海角大神

The West鈥檚 response to Russia鈥檚 alleged military aid to Ukraine鈥檚 rebels has been based on the idea that the biggest influence in Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 inner circle are the so-called oligarchs. Hurt the business elite that stand beside Mr. Putin, goes the theory, and you pressure the Russian president himself.

And the oligarchs are reportedly hurting, as Western sanctions 鈥� given extra bite by plummeting oil prices 鈥� have eaten away at their fortunes. Financial analysts put the damage in the billions of dollars, with no respite in the offing.

So why have the Ukrainian rebels been pushing their offensive and talking of building a 100,000-strong reserve army to bring the fight to Kiev?

The reason, according to some accounts, is that it is not the oligarchs who hold Putin鈥檚 ear now. Rather, it is Russia鈥檚 military-security establishment, collectively known as the siloviki, who are shaping the Kremlin鈥檚 foreign policy.

鈥淭he role of what we call the defense-industrial complex is rising rapidly in Russian society,鈥� says Alexander Golts, an independent military expert. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not just the armed forces, but also the [80,000-strong] interior troops, the Federal Security Service [FSB], police, and other security organizations. The key narrative of the siloviki, that Russia is surrounded by enemies and must defend itself from external aggression and internal subversion, has become the main theme on nightly TV broadcasts.鈥�

And that changing of the guard must shape how Western decisionmakers respond as Ukraine teeters on the edge of war, the Middle East seethes amid fighting in Syria and Iraq, and Europe frets over how much to sanction the Kremlin.

The inner circle

For most Russia-watchers, understanding what Putin is thinking 鈥� and who is shaping it 鈥� is a matter of rumor, guesswork, and the arcane art of reading Kremlin tea leaves.

Alexander Dugin, a prominent right-wing scholar and founder of the anti-Western 鈥淓urasian鈥� school of political philosophy, would seem an appropriate person to ask to explain Moscow鈥檚 worldview. He has often been named by Western Russia-watchers as the main intellectual influence behind Putin鈥檚 worldview. After Russia annexed Crimea last year, amid a tidal wave of patriotism, Foreign Affairs magazine went so far as to label Mr. Dugin 鈥淧utin鈥檚 Brain.鈥� If anyone knows how the inner-Kremlin circuits are wired, he should.

But Dugin says he never enjoyed special access, and whatever input he had was shut down last summer when he and other 鈥減atriots鈥� were fired from their jobs and pushed aside. 鈥淎nything anyone tells you about how Putin decides things is either disinformation, or error,鈥� Dugin says.

Yet knowledge of who gets Putin鈥檚 attention these days has serious implications for Western policy as relations with Moscow spiral to depths not plumbed for a generation. Consider the stir created recently by former Putin adviser Sergei Markov, who told journalists that the composition of Putin鈥檚 inner circle has shifted radically over the past year, with wealthy pro-Kremlin oligarchs 鈥� whose financial well-being depends on good relations with the West 鈥� being shunted aside and replaced by siloviki.

If true, that could mean that Western sanctions policy, which sought to pressure Putin into changing course in Ukraine by squeezing his rich cronies, may have actually accelerated the militarization of Russian society and stiffened the Kremlin鈥檚 resistance to making any compromises over Ukraine.
鈥淎t the moment, the sanctions regime helps those who stand for a strong state sector,鈥� says Igor Yurgens, a longtime advocate for private business. 鈥淲hen you do not have a flow of capital from outside, it hands the advantage to state corporations and those who stand for a strong state. It鈥檚 that simple.鈥�

Day of the siloviki

Experts have been pointing out for some time that the influence and share of national wealth enjoyed by Russia鈥檚 Army and security forces have been expanding for much of the Putin era, and may be spiking as Russia slides into an increasingly ugly confrontation with the West over Ukraine.

Russia鈥檚 post-cold-war rearmament program began nearly a decade ago, but went into high gear after Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012 for an unprecedented third term as president. This year Russia鈥檚 military budget is $80 billion, a 30 percent increase over last year. By order of Putin, military spending is exempted from the across-the-board 10 percent cut in government spending mandated amid the current economic crisis.

Now, leading Russian hawks, including members of Putin鈥檚 inner circle, regularly express views in the mainstream media that might have been considered marginal just a few years ago. For example Nikolai Patrushev, former chief of the FSB and current secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, recently gave an extended interview to the state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in which he claimed that the West had 鈥渄usted off鈥� its old blueprint for destroying the USSR and was actively applying it against Putin鈥檚 Russia.

The group鈥檚 ranks include current FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov, a career KGB officer, and the head of the powerful Interior Ministry, Vladimir Kolokoltsev. Perhaps the best-known silovik is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who, aside from Putin himself, is one of Russia鈥檚 few genuinely popular public officials. Mr. Shoigu is well regarded largely for his competent management of the Ministry of Emergency Situations 鈥� Russia鈥檚 version of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 鈥� which he headed from the early 1990s until 2012.

And the rise of the siloviki isn鈥檛 just about a handful of generals and intelligence apparatchiks, says Mr. Golts.鈥漌ith their families, they number about 10 million people, strategically placed,鈥� he says. 鈥淭aking care of them is probably more important than the stated goals of rearmament and modernizing the military, which are probably largely unattainable anyway. This definitely plays a role in skewing Russian politics鈥� toward more militaristic and nationalist viewpoints.

Political survival at stake

鈥淧utin these days surrounds himself with the commanders of state structures, and they bring this mentality of a beleaguered nation that must defend itself at any cost,鈥� says Alexander Konovalov, president of the independent Institute for Strategic Assessments in Moscow. 鈥淭his is not so much about the money as it is about politics.鈥�

Though Putin鈥檚 approval rating still exceeds 80 percent among the Russian public, the Kremlin knows that won鈥檛 last forever, says Alexei Mukhin, director of the independent Center for Political Information in Moscow. 鈥淥ur government is worried. Putin knows that internal troubles can blow up in Russia very quickly,鈥� Mr. Mukhin says. 鈥淎 lot of attention is being given to police reform, strengthening security systems, with the goal of nipping revolution in the bud.鈥�

Most analysts say Putin probably believes that the West is out to overthrow him, perhaps with a 鈥渃olored revolution鈥� like the one that unseated Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych a year ago, and that he is ramping up internal security forces and granting them broader powers to track down and squelch subversion.

But even so, the siloviki are not a monolith, says political scientist Yevgeny Minchenko. 鈥淵ou should remember that the siloviki are not united; there is no siloviki union that represents them. In practice, they compete with each other for influence with the Kremlin, and this gives Putin a lot of scope to play them off against each other.鈥�

Others argue that focusing primarily on the role of the siloviki in shaping Kremlin policy ignores the still-important role of the oligarchs, who will now be tasked with rebuilding Russia鈥檚 economy to sidestep sanctions and tap new sources of investment and growth. 鈥淧utin is known to be a good manager,鈥� says Nikolai Petrov, a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. 鈥淗e will move to restore the balance between the different groups that are close to him. He needs them to help formulate new policies to minimize the economic losses and neutralize the political trends that could threaten his power.

鈥淗e鈥檚 a rational player, and he鈥檚 very interested in his own political survival.鈥�

[Editor's note: This article includes material published last month by 海角大神.]