Who are Europe's jihadis? Check your assumptions.
Concerns over foreign fighters returning home has come violently back to the spotlight in the wake of聽the terrorist attack in France and the vow to fight 鈥渁gainst聽terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islamism,鈥� as French Prime Minister Manuel Valls put it.聽
Said Kouachi聽and Cherif聽Kouachi, the two brothers聽who killed 12 people at the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo Wednesday, had established ties with terrorist networks. The perpetrator behind the siege at a kosher grocery store Friday night, one of聽two deadly hostage incidents that day,聽said that he was acting for the self-described Islamic State.
All three perpetrators are dead. But their actions have revived questions about 鈥淓uropean jihadis鈥澛犫�� as well as misconceptions of who these men and women are and what threat they really represent to Europe.
Misunderstanding no. 1: This is a European problem.
In fact, it is actually a global problem. The 鈥淓uropean jihadi鈥� phenomenon came into focus with the conflict in Syria because researchers started to see a significant flow of French, British, and German fighters into the country to take up arms. They far outnumber American ones.
But it is not new, as the Kouachi brothers, who received training in Yemen, prove. And most jihadis are not in fact聽European. The聽International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King鈥檚 College London聽estimates that the 11,000 foreign fighters who have gone to Syria in the past three years hail from 74 nations.
The vast majority of those 鈥� about three-quarters 鈥� come from neighboring Middle East countries, who also suffer far more terrorism attacks than Western nations. Of course, with an estimated 2,800 fighting in Syria, European fighters still comprise a significant minority of those participating overall.
But Islamic State has intentionally played up the strength of the European contingent 鈥� for example by using 鈥淛ihadi John,鈥� the masked man in a British accent used to kill Western hostages 鈥� to present their goals as global ones.
Misunderstanding no. 2: Shady mosques are where radicalization is happening.
Actually, if there is any single breeding ground for extremism, it鈥檚 the Internet.
Mosques do serve as a recruiting ground in some places in Europe and have been duly monitored by intelligence authorities. But research by Dounia Bouzar, director of the Centre for Prevention Against Islamic Sectarianism, indicates that 91 percent of recruitment happens online.
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and scores of other networks lure in foreigners whose motivations range from a sense of injustice to one of adventure. Ms. Bouzar has worked with French families who fear their children are becoming radicalized, and says some 80 percent of them come from atheist households. The remaining 20 percent come from Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, and Buddhist backgrounds.
Another common place for both conversion and radicalization is in jail. Amedy Coulibaly, who took hostages in the Parisian kosher supermarket Friday before getting killed by police, is believed to have first gotten radicalized behind bars.
Misunderstanding no. 3: This is an integration problem.
It's not just the disenfranchised who are turning to jihad. It's also the middle class.
A dominant narrative is that an underclass of Muslim immigrants who have failed to integrate in European society are driving European jihadism. Some do fall into this category, and the economic struggles that many have can deepen the risk of radicalization.
However, many of those fighting abroad are not poor or vulnerable at all. In Bouzar鈥檚 study in France, for example, 84 percent of families of radicalized youths come from the middle class. Only 10 percent had grandparents that weren鈥檛 French.
That hasn鈥檛 stopped far-right parties from condemning mass migration as the problem. When an Islamic State video showed a Frenchman who was not an immigrant beheading victims in Syria in November, France鈥檚 National Front party leader Marine Le Pen was dismissive, saying that the number of French fighters with no immigrant background was 鈥渁necdotal.鈥澛�
鈥淥bviously, mass immigration has been a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism in our country,鈥� she insisted.
Misunderstanding no. 4: This is a male problem.
Actually, these jihadi organizations couldn鈥檛 function without the support of women.
That has been made clear this week as the search for Coulibaly鈥檚 partner and alleged accomplice,聽Hayat Boumeddiene, continues. She is believed to have fled to Turkey and now is reported to be in Syria.
Women are playing an increasingly important role in the demography of foreign fighters. If the first wave of fighters was dominated by males, women are now part of a second wave. They are lured by men who see marriage and procreation as a means to perpetuate the Islamic State.
According to recent figures compiled by the Guardian, women comprise about 10 percent of 鈥淲estern jihadis,鈥� and up to 25 percent in France. Some women get manipulated into going, but others are drawn by the same adventurism and idealism that draw men.
Some are barely teenagers. A Dutch mother made international headlines in the fall after a story circulated that she traveled to Syria to bring home her teenage daughter, who allegedly departed to the heart of civil strife to marry a Dutch jihadi.
