US-Turkey deal on ISIS assault? Why that's a tough sell for Tillerson.
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| Istanbul
On paper, the United States and Turkey are on the same side in the fight against the Islamic State jihadists.
But on the battlefield, as a key offensive nears to force ISIS out of its Syrian capital of Raqqa, the two NATO allies could not be further apart in their choice of the means to do the job 鈥撀燼n issue that will dominate Secretary of State Rex Tillerson鈥檚 meeting with Turkey鈥檚 President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an Thursday in Ankara.
Frustration is mounting on both sides, with the US and Turkey backing competing Syrian proxies as the primary attacking force in the Raqqa offensive.
Tensions between the US and Turkey, however, go far deeper than the disagreement over Syria, analysts say, and are fed by diminishing hopes in Ankara that Donald Trump鈥檚 succession of Barack Obama would bring a fresh perspective that would lead to a fundamental improvement in bilateral relations.
Mr. Erdo臒an and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) expected a more sympathetic hearing from the Trump administration, after years of increasing friction with President Obama over Erdo臒an鈥檚 authoritarian slide, human rights issues, and the US alliance with Kurdish fighters in Syria.
鈥淭he US is pursuing a policy that Turkey hates, no matter who delivers the message,鈥 says Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 really see any overlapping interests. We have drifted very far apart.鈥
Washington鈥檚 choice to lead the Raqqa offensive is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group led by the Kurdish People鈥檚 Protection Units (YPG) militia.
But Turkey insists that its own non-Kurdish Syrian proxy force tackle Raqqa, and accuses both the US and Russia of backing a 鈥渢errorist鈥 group that is determined to create a Kurdish mini-state, allied with Turkey鈥檚 own ethnic Kurdish separatists.
Turkey is demanding the US cut ties with the SDF-YPG and is threatening not to take part in the Raqqa offensive, which is expected to start soon after Turkey votes in an April 16 referendum on the expansion of Erdo臒an鈥檚 presidential powers.
鈥淚t鈥檚 going to be Raqqa, Raqqa, and Raqqa,鈥 Dr. Stein, author of "Turkey鈥檚 New Foreign Policy," says of Mr. Tillerson鈥檚 meeting with Erdo臒an. Expectations on the US side are that it will not go well, he says.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think there is any real room for maneuver until after Raqqa falls, and the pace of the battle slows down,鈥 says Stein. 鈥淭hen maybe you can put it back together again, on the broader geo-strategic level and say, 鈥極K, the tactical relationship [with Syrian Kurds] is over, let鈥檚 work together to combat broader threats.鈥 鈥
Syria may be the biggest bone of contention, but it is only part of a list of Turkish grievances that has caused the escalation of US-Turkey tensions in recent years. They include the arrest Monday at JFK airport of a top executive of one of Turkey鈥檚 biggest state-owned banks, accused of facilitating the evasion of US sanctions against Iran.
Turkey is angry, too, that Washington has not deported the Pennsylvania-based cleric Fethullah G眉len, whom Turkey accuses of orchestrating a failed coup attempt last July.
Expectation of common ground
Some in Turkey had speculated that President Trump鈥檚 tough and uncompromising talk, his stated commitment to battling ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and his pro-business outlook would prove a close match for Erdo臒an that might yield more common ground.
So far, that has not happened. US efforts to improve ties include half a dozen high-level meetings with Turkish officials so far, including visits by CIA director Mike Pompeo and the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joseph Dunford.
The top American general was quietly taken in mid-February to the base where Turkey is training its own Syrian Arab forces, in a bid by Turkey to convince the US to employ them in the Raqqa battle, instead of the Kurdish fighters, says the Ankara-based analyst Metehan Demir.
鈥淗e was to some extent convinced, and he was expected to give an answer to the Turkish side,鈥 says Mr. Demir. 鈥淭he [US] answer was to help SDF. Therefore there was huge disappointment on the Turkish side.
鈥淥ne way or another, the US eventually will include Turkey in this game, because without Turkey it鈥檚 not that easy to carry out this operation, either with the SDF or any other force,鈥 says Demir. 鈥淭he problem is 鈥 Turkey says it is impossible for its involvement, as long as Kurdish forces will be included.鈥
Sensitive to Turkey鈥檚 domestic politics, the US appears to be holding off starting the Raqqa offensive until after the mid-April referendum. As a sweetener, Tillerson may offer assistance to help rebuild parts of northern Syria occupied by Turkey鈥檚 cross-border Operation Euphrates Shield.
A State Department official this week said Washington was 鈥渧ery mindful of Turkey鈥檚 concerns,鈥 and that Tillerson would discuss 鈥渋nterim deescalation zones based on cease-fires or other means,鈥 as well as Turkey鈥檚 joint peace efforts with Russia and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan.
Visit is political, not military
Yet there is little sign the Pentagon will turn its back on the Kurdish militia, which has proven the most effective anti-ISIS force fighting in Syria.
On Monday, Erdo臒an again scolded the US. 鈥淲e don鈥檛 consider your business with a terrorist organization appropriate taking into account our strategic partnership and alliance in NATO,鈥 he said.
鈥淚 think the military front of the Turkish-American relationship is blocked, and does not seem like it will be unblocked,鈥 retired Turkish Brig. Gen. Haldun Solmazt眉rk told Voice of America Turkish.
Tillerson鈥檚 visit 鈥渋s to keep political relations under control, not to make progress on the military front,鈥 said General Solmazt眉rk. 鈥淚t鈥檚 obvious that Turkish national interests and American national interests are clashing when it comes to Syria and the Middle East in general.鈥 I am seriously worried about the future of Turkish-American relations.鈥
Turkey could respond by limiting US or NATO access to its eastern airbase at Incirlik, which has been instrumental in conducting US-led, anti-ISIS air operations.
But analysts say that, even though Turkey has warmed to Russia in recent months 鈥 Turkey鈥檚 foreign minister is visiting Moscow Wednesday 鈥 there is a limit to those ties. Turkey has been surprised to see Russian forces with Kurdish flags in northern Syria, reportedly side-by-side with the Americans in supporting the SDF-YPG. There appears little danger of the US-Turkey feud causing Ankara to turn away from the Western alliance.
In the Raqqa offensive 鈥渨e see the dark intentions of the militant Kurds鈥 to capture an Arab city and create a 鈥淜urdish federation,鈥 says 陌lnur 脟evik, an aide to Erdo臒an writing in the pro-government Daily Sabah newspaper.
鈥淭he Americans are thus playing into the hands of the Kurdish militants willingly or unwillingly as they continue to embolden [their] dreams of a mini-state in Syria鈥 that would stretch from Iraq to the Mediterranean, wrote Mr. 脟evik.
Did Turkey misread US stance?
The US commander in charge of the anti-ISIS coalition notes that Kurds make up less than 10 percent of the population of northern Syria, and can鈥檛 impose their own rule by force.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 expect any Kurdish units to remain in Raqqa,鈥 said Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, in a conference call with reporters from Baghdad Tuesday. The SDF are expanding their Arab elements in preparation for the Raqqa offensive.
鈥淲hat we have seen as Syrian Democratic Forces have liberated a good 20 percent or more of northern Syria, is they have recruited fighters from the local area. They have led the assault to liberate their own towns and villages,鈥 said Townsend. 鈥淥nce those have been liberated, they believe the local fighters, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen alike 鈥 they leave them to govern it and they move on.鈥
Turkey鈥檚 leaders 鈥減rofoundly misread the new [Trump] administration, and the forces they were inheriting, who have a battle plan that鈥檚 been on the books for over a year now,鈥 says analyst Stein.
鈥淭he Syria stuff just seems set in stone. The Turks are pushing against forces that are bigger than them within the US government. They must be furious,鈥 he says.
鈥淔rom the proponents of the YPG strategy, the line is very much, 鈥榃e gave this [Turkey-backed units] a shot many, many times. You didn鈥檛 produce forces, and so we just had to keep going.鈥 The frustration is felt on both sides.鈥