Why ISIS gains in Iraq are reshaping Syrian regime's war strategy
| Beirut, Lebanon
With听Islamic militants听at the vanguard of what appears to be a general Sunni uprising against Baghdad鈥檚 Shiite-dominated government, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are beginning to merge under the strains of sectarian and ethnic competition.
The shockwaves听are already听reverberating in Syria鈥檚 civil war and changing the calculus of both the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian armed opposition. One element of that opposition is听the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIL or ISIS.听Last week it seized Mosul and it has advanced on Baghdad, raising alarm bells in Washington 鈥� and in Damascus, which had previously shown tacit tolerance for a group that controls a swath of northeast Syria.听
Over the weekend, the Syrian Air Force staged its first major attacks on ISIS strongholds in the provinces of Raqqa and Hasakeh. These strongholds were the launching pad for the group's recent gains in Iraq. The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that Syrian jets had targeted ISIS headquarters in Raqqa and the group's religious courts. There was no word on casualties.听
鈥淚SIL was useful to the [Assad] regime and [Assad鈥檚 ally] Iran for the pressure it put on the Syrian opposition,鈥� says Frederic Hof, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council鈥檚 Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. 鈥淏ut given what's happened in Iraq, ISIL's shelf life in Syria has expired.鈥�
Although sworn enemies on paper, ISIS has largely refrained from fighting the Syrian regime to听focus on听building an Islamic state in northern Syria and听ousting听more moderate rebel rivals. In return, the regime has left ISIS alone, allowing the Syrian military to concentrate on fighting the moderate rebel groups.听At the same time,听Assad听also points to the brutal exploits听of ISIS and other jihadist groups in the conflict听to justify its argument to the international community that it is fighting Islamic 鈥渢errorists.鈥�
The Iraq upheaval appears to have changed that calculation.听It has also injected uncertainty into Assad's reliance on Iraqi Shiite fighters to seize the upper hand in Syria's war.
In recent weeks, 鈥渢housands鈥� of Iraqi Shiite fighters who were in听Syria to defend the Assad regime听have left, according to a diplomatic report from a European embassy in Beirut. Some of the Iraqi Shiites听withdrew听from the town of Rankous in the mountainous Qalamoun region north of Damascus.听Two months ago, the town听fell to the Assad regime.听Last week,听Syrian rebels took advantage of the weakened regime presence in Rankous to mount a counter-attack in which at least 11 Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah fighters were killed.
鈥淭he rebels launched a surprise attack on the edge of Rankous. The fighting is ongoing,鈥� says a veteran Hezbollah combatant who has served multiple tours in Syria.
Challenge of holding territory
Despite a succession of battlefield successes in western Syria over the past year, the Assad regime barely has听sufficient forces to hold its newly seized territory. With the Syrian Army weakened by desertions and exhaustion, the regime relies heavily on its allies, chiefly Hezbollah as well as Iraqi paramilitaries and the National Defense Force (NDF), a militia composed mainly of Alawites, the splinter Shiite sect to which Mr. Assad belongs.听
It is estimated that there are around 5,000 Hezbollah fighters in Syria at any one time and they have spearheaded key offensives in the past year, backed by Syrian air power and artillery.听Before the ISIS offensive in northern Iraq, there were an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Iraqi Shiite fighters serving in Syria, most of them ill-trained recruits on six-month contracts offered by Iran with a promise of a job upon return. The Iraqi Shiites mainly defend religious sites and man checkpoints. The strength of the Iran-trained NDF is thought to have reached 80,000.
Even before ISIS seized Mosul,听some Iraqi Shiites were pulled out of Syria in response to rising tensions in Iraq听where Sunni militants had a growing presence in Anbar Province.听But the advance toward Baghdad and a vow by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the group鈥檚 spokesman, to take the war to the 鈥渇ilth-ridden city鈥� of Karbala and Najaf, 鈥渢he city of polytheism,鈥� both containing paramount Shiite shrines,听has upped the ante.听For听Iraqi Shiites in Syria,听protecting these holy sites is听a more pressing priority than defending Assad鈥檚 regime.
A drawdown of Iraqi Shiites could make Syria's regime even more dependent on Hezbollah fighters, further straining听the Lebanese group鈥檚 support base. Lebanese Shiites generally have supported Hezbollah鈥檚 intervention in Syria, especially when Shiite areas of Lebanon听suffered听suicide听bombings last year听by extremist Sunni groups.
But the last car bombing occurred at the end of March, and since then Lebanon has enjoyed a period of relative calm. Now, there is a sense of unhappiness building among the families of Hezbollah fighters.听They are increasingly asking听how much longer their fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons will be sent to fight and die on the Syrian front.
Regional recalculations
More broadly, the Iraq crisis could change the regional and international calculus toward Syria. The sight of ISIS militants equipped with American vehicles and weaponry looted from Iraqi Army bases may further dampen the White House's willingness to supply arms to moderate Syrian rebels in case they fall into the wrong hands. 听
听Iran also is having to recalibrate its position in light of the Iraq crisis. Tehran has committed a significant financial and military investment in propping up the Assad regime over the past three years. It also is showing a willingness to come to the rescue of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government and reportedly has dispatched elite troops to Baghdad.
鈥淚ran鈥檚 primary interest has been to maintain the axis of Iran, Maliki鈥檚 Iraq, Assad鈥檚 Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon,鈥� says the European diplomatic report. 鈥淚ran is therefore now entering its very own two-front situation [Syria and Iraq] and may face a lengthy problematic situation that could affect the quantity and quality of the financial and military support to Assad鈥檚 Syria.鈥�
