Why some Europeans hesitate at Biden鈥檚 fight against authoritarians
| Berlin
In the fight against the world鈥檚 authoritarians, U.S. President Joe Biden wants help from democratic allies. But not all those allies are fully on board with his vision.
A recent poll asked voters in 20 democracies to choose between forming alliances to stand up to countries like China and Russia and taking a softer line that protects mutual economic interests. The YouGov/Global Progress poll of more than 22,000 people then divided countries into three groups: pro-democracy hardliners, pro-engagement 鈥渟oft-liners鈥�, and a middle group dubbed 鈥渉andwringers.鈥� These handwringers include Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands, and their populations show clear fissures over how much weight to put on exporting democratic values.聽 聽
Respondents in France, Italy, and Spain expressed fewer doubts: Economic cooperation trumps democratic alliances, putting them in the 鈥渟oft-liner鈥� camp. By contrast, Sweden and the U.K. sided with the pro-democracy camp, along with the U.S. and Canada.
Why We Wrote This
Some Europeans look askance at forming clubs of democracies to confront dictators. Their views reveal nuance to the U.S.-favored framing of democracies versus authoritarians.
And while these views don鈥檛 necessarily preclude NATO allies standing firm against Russia in the current standoff in Ukraine, for example, it does point to ambivalence in Europe over President Biden鈥檚 democracies-versus-authoritarians framing. 聽聽聽
Behind this hesitancy is the narrative that the U.S. lost much of its shine as the world鈥檚 democratic beacon amid President Donald Trump鈥檚 tenure, capped by the Capitol riot debacle as his term came to an end. There are also unique historical ties between individual countries and Russia, and support for strong economic ties with China. More than that, Europe with its welter of languages, cultures and styles of governance doesn鈥檛 fall so neatly into 鈥渂lack and white thinking,鈥� says Ren茅 Cuperus, a political columnist and senior fellow at the Clingendael International Institute, a think tank in The Hague.
鈥淭he Europeans don鈥檛 like to think in terms of friend or foe, and what [Biden鈥檚] summit of democracies is doing is more or less preparing a new Cold War between the democracies and authoritarianism,鈥� says Dr. Cuperus, referring to a virtual summit held last month. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think that Europe wants to enter that frame.聽They are part of a multilateral family.鈥�
A call for self-reflection
For four years, Europe endured a U.S. president who flattered dictators and disdained democratic allies, including in Europe. That the same president, or an acolyte, could return to power has led some to question the stability of American democracy itself.
鈥淚 think in Europe, we would like to see the Americans go into聽self-introspection and聽self-reflection聽about their own democracy rather than exporting it. America is a very vulnerable, polarized democracy at the moment,鈥� says Dr. Cuperus.
Deep, complex relationships with authoritarian countries like China and Russia also color the picture. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz hails from a center-left party with a historic affiliation with Russia, a country that was invaded by Germany and its fascist allies during World War II. 鈥淭here鈥檚 a lot of guilt,鈥� says Dr. Cuperus. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not so easy for Americans to understand the legacy of the Second World War engine in Europe.鈥�
Then there鈥檚 the economic weight of undemocratic powers like China. Take the Netherlands: It鈥檚 a longstanding trading nation that hosts ASML, a world-class computer chip toolmaker that underpins global high-tech supply chains.
鈥淪hould they be allowed to export their very聽high-class聽chips to China, or is that giving Western world a problem?鈥� asks Dr. Cuperus. 鈥淏ut America is not compensating for that loss dealing with China. There should be a compensation mechanism within the western transatlantic trade arena.鈥�
Trade with China has also driven policy in Germany, which under former Chancellor Angela Merkel backed a controversial European Union-China trade agreement that stalled last year. Germany also relies on Russian gas, particularly with the phaseout of nuclear power.
Operating from a different baseline
Overall, European countries perhaps operate from a different baseline than the U.S. on the purpose of foreign policy. Human rights violations don鈥檛 necessarily compel EU countries to act to change those governments鈥� behavior, says , director of Europe in the World Program at The Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations.
鈥淔urthermore, they don鈥檛 necessarily see the fact that China is authoritarian as the defining aspect of China,鈥� adds Dr. Biscop. 鈥淧robably a democratic China would not abandon its claims to Taiwan, probably not even to the South China Sea, and it would still be a mighty economic competitor. What鈥檚 defining here 鈥� that China is authoritarian, or is it that it鈥檚 a great power?鈥�
And while Russia borders Europe and poses a direct military threat, as seen in Ukraine, friction with China relates mostly to economic competition and the rules of trade, he notes.
Ultimately, there鈥檚 a pragmatism to Europe鈥檚 approach to global issues, and a realization that China and Russia need to be at the table, Dr. Biscop says. 鈥淧eople do care very much, for example, about climate change but it鈥檚 not so directly related to form of government,鈥� he says.
For Hungary, another 鈥渉andwringer鈥� in the YouGov poll, the notion of standing up for democratic values is at odds with its own form of government under President Viktor Orb谩n; most analysts consider it a nondemocratic state. 鈥淰iktor Orb谩n聽has very openly challenged EU liberal norms, so it鈥檚 really a core part of his ideological identity,鈥� says Richard Youngs, a democracy expert and senior fellow at Carnegie Europe.
Some European democracies are relieved that an America that vacated the field of democracy promotion and human rights policy under Mr. Trump has come back into the conversation.
鈥淏ut I still think there鈥檚 a degree of skepticism over what a U.S.-led democracy and human rights push might achieve,鈥� says Dr. Youngs. 鈥淭he key question is, what happens now. It鈥檚 not simply about rebuilding the old transatlantic relationship. Can this move toward being an initiative that鈥檚 genuinely global?鈥�
