in the early 1990s.
For Turkey, the outcome was also the latest successful example of its assertive and game-changing use of military hard power, which has so far redrawn geopolitical realities from Libya and Syria to the southern Caucasus.
Why We Wrote This
What鈥檚 behind Turkey鈥檚 increasingly assertive use of military hard power? An easy answer is it helps bolster President Erdo臒an politically. But another is that he sees restoring Turkey鈥檚 regional standing as his calling.
The moves take advantage of a vacuum left by now-absent U.S. and European actors, analysts say, in order to realize Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an鈥檚 ambitions of regional preeminence 鈥� and to enhance his popularity at home.
The result is that Mr. Erdo臒an is the latest exemplar of the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy, even as traditional military players withdraw from the field. If there is one important caveat, though, it is that Turkey鈥檚 ambitions have also brought it increasingly into competition with another power, Russia.
鈥淭here is clearly a resurgent Turkey 鈥� one that has more self-confidence 鈥� [that] defines its role in the world as having a military footprint outside of its borders,鈥� says Asl谋 Ayd谋nta艧ba艧, a Turkey expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
鈥淭urkey wants to be a regional hegemon, and to get to that it understands it needs to be an active player in conflict zones,鈥� Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧 says. 鈥淧resident Erdo臒an himself feels that ... we鈥檝e already entered a new age of great power competition, and [that] it鈥檚 his calling in life to make sure Turkey emerges as a great power.鈥�
鈥淥ften all of these things are regarded [abroad] as Turkish adventurism, whereas in Turkey they are a source of pride,鈥� she says. 鈥淭he government does not see these as adventures, [but] as milestones that are building up a Turkish empire in a new age.鈥�
In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia brokered the cease-fire after President Vladimir Putin and Mr. Erdo臒an spoke. Nearly 2,000 Russian troops are to monitor the cease-fire lines. Turkey鈥檚 peacekeeping role is still to be determined, but Mr. Erdo臒an submitted a bill to parliament today to approve deployment of peacekeeping troops for a year.
Turkey鈥檚 expanded influence
Few think Azeri troops could have broken the years-long stalemate with Armenia without Turkey鈥檚 ironclad support and weaponry. Ankara鈥檚 arms sales to Azerbaijan increased six-fold this year, rising to $77 million in September alone 鈥撀爉aking Azerbaijan the biggest client for Turkish weapons 鈥撀燫euters reports. Turkey also reportedly deployed Turkish-trained mercenary fighters from Syria.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is hardly the only arena in the region 鈥� and beyond 鈥� in which Turkey has exerted influence:
- Timely Turkish military intervention in Libya last spring, on behalf of the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli, is credited with blocking a takeover bid by Khalifa Haftar, a renegade general who had Russian, French, and Saudi support.
- Since 2016, Turkey has played increasingly effective military roles in Syria and Iraq to limit the reach and power of ethnic Kurdish militias it calls 鈥渢errorists鈥� 鈥撀爀ven facing off directly with U.S. Special Forces units and, last spring, Russian forces over Syria鈥檚 northwest enclave of Idlib.
- Turkey is locked in a tense maritime dispute with Greece and Cyprus over newfound energy reserves in the eastern Mediterranean.
- And, further compounding Turkey鈥檚 fractious relations with Europe 鈥� and bolstering Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 claim to be a leader for all Sunni Muslims 鈥� the Turkish president in late October rejected government efforts to limit the practice of Islam in France after a spate of Islamist attacks, saying President Emmanuel Macron 鈥渘eeds treatment on a mental level.鈥�
Such nationalist and pro-Islamic activism plays well for Mr. Erdo臒an at home, where a struggling Turkish economy has dented his popularity.
鈥淭here are inherent limits to how far this can go, and the limit is really the Turkish economy, because it is very interdependent with the Western economy,鈥� says Sinan 脺lgen, a former Turkish diplomat and head of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).
Turkey鈥檚 assertiveness abroad has been aided by two concurrent changes in the global order, he says: A United States that is 鈥渕uch more disinterested in this part of the world,鈥� coupled with the 鈥渃ontinuing ineffectiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor.鈥�
鈥淭his combination has opened up space for mid-power countries like Turkey to exert themselves more assertively in the regional theater,鈥� says Mr. 脺lgen. 鈥淭he domestic dimension is that the [ruling] AK Party has espoused a narrative of a strong Turkey abroad, and hard power tactics tend to nurture this narrative.鈥�
A report by Al-Monitor news website noted that Mr. Macron 鈥渇ollowed the tried and tired analysis that everything [Erdo臒an] does abroad must be for 鈥榬eligious鈥� reasons. Others claim that Erdo臒an is overreaching politically and militarily.... And yet the Turkish juggernaut keeps marching on.鈥�
Russia sees encroachment
Turkey鈥檚 moves have also caught the eye of other intervening powers, notably Russia, which has seen Turkey on the opposite side of frontlines in both Libya and Syria. Turkey鈥檚 support for Azerbaijan 鈥撀燼 former Soviet Republic 鈥� is viewed by Moscow as encroachment in its backyard.
The Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, for example, stated that Turkey had made 鈥渁n unprecedented breakthrough into the political space Moscow always considered exclusively its own.鈥�
The result of the war is 鈥渄isastrous鈥� for Russia, says聽Ruslan Pukhov, director of a Russian defense think-tank. 鈥淭he harsh reality is that Moscow鈥檚 influence in the trans-Caucasus region has sharply decreased, while the prestige of a successful and pugnacious Turkey, on the contrary, has grown incredibly,鈥� .
Indeed, the Kremlin made clear last week that Turkey is not mentioned in the cease-fire deal and that 鈥撀燿espite Azeri statements 鈥� any Turkish forces deployed are not official peacekeepers.
Even the fact that Russia is treating Turkey as a player is indicative of how the character and quality of Turkey鈥檚 regional reach has changed since the Arab Spring in 2011. Back then, Mr. Erdo臒an took a 鈥渧ictory lap鈥� tour of Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli, buoyed by the widespread belief that Turkey presented a model of a successful and modern Islamic state for the post-dictator era.
But the credibility of that model soon disappeared, lost in the clouds of tear gas fired against protesters during the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, and then eroded further by Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 own increasing authoritarianism.
鈥淎 decade ago, Turkey presented itself as a model for the region, with its soft power instruments,鈥� says Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧 of ECFR. 鈥淭oday it鈥檚 an actor in the region with hard power instruments. There is a great interest in the use of hard power, and each and every time that becomes a reality, the lesson for the next international incident is that it works.鈥�
How to use influence?
Turkey has been on a learning curve of interventions since it first crossed into northern Syria in 2016. Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧 recalls visiting Syrian territory controlled by Turkey back then and finding local Turkish authorities 鈥渧ery self-consciously talking about this as an experiment.鈥�
Though Turkey鈥檚 military footprint has since extended much farther, it is not clear how Turkey will use its influence in a place like Libya.
鈥淭his is not really thought through. And there is a reason that Western countries are so gun-shy about the use of hard power in the Middle East, precisely because the returns are so little and the costs are so heavy,鈥� says Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧.
鈥淔or Turkey, there is a great appetite, because it helps Turkey鈥檚 self-image, it helps the president鈥檚 own standing, and it is now defined as an ultimate destiny for the country,鈥� she says.
The fact that many Turks favor intervention abroad 鈥� even if it is too early to tell if it makes Turkey itself more secure, or improves the economy 鈥� is a key reason behind it, says Mr. 脺lgen of EDAM.
鈥淭he way you have to analyze the activism in Turkish foreign policy is less from the standpoint of the end result, and more in terms of its implications for domestic power,鈥� says Mr. 脺lgen.
鈥淚t鈥檚 really more about whether this foreign policy activism helps President Erdo臒an鈥檚 popularity at home 鈥撀燼nd it does 鈥撀燼t a time when that popularity is under stress because of the economic malaise.鈥�
