A decade after lifting one-child policy, China struggles to boost population
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Ann Scott Tyson Staff writer
| Beijing
Liu Jinsong sits behind the counter at the maternity shop he opened 20 years ago in central Beijing, under racks of expandable jeans and leggings, waiting for customers. Mostly, he just waits.
鈥淥ur business has been decreasing so much,鈥� he sighs, crossing his knees. 鈥淏efore we did wholesale and sold a lot. Now business is really slow.鈥�
China鈥檚 birth rate hit a record low in 2025, despite a raft of government measures in recent years aimed at encouraging couples to have more children.
Why We Wrote This
Despite Beijing鈥檚 campaign to encourage couples to have more children, new data shows China鈥檚 population decline is accelerating. Some experts believe the problem lies in the government鈥檚 narrow, materialistic approach to family planning.
The number of births per 1,000 people plunged to 5.6, the fewest recorded since the founding of the People鈥檚 Republic of China in 1949, released last week show. About 7.9 million babies were born in China last year, significantly fewer than the 9.5 million born in 2024.
The sharp reduction suggests China鈥檚 pronatalist agenda is proving ineffective, demographers say, and the country is following the pattern of the rest of East Asia 鈥� the region with the world鈥檚 lowest fertility rates.
鈥淭he decline in scale and speed was even faster鈥� than predicted, says Yong Cai, associate professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who focuses on China鈥檚 birth policies.
China is likely undergoing 鈥渁 large shift鈥� that will see 鈥渁 sizable number of women 鈥� stay single and child-free for their lifetime,鈥� Dr. Cai says.
World Bank, National Bureau of Statistics of China
Delaying families
The reasons underlying the shift are complex, but include women鈥檚 empowerment, economic pressures, and gender gaps in the population exacerbated by China鈥檚 infamous, decades-long one-child policy.
As women make gains in education, social status, and independence, they are delaying or forgoing marriage. It is harder for them to find suitable partners, especially as most Chinese women seek to 鈥渕arry up,鈥� says Dr. Cai. The country has a large cohort of less affluent men, who face difficulty finding wives, he adds. Indeed, marriage in China is also an expensive proposition, with men expected to own a home and offer gifts to parents of the bride-to-be, and China鈥檚 slowing economic growth and high youth unemployment has made these conditions more difficult. And marriage is virtually a prerequisite for having children in China, as in other East Asian countries, given a long-standing taboo on out-of-wedlock childbirth.
The trend of delayed marriage and childbirth has reduced China鈥檚 total fertility rate (TFR) 鈥� or the average number of children a woman is expected to have in her childbearing years 鈥� to an estimated 0.98, slightly less than the 1.0 TFR reported for 2023.
As the population shrinks and ages, China鈥檚 government is making an all-out push to boost births. Policies include tax breaks, lump-sum payments or monthly allowances distributed by local governments to parents, as well as a national program offering 3,600 yuan (about $516) in annual child care funds for each child under the age of three, introduced in 2025. The government also removed an exemption to allow tax on the sale of condoms and other contraceptives.
But the top-down, sometimes heavy-handed approach that emphasizes monetary incentives is having little impact 鈥� and could even be backfiring, experts say, as it reminds the public of the intrusive one-child policy.
The right messaging
鈥淭he message right now is all about the cost-benefit calculation,鈥� says Dr. Cai. 鈥淢y criticism is 鈥� people are not going to have kids for the sake of a few extra hundred dollars. 鈥� The thinking is too materialistic.鈥�
Indeed, so far there are few indications such incentives are working. In the 10 years since China lifted its one-child policy in 2016, its number of annual new births has fallen 40% and the number of new marriages has plunged 50%, according to a report by Gavekal Dragonomics, a research firm focused on China鈥檚 economy.
As a result, China鈥檚 TFR now matches the average for East Asia, or about 1.0. Within the region, South Korea has the lowest TFR at 0.72, as of 2023, and Japan鈥檚 is marginally higher than that of China, at 1.2.
鈥淭hese numbers are considered ultra-low fertility that have profound implications for population age structure,鈥� says James Raymo, professor of sociology at Princeton University, who researches demographic trends in Japan.
As a comparison, the United States鈥� total fertility rate is around 1.6. A rate of 2.1 is needed for replacement of the population.
China鈥檚 policy approach is unrealistic in that it is aimed at persuading people to have more children, rather than supporting people in being able to have the number of children they want.
鈥淓xhorting people to give birth for the country is delusional,鈥� says Dr. Raymo, who argues that policymakers must 鈥渢hink holistically about building a social and economic environment in which people can realize their desired family structure and size.鈥�
And that lesson is all the more important as most developed countries, from Canada and Argentina to Germany, are well below the 2.1 TFR mark. United Nations forecasts show the global TFR could drop to 1.8 by 2100.
鈥淲hat鈥檚 happening in East Asia is a sign of what鈥檚 coming for most of the world,鈥� Dr. Raymo says.
