Trump鈥檚 pivot to Asia is a turn away from Europe
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
The full scale of Donald Trump鈥檚 ambition to remake U.S. foreign policy 鈥� and redefine America鈥檚 approach to the world 鈥� has become clearer in the past few days, with the rollout of his version of an Obama-era initiative dubbed the 鈥減ivot to Asia.鈥�
It builds on one of the few remaining areas of bipartisan consensus in Washington 鈥� countering the rising economic clout, military strength, and geopolitical ambitions of China.
But Mr. Trump鈥檚 approach could hardly be more different than the shift begun under Mr. Obama and expanded by President Joe Biden.
Why We Wrote This
Donald Trump鈥檚 鈥減ivot to Asia鈥� is not a new concept, but it differs in key ways from President Barack Obama鈥檚 strategy. As he wages a tariff war in Asia, will Mr. Trump find the regional allies he needs?
President Trump鈥檚 bet is that it will also be more effective: a show of power that will ultimately allow for creative dealmaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is designed to ensure, as Secretary of Defense told a major Asian security conference last Saturday, that 鈥淐hina will not invade Taiwan on his [Mr. Trump鈥檚] watch.鈥�
But he will have to reckon with two imponderables.
How will Mr. Xi respond? At least initially, on Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 address has been scalding.
And what of America鈥檚 Asian allies, described by Mr. Hegseth as key 鈥渇orce multipliers鈥�?
They are feeling conflicted, confused, and unsettled about Mr. Trump鈥檚 America these days, and not only because of his sudden announcement in April of sweeping tariffs on their exports to the United States.
They are front-row spectators in Mr. Trump鈥檚 on-and-off tariff war with China, a key trading partner for many of them, and they are worried by the prospect of being caught in the middle of a major superpower showdown.
They have also been watching Mr. Trump loosen his commitment to the countries that had been America鈥檚 closest allies since World War II: the NATO member states of Europe.
It is from Europe that the contrast between Mr. Trump鈥檚 鈥減ivot鈥� and the Obama-era vision appears most stark.
When then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first set out the policy in a , she presented the pivot as building on, not downgrading, the transatlantic alliance.
But under Mr. Trump, it has begun to look like a pivot away from the European allies. The president has suggested that America鈥檚 security commitment to them could depend on whether he thinks that they have been spending enough on defense.
He has also prioritized ending the Ukraine war over heeding European allies鈥� warning that a peace deal should not reward Russian President Vladimir Putin for his 2022 invasion.
That view is shared by America鈥檚 major allies in Asia. They are concerned that such an outcome could embolden Mr. Xi to make good on his pledge to make the island democracy of Taiwan part of China, by force if necessary.
The encouraging news for the Trump administration is that Washington already has strong, and expanding, security partnerships with key Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan.
The Biden administration also increased security cooperation with other major players, including India, and encouraged closer ties among regional partners.
They share America鈥檚 concerns about China鈥檚 growing power, and Beijing鈥檚 increasing readiness to brandish it, especially in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
And they view U.S. support as vital to their security.
So they will have welcomed Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 overall message 鈥� that the Indo-Pacific was now the American military鈥檚 鈥減riority theater.鈥�
Ditto his insistence that Mr. Trump did not seek conflict with China, but a 鈥減eace through strength鈥� that would make the 鈥渃osts too high鈥� for Beijing to 鈥渄ominate us 鈥� or our allies and partners.鈥�
But they were left in no doubt that their terms of engagement with Washington, and of any new 鈥減eace鈥� arrangement with Beijing, would be set by Mr. Trump.
鈥淧resident Trump was elected to apply America First on the world stage,鈥� Mr. Hegseth declared.
鈥淲e ask 鈥� and indeed insist 鈥� that our allies and partners do their part,鈥� he added, telling them that they 鈥渃an, and should, quickly upgrade their own defenses.鈥�
Echoing what he called the administration鈥檚 鈥渢ough love鈥� approach to NATO, he called on Asian allies to ratchet up their defense spending to 5% of GDP. That is clearly out of early realistic reach, even in those countries already increasing their military outlays.
South Korea, for example, facing a nuclear-armed North Korea, spends less than 3% of its GDP on defense.
Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 message had particular force because Mr. Trump has in the past openly questioned the cost of American military support for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. He has also suggested Taiwan had 鈥渟tolen鈥� the role of preeminent producer of advanced microchips from U.S. companies.
Still, Washington鈥檚 Asian allies can hope that strongly shared security interests, and Mr. Trump鈥檚 determination to achieve 鈥減eace through strength鈥� with China, will shield them from the kind of tensions shaking the transatlantic partnership.
On the other hand, amid Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 praise for his boss鈥檚 guiding worldview 鈥� that 鈥淎merica does not have or seek permanent enemies鈥� 鈥� NATO鈥檚 experience has left some of them wondering whether, under Mr. Trump, America can be relied on as a permanent friend.
