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Turkish tanks rolled into northern Syria Sunday, attacking Syrian Kurdish forces that have been instrumental US allies in the fight against Islamic State militants.

The Turkish offensive is the latest move in a confluence of events that mark a new stage of the seven-year-old Syrian conflict. As the main players strive to establish facts on the ground to maximize their own chances of shaping postwar Syria, Turkey in particular is challenging core components of the Trump administration鈥檚 foreign policy.

The short-term catalyst for the clash was a Pentagon declaration last week that the United States now plans to extend indefinitely a military presence in northeast Syria, and build a largely Kurdish force of 30,000 to help achieve its aims. ISIS has been squeezed from most of its territory in Syria,聽thanks largely to a US-backed Kurdish force, but momentum in the war is favoring President Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies.

The declaration infuriated Turkey鈥檚 President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an, who called the northern Syria Kurdish forces a 鈥渢error army鈥� established by the US. He vowed that the Turkish military would cross into Syria to 鈥渟trangle鈥� the new US-backed force 鈥渂efore it was born.鈥�

The new force is a key piece for the Trump administration as it rolls out an ambitious, three-pronged Syria policy, which aims to prevent the reemergence of ISIS, help orchestrate a postwar Syria without President Assad, and contain Iranian influence.

But analysts note that Russia and Iran have already prevailed in Syria, and the US is acting from a position of relative weakness. And they ask whether the US administration, which has a history of inconsistent messaging on foreign policy, has the capacity and patience to achieve those goals.

The backbone of the new militia would be the umbrella Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed group that is led by the Kurdish People鈥檚 Protection Units (YPG) that also include some Arab forces. The new militia would deploy on Syria鈥檚 northern border with Turkey, its eastern border with Iraq, and along the Euphrates River.

Turkey has long been angry at the overt US support for the YPG over its close affiliation with the Kurdistan Worker鈥檚 Party (PKK), which has waged a lethal insurgency against Ankara.

In an attempt to defuse the clash with Turkey over the force, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledged Sunday that Turkey had 鈥渓egitimate鈥� security concerns. But Turkey's vitriol signals a new low in US-Turkey relations.

At the same time, while Turkish forces advance to create what Ankara calls a 20-mile deep 鈥渟ecurity zone鈥� in northern Syria, analysts wonder if the Trump administration will be able to see its new Syria policy through to fruition.

鈥淭here does seem to be an element of Washington giving up on Turkey and driving forward their position in Syria with an anti-Iran prioritization, but as ever with the Trump administration, the tide seems to turn so quickly, it鈥檚 really hard to know how much this new approach is anchored in anything real or sustainable,鈥� says Julien Barnes-Dacey, a senior policy fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Brussels.

'A very weak position'

For years, Washington and its allies, including Turkey and Persian Gulf states, supported anti-Assad rebels in a proxy war. But today, the Americans 鈥渁re in a very weak position,鈥� and achieving results that press both Damascus and Tehran 鈥渨ould require a much wider and deeper military push than Trump is ever going to be prepared to undertake,鈥� says Mr. Barnes-Dacey.

He also notes an 鈥渋nherent contradiction鈥� in the policy the US shares with the European Union and the UN that Russia 鈥撀爓hose airpower helped ensure Assad's survival 鈥� can pressure Assad into compromises at the negotiating table. That can happen only with a joint Russia-Iran push. Yet the declared US anti-Iran approach will likely 鈥渒ill off any hope鈥� of such an outcome, says Barnes-Dacey.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who tried last week to calm the dispute with Turkey, on Wednesday publicly enunciated the emerging US policy. It was anti-ISIS, anti-Assad, and 鈥� emphasized for the first time on that battlefield 鈥� anti-Iran.

Mr. Tillerson said Iran had 鈥渄ramatically strengthened鈥� its role in Syria, a status that would be 鈥渇urther鈥� enhanced by any US disengagement, enabling Iran to聽鈥渃ontinue attacking US interests, our allies and personnel.鈥澛燭he continued US presence, he said, would be aimed at 鈥渞educing and expelling malicious Iranian influence."

Whether or not Turkey and the US are aligned on ISIS and Assad, however, Turkey鈥檚 reaction is being driven by the prospect of a sustained US presence in Syria, which is 鈥渢antamount to a security guarantee鈥� for the Syria鈥檚 Kurdish militias, says Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council鈥檚 Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East in Washington.

Turkey chose to vilify 鈥渨hatever is left of US-Turkish relations鈥� with its rhetoric and cross-border incursion, while the US was also insensitive by stating it would create a new force in Syria when it already had one in place, says Mr. Stein.

Operation Olive Branch

Turkey on Saturday announced the launch of Operation Olive Branch, with shelling of YPG positions. The ground offensive began on Sunday, and Turkish media on Monday reported that Turkish forces had advanced more than three miles into the Kurdish enclave of Afrin, north of Aleppo. The YPG claimed it had pushed back the offensive.

The aim is to 鈥渓iberate the area by eliminating the PKK-YPG-linked administration,鈥� according to a Turkish official who commented on condition of anonymity. He said the operation would continue east toward the larger city of Manbij. The SDF units with direct US support are farther east, across the Euphrates River.

鈥淚 suppose Washington is trying to keep Afrin entirely separate from the situation east of the Euphrates,鈥� says Frederic Hof, director of the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council. 鈥淭he logic would be that the 鈥� SDF is the anti-ISIS coalition 鈥榩artner force,鈥� and that the partnership in question does not extend to Afrin or any place beyond the anti-ISIS area of operations.鈥�

While the US-Turkish fight over Kurdish control unfolds, the addition of the US anti-Iran strategy stems from a desire by some at the National Security Council to 鈥済et tough and put Iran on notice,鈥� says Stein.

鈥淎nybody who knows how Iran operates 鈥� knows that this will not put Iran on notice,鈥� he says. 鈥淚ran and Russia and the [Syrian] regime have won this war, they will settle this thing on their terms. The US is hanging on for dear life, and trying to alter an outcome that鈥檚 probably unalterable.鈥�

That is not stopping Washington from trying. Iran was high on the list of priorities during testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when David Satterfield, acting assistant secretary for Near East affairs, was asked about the continued role of US forces in Syria.

鈥淲e are deeply concerned with the activities of Iran, with the ability of Iran to enhance those activities through a greater ability to move materiel into Syria,鈥� said Mr. Satterfield.

Balancing policy aims

Analysts say that if Iranian forces and their allies were to move unopposed into eastern Syria it could trigger a backlash by the Sunni population, which resents the Shiite-flavor of Iran鈥檚 military presence.

鈥淭he US problem with Iran is that it uses a [Shiite] sectarian agenda to prop up these rickety states like Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere that generates stronger and stronger variants of ISIS and Al Qaeda,鈥� says Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The new US policy will try to balance these multiple policy aims in a way that Washington has never achieved throughout the Syrian conflict. Instead, immediate focus on tactical gains 鈥� such as using Syrian Kurds as a key component against ISIS, despite the anger of a NATO ally 鈥撀爃as often created new dilemmas.

鈥淪uccessive US administrations have failed to find a means of taking into account Turkey鈥檚 very real, and to some extent understandable, objections to support a group so closely linked to the PKK,鈥� says Noah Bonsey, the senior Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group.

At the same time, 鈥渁 precipitous [US] withdrawal from northeastern Syria could very well pave the way for a new war,鈥� he says, in which the many enemies of the YPG might move against the Kurdish militia.

鈥淭he rhetoric probably does overstate what can be achieved, [but] to some extent by maintaining a US presence you diminish the likelihood of that destabilizing scenario, at least temporarily,鈥� says Mr. Bonsey.