Why some Rio residents yearn for an iron-fisted druglord
鈥� A version of this post ran on the author's blog, riorealblog.com.聽The views expressed are the author's own.
The day after Rocinha鈥檚 police occupation last November, O Globo newspaper announced to the world on its front page that Rocinha 茅 nossa, Rocinha is ours. However, it seems that several other groups are contesting ownership of 聽the South Zone鈥檚 largest and most visible favela, or slum, with an estimated population of 200,000.
According to press reports, two drug gangs are fighting over the territory, up for grabs since druglord Nem was , also last November. That鈥檚 the explanation for most of the eight murders that have taken place since occupation. Robberies are also on the rise. Such crime hasn鈥檛 been seen in other pacified favelas, though there have been problems with police corruption and community relations.
Rocinha doesn鈥檛 yet have a UPP, or police pacification unit. Each of the city鈥檚 nineteen units have been installed only after a territory is fully in control of the Rio police 鈥� certainly not the case here. Given the crime spike, some residents yearn for the return of an iron-fisted druglord.
Yet the state government is far from allowing a return to the past. This week State Public Safety Secretary Jos茅 Mariano Beltrame announced that 130 new recruits will intern in Rocinha, bringing more manpower to an additional 40-man contingent and swelling the total force there to 350. Most are meant to carry out foot patrols in the favela鈥檚 alleyways.
Beltrame also (in Portuguese) responsible solely for Rocinha.
In late February, Governor S茅rgio Cabral signed a decree requiring police and firemen to provide (in Portuguese).
But the Rio police might do well to extend to Rocinha the level of technological intelligence and coordination reportedly聽 (in Portuguese), another troublesome territory. Only last week did the military police begin taking over Alem茫o from the Brazilian Army, which back聽in November 2010 had聽invaded the complex of favelas, in response to a series of vehicle torchings that terrorized the city.
There are installed in Rocinha. Even better intelligence 鈥� and possibly, intelligence sharing 鈥� could help nail what says is the real reason why Rocinha still isn鈥檛 鈥渙urs鈥�:
A document produced by the Civil Police Intelligence Unit, dated February 15 of this year, is as succinct as it is shocking in its revelations. In the hands of the Rio Secretariat of Public Safety, which is investigating its contents, the dossier raises suspicions that once again, police are collaborating with criminals in exchange for a substantial 鈥渢ip鈥�. Item four of the ten-topic, two-page report, to which Veja聽had access, provides the probable sums. The 鈥渄own payment鈥� is said to be 200,000 reais (almost 120,000 dollars equivalent). And the monthly payments to military police, according to the document, come to 80,000 reais. In exchange for this, the police are said to be staying out of the alleyways, and keeping watch only over the larger byways that cut across the favela.聽
Tensions between Rio鈥檚 civil (intelligence) police and its military (patrolling) police are (in Portuguese), as one might imagine, given what聽Veja published.
As long ago as the 1990s, when anthropologist Luiz Eduardo Soares was in Beltrame鈥檚 job, during Governor Anthony Garotinho鈥檚 first term, it was clear that having more than one police force was problematic. In addition to the state-wide military and civil police forces, the city of Rio also has traffic police (CET), and a Municipal Guard. The state of Rio also has highway police and then there is Brazil鈥檚 FBI, the Federal Police. Oh, don鈥檛 forget the forest police (who have (in Portuguese)).
In 2009, (in Portuguese), by way of the Portuguese acronym. These have been instrumental in bringing down crime, since the state is now divided up into regions in which civil and military police units are jointly responsible for crime reduction goals.
This year the military police force also instituted a new police academy curriculum, with a focus on reduced police corruption and violence.
Some security and police experts say the RISPs aren鈥檛 enough to foster true coordination, planning and evaluation 鈥� i.e. effective policing. They suggest more radical institutional change.聽What happens next in Rocinha may determine how necessary that is.
And Rocinha constitutes only one of several enormous territorial challenges facing security officials. In addition to the ongoing military police handover of Alem茫o, Complexo da Mar茅, .
鈥� Julia Michaels, a long-time resident of Brazil, writes the blog , which she describes as a constructive and critical view of Rio de Janeiro鈥檚 ongoing transformation.
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