China expands its reach in the South China Sea. What's the end goal?
| Beijing
It is typhoon season in the South China Sea. But more dangerous than the physical winds tearing down homes and trees is a brewing political storm that threatens the peace in one of the world鈥檚 most strategic flash points.
Over the past several months China has set itself on a collision course with its Southeast Asian neighbors, taking a series of forceful steps to assert territorial claims over potentially valuable rocks, reefs, and waters that other nations claim, too.
Some of them, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, are alarmed enough to have voiced their anger publicly. Others, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, have been more cautious.聽
Their collective disquiet has drawn in the United States. Senior US diplomats and defense officials have bluntly accused China of fomenting instability in the region and intimidating its neighbors.
China鈥檚 oft-repeated pledge of 鈥減eaceful development鈥� and its offer of 鈥渁mity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness鈥� to Southeast Asia are looking threadbare. Adding to the uncertainty is the lack of clarity surrounding Beijing鈥檚 goals.
They may not be clear even to Beijing, where more dovish and more hawkish factions appear to be debating the wisdom of China鈥檚 recent moves. If Beijing鈥檚 abrasive attitude pushes its neighbors to seek help from Washington, some analysts here are warning, it will mean only trouble for China.
Instead of ending up as the naturally dominant power surrounded by economically dependent smaller neighbors, China would find itself strategically isolated in the region and facing off directly with the US.
鈥淭here are some inside the system who are wondering ... whether or not this is all going to backfire,鈥� Christopher Johnson, a China analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, told those at a recent conference on China鈥檚 intentions.
At the same time, he added, there is 鈥渁 possibility that they [the Chinese government] are not scoring 鈥榦wn goals,鈥� that they know exactly what they are doing with this strategy because they think it will be effective鈥� in intimidating China鈥檚 neighbors into submission to Beijing鈥檚 regional domination.
'Salami slicing'
There is less ambiguity about what China has actually done in the South China Sea this year.
On Jan. 1, it imposed rules demanding that anyone fishing in waters it claims, which make up nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea, should get prior permission from the Chinese authorities.
In March a Chinese Coast Guard vessel prevented the Philippine Army from resupplying its soldiers based on a rusting ship grounded on the Second Thomas Reef in the Spratly Islands, which Beijing and Manila both claim.
Over the past few months, a Chinese dredging vessel has been creating an artificial island on the previously submerged Johnson South Reef, which the Philippines also claims. The company doing the work has published computer mock-up images of an airstrip it says is planned.
In May the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved an oil drilling rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims. A Chinese barge accompanying the rig rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat during clashes.
All these moves appeared to violate an agreement that China signed with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 12 years ago in which both sides pledged to 鈥渆xercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.鈥�
鈥淐hina has been very opportunistic, pushing and pushing to see what they can get ... and taking as much as they can,鈥� says David Arase, who teaches international politics at the Johns Hopkins University campus in Nanjing, China.
By taking small steps to avoid provoking Washington to act in support of its regional allies, China is trying to 鈥渄ishearten鈥� rival claimants and 鈥渞esign them to the fact that they have to give up their rights,鈥� Professor Arase says.
鈥淭hey are continuing with their salami slicing, reef by reef, step by step,鈥� said Tran Truong Thuy, an analyst at Vietnam鈥檚 Institute for East Sea Studies, at a recent CSIS conference. 鈥淚n reality they want to change ... the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.鈥�
Are China's claims legitimate?
China insists its actions are legitimate since, in an oft-repeated official phrase, Beijing enjoys 鈥渋ndisputable sovereignty鈥� over all the islands in the South China Sea and 鈥渢heir adjacent waters鈥� on historical grounds, no matter how far they are from the mainland or how close to other countries鈥� coastlines.
That is debatable, say international law experts. Chinese maps show what it calls a 鈥渘ine-dashed line鈥� around the edge of the South China Sea, shaped in the form of a lolling cow鈥檚 tongue, cutting through several neighboring countries鈥� 200-mile exclusive economic zones and their continental shelves. But Beijing has never clearly explained just what this line signifies.
鈥淓ven in China there are different ideas鈥� on the subject, says Xue Li, head of the international strategy department at the China Academy of Social Sciences. Members of the military insist the line marks China鈥檚 national boundary; others suggest it encloses China鈥檚 historical waters; some scholars say it merely demarcates the land features over which China claims sovereignty.
The Philippines is challenging the legality of the 鈥渘ine-dashed line鈥� in a case it has brought before a tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China has refused to participate in the case, and few foreign legal experts say Beijing could win it.
China might, however, try to defend the line anyway by altering facts on the ground. Nationalist sentiment is strong in China: President Xi Jinping has shown himself readier to take risks than his predecessor, and territorial assertion could prove an attractive way to illustrate the 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� he has promised as China takes its rightful place in the world.
Xi 鈥榙oes not want to look like a chicken鈥�
鈥淒omestic opinion is very important to Xi Jinping,鈥� says Zhu Feng, the head of the recently created Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, a think tank to coordinate South China Sea studies. 鈥淗e does not want to look like a chicken.鈥�
At the same time, suggests Mr. Johnson of CSIS, Mr. Xi may believe he can get away with current policy because 鈥渦ltimately, ASEAN countries will stand aside because of their interest and dependence on China鈥檚 economic prospects.鈥�
But the costs of appearing to neighbors like an arrogant bully are not negligible. The recent row with Vietnam over the oil rig 鈥渃ompletely turned around relations with Vietnam,鈥� says Carl Thayer, an expert on Southeast Asia at the University of New South Wales in Australia.聽
The Vietnamese prime minister threatened to follow the Philippines to an international court and 鈥渢he idea of getting out of China鈥檚 orbit has gone viral in Vietnamese public opinion.鈥�
China withdrew the rig a month ahead of schedule, perhaps to cool the crisis, but not before it had drawn heavy international criticism and further stoked regional fears.
A survey published in July by the Pew Research Center found that a majority of people in eight of 10 countries neighboring China are worried that the Asian giant鈥檚 territorial ambitions could lead to military conflict.
Chinese analysts insist that Beijing鈥檚 traditional aim of maintaining a peaceful international environment to favor its economic development has not changed fundamentally, nor has its declared policy of shelving territorial disputes and jointly developing energy and other resources.
The challenge, says Lou Chunhao, an analyst at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, affiliated with China鈥檚 Ministry of State Security, is 鈥渉ow to achieve a balance ... between protecting Chinese rights and sovereignty in the South China Sea and maintaining a benign environment.鈥�
China鈥檚 rivals see safety in numbers
China鈥檚 ASEAN rivals in territorial disputes are not reassured by Beijing鈥檚 insistence that they resolve their differences one-on-one; they see safety in numbers. Nor have any of them yet voiced any enthusiasm for Xi鈥檚 call for a new Chinacentric security system in the region to replace the US-dominated arrangements that have held for the past 70 years.
鈥淚n the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia,鈥� Xi told an international conference in Shanghai, China, last May.
China鈥檚 top long-term goals in the ocean it claims, says Rory Medcalf, head of the international security program at the Lowy Institute, a think tank in Sydney, Australia, is 鈥渢o ensure that nothing happens in the South China Sea without Chinese blessing鈥� and 鈥渕aximum freedom of maneuver for its Navy ... to be the dominant military player in those waters.鈥�
An increasingly vocal band of government policy advisers in Beijing are suggesting that those goals would be easier to achieve if China鈥檚 neighbors trusted it more; they are urging a reset in China鈥檚 neighborhood diplomacy.
鈥淐hina鈥檚 Navy could already beat all the ASEAN navies. The question is whether it would be worth it,鈥� Mr. Xue argues. 鈥淲e would pick up a sesame seed and throw away a watermelon,鈥� he says, referring to the manifold economic benefits that closer ties with Southeast Asia would bring.
鈥淭he South China Sea could be a real battlefield, and that would be very harmful to China鈥檚 future,鈥� adds Professor Zhu. 鈥淲e need to find a way to settle [the disputes] piece by piece.鈥�
Given China鈥檚 geographic position and its economic and political strength, 鈥渋t is quite normal that China should be the dominant power in the South China Sea,鈥� Xue says. 鈥淎nd just because of that, maybe we need to make compromises with our neighbors.鈥澛�
