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The impact crater faded back into the sands long ago, but locals can still point out with ease the site of the May 12, 2012, US airstrike near al-Husoon village. The Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) later acknowledged that six of its fighters were killed when a drone fired two missiles at two vehicles carrying the militants.

It was a clean strike: It didn't kill any civilians, nor did it damage any property. But because of its location 鈥� a few hundred feet from farms and homes, a 10-minute drive from the center of the provincial capital 鈥� it continues to fuel trepidation among locals.

It鈥檚 been months since an American airstrike has occurred in Mareb Province, but past strikes still cast a heavy shadow here. Many say that they associate the United States almost solely with one thing: intermittent, unannounced drone strikes. Despite the fact that Yemen鈥檚 government openly allows the drone campaign, opposition runs deep in Mareb. Locals say the strikes have inflamed preexisting resentment of the central government, stoked fear among civilians and fueled anti-American sentiment. They also argue that the strikes have ultimately hampered the fight against Al Qaeda.

The Obama administration insists targeted strikes against suspected Al Qaeda-affiliated militants are crucial. To many Marebis, however, they are violations of Yemen鈥檚 sovereignty that inflame popular anger and sow further instability without making progress battling Al Qaeda.听

Strikes in the province date back to the earliest days听of aggressive American counterterrorism operations in Yemen: The first drone operation in the Arabian Peninsula struck this province in November 2002. The attack killed six suspected fighters, including leading Al Qaeda militant Qa鈥檌d Salem Sinan al-Harethi and US citizen Kamal Derwish.

But it is the second confirmed strike here, which came nearly eight years later, that still grips the public.听That strike, on May 24, 2010, accidentally struck a vehicle carrying Jabir al-Shabwani, killing the then-deputy governor of Mareb and three other passengers.

The cause of the error that led to Mr. Shabwani's death remains unclear.听According to a 2011 report by The Wall Street Journal, 鈥� relations had recently soured between Sanaa and Shabwani,听a widely respected scion of a prominent tribal family.听

Locals insist the botched strike fundamentally changed the mood in the region, one of Yemen's most tumultuous.听

鈥淸Shabwani鈥檚 death] marked the point where the situation really started to deteriorate,鈥� says Nasser Muhtam, the head of a Mareb-based NGO, reflecting on the province鈥檚 increased instability in recent years. 鈥淭his was someone liked and respected by all of Mareb; someone who resolved problems and helped maintain order. After the strike, everything was affected鈥�and it still hasn鈥檛 really improved.鈥�

The next strike here occured almost two years later, amid a dramatic uptick that鈥檚 seen the United States carry out more than 60 airstrikes in Yemen in the past two years.

Civilian casualties elsewhere in the country听have stirred public outrage, but mistakes of the magnitude of the killing of Shabwani have largely been avoided in Mareb, and even locals听say most of those killed there had ties to Al Qaeda.

However,听the听relative accuracy of strikes听do little to temper fear. Anxiety about when the next strike will come and听where听it will hit is pervasive, fueling paranoia. The psychological effects linger long after the dust settles, locals say.

鈥淭he fear doesn鈥檛 go away,鈥� says Abdullah al-Haddad, a farmer鈥檚 son, his voice shaking as he recounted a strike that occurred near his village last fall. 鈥淚鈥檓 a simple person 鈥� I can鈥檛 do anything and don鈥檛 know what鈥檚 coming.鈥�

Lingering fears of ending up in the path of an incoming strike may be unfounded, but many here believe that the greatest threat to their safety comes from efforts to combat local militants, rather than the fighters themselves.

鈥淭he end result of the drones, in my opinion, is clear,鈥� says Zein al-Abedin Aishan, a student at Sanaa University鈥檚 satellite campus in the city of Mareb. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e the biggest thing driving people towards Al Qaeda.鈥�

And most here dismiss US claims that the flurry of strikes have inflicted lasting damage to Al Qaeda.

Marebis largely cast the province鈥檚 Al Qaeda presence as a symptom of larger issues,听such as chronic听underdevelopment and unemployment that听need to receive the same level of attention听as combating militancy.

鈥淭he defeat of Al Qaeda [in Mareb] will only come through education, through comprehensive human and economic development,鈥� says Hussein Saleh, a youth activist based in the provincial capital. 鈥淲orking with locals 鈥� especially tribal leaders 鈥� is key.鈥�

With the central government鈥檚 hand largely negligible outside of the province capital, analysts say, the position of local leaders is crucial.

Fallout from the airstrikes, locals warn, threatens to doom any attempts at collaboration 鈥� the feeling of powerlessness they fuel has bred an atmosphere of distrust that鈥檚 left many here leery of even international humanitarian organizations.

鈥淭he US, the Yemeni central government and the Saudis may all have a role to play but none can win this war on their own,鈥� says Gregory Johnsen, author of "The Last Refuge," a new book on Yemen and Al Qaeda. 鈥淥nly the tribesmen and clerics on the ground in Mareb are in a position to decisively and definitively defeat Al Qaeda.鈥澨�