How post-ISIS scramble for advantage in Syria raises risk of wider war
| London
On three different Syrian front lines, the violent events of recent days signal that the long-running conflict has reached a critical moment of evolution, as key players jockey to establish new red lines and maximize gains after the defeat of the so-called Islamic State.
First to grab headlines was the launching last weekend of an Iranian drone from western Syria into Israel for the first time. Israel shot it down, then lost one of its own F-16 jet fighters 鈥� the first such loss in decades 鈥� to a Syrian anti-aircraft missile after striking the drone鈥檚 home base.
The Israeli Air Force retaliated for the downed jet, targeting eight Syrian and four Iranian positions inside Syria, and claiming to destroy half of Syria鈥檚 air-defense capacity.
Second to grab headlines were reports that emerged this week about the death of scores of Russian 鈥渕ercenaries鈥� that had attacked a position of US advisers and their militia allies in the oil-rich eastern Syrian region of Deir Ezzor on Feb. 7 and 8. They were met by a three-hour US military barrage, in the most lethal US-Russia incident since the cold war.
The third event, with fewer fireworks, saw the Turkish military advance up to positions in northern Syria, eyeball to eyeball with forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, which have themselves been shelling anti-regime rebels in the northern Idlib enclave.
As the danger of ISIS fades from Syria, the array of players that have helped destroy the country during seven years of war are probing each other to establish new rules of the game, analysts say, in high-stakes efforts that risk sparking an even wider war.
鈥淭his is the most dangerous phase of the Syrian conflict, because now geo-strategic regional and global powers are positioning themselves for the post-ISIS phase,鈥� says Fawaz Gerges, a Mideast scholar at the London School of Economics.
鈥淭here is a fierce rivalry, everyone is willing to push the envelope, to escalate, and this is why the fear 鈥撀爊ot only of a clash between the regional powers, but a major blunder by Russia or the US 鈥撀燵is that this] could really escalate conflict to a different level,鈥� says Mr. Gerges, author of 鈥淚SIS: A History.鈥�
Flashpoints are obvious, as the evolving post-ISIS conflict brings foes Israel and Iran and Iran鈥檚 allies Hezbollah closer to each other along Syria鈥檚 southwest border.
Likewise, the US has indicated that it intends to keep a military presence in the broad swaths of northeastern territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that it backs, despite the stated intention of Damascus 鈥撀爏upported by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah 鈥撀爐o reclaim every inch of Syrian territory.
The results of the recent violence nevertheless indicate that, despite the probing military actions and reactions, no side is yet eager for a full-blown war.
Swift de-escalation
Downing the Israeli F-16, for example, 鈥渁ppears to have been part of a pre-planned 鈥榖ait and trap鈥� operation鈥� by Mr. Assad and Iran鈥檚 Revolutionary Guard, wrote Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, in an analysis this week.
鈥淭he use of the comparatively disposable Iranian drone as bait to lure in an Israeli response was met with an unusually large wave of at least 24 surface-to-air missiles,鈥� wrote Mr. Lister.
鈥淭he Iranians are raising the stakes of the bet,鈥� Brig. Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, the former director of Israel鈥檚 Strategic Affairs Ministry, was quoted as saying in the Jerusalem Post.
鈥淪ince the Iranians were facing Israeli efforts to prevent them from having what they want, they are now trying to do things they haven鈥檛 before,鈥� said Mr. Kuperwasser, also a former head of the army鈥檚 Intelligence, Research and Assessment division.
And yet, after the initial strikes, de-escalation efforts were swift: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone; and Iran denied it launched a drone at all, with one Tehran official saying the claims were 鈥渢oo ridiculous to be addressed.鈥�
The Israeli military released cockpit footage of a batwing drone 鈥� similar to knock-offs of the American RQ-170 stealth drone that Iran captured in late 2011 and claims to have reverse-engineered 鈥撀燽eing tracked and then obliterated by a missile. It also released footage it claimed to be of the launch vehicle being destroyed inside Syria, and photographs of the burnt wreckage of the drone on Israeli soil.
Russia鈥檚 and Iran鈥檚 interests both converge and diverge in Syria, says Gerges. Iran鈥檚 presence has been key to Russia鈥檚 success, but Russia has a different agenda. 鈥淩ussia does not really want Iran to have a dominant position,鈥� he says. 鈥淩ussia suspects that Iran wants to basically divert the crisis into a greater crisis, not only with Israel but with the Gulf countries.鈥�
Russia as mediator
Absent an effective diplomatic process to mediate and enforce mutually agreed parameters of peace, the new back-and-forth on the Iran-Israel front in Syria is defining a de facto level of mutual deterrence, like the one that came to be between Hezbollah and Israel after their devastating 33-day war in 2006.
鈥淭o the extent it is Iran and Israel doing this, that is probing, yes. But it鈥檚 the only way to make the red lines clear, because that is what happened after 2006, too. There wasn鈥檛 any negotiation,鈥� says Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East and North Africa program director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.
Russia is in the best position to play mediator, because of its relatively good relations with all players 鈥撀燗ssad鈥檚 allies, as well as Israel 鈥� and its military presence since 2015 that proved decisive for pro-regime forces, says Mr. Hiltermann. It also likely wants a relatively stable Syria, so it can reduce its military footprint.
鈥淚f that鈥檚 what [Russia] wants, then it can鈥檛 allow a war to be ignited over the southern border, because that would lay Syria to waste, if not a large area of the Middle East,鈥� says Hiltermann. 鈥淭he will [to mediate] might be there 鈥� but I鈥檓 not sure they have the capacity 鈥撀爐hey just haven鈥檛 actually played that role.鈥�
Russian attempts to bring even Syria鈥檚 domestic players together for a peace conference in Sochi failed at the end of January, when, despite strong cajoling from Moscow, the most important Syrian opposition grouping and Kurdish groups boycotted the event.
And Russia has other problems in Syria, where its nationals were reportedly embroiled in fighting last week. Several hundred pro-regime fighters 鈥撀爉any reportedly Russians or nationals of former Soviet Republics like Ukraine 鈥� were targeted by a host of US aircraft as they tried to overrun a base near Al Tabiyeh, east of Deir Ezzor.
US military officials said they communicated with Russia 鈥渂efore, during and after鈥� the strikes. A Kremlin spokesman distanced Russia from the battle, saying it only deals with servicemen, and adding: 鈥淲e don鈥檛 have data about other Russians who could be in Syria.鈥�
US not leaving yet
Still, Bloomberg reported that 鈥渟cores of Russian mercenaries鈥� linked to a private Russian military contractor, Wagner, were being treated this week in Defense Ministry hospitals in Moscow and St. Petersburg, citing two people in contact with them. Russian media reports suggest that 鈥淎ssad may have hired Wagner to recapture and guard Syrian energy assets in return for lucrative oil concessions,鈥� Bloomberg reported.
鈥淎mericans have taken dangerous unilateral steps鈥� in backing the SDF, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said this week, without directly mentioning the episode. 鈥淭hose steps look increasingly as part of efforts to create a quasi-state on a large part of Syrian territory from the eastern bank of the Euphrates [River] all the way to the border with Iraq.鈥�
That Russian reaction coincides with clear signals from Washington in recent months that US advisers don鈥檛 plan to leave Syria, despite the winding down of anti-ISIS operations.
鈥淭he reason Russia is very angry is that Putin had thought he has most of the cards 鈥� that he could really translate his military dominance into political currency,鈥� says Gerges of LSE. 鈥淭he Sochi conference has shown very clearly that Russia could not deliver.鈥�
But if Russia could this week at least help manage de-escalation between Israel and Iran, 鈥渢he Americans were nowhere to be seen,鈥� notes Gerges.
鈥淚t tells you a great deal about the weak hand the US has,鈥� he adds. That鈥檚 why the US decided to stay in north and eastern Syria, 鈥渘ot because of resources, not because they love the Kurds, but because they are very concerned about not allowing Russia and Iran to have the ultimate say, in either the post-ISIS phase or the New Syria.鈥�
