Did Brazil鈥檚 armed forces halt 鈥� or help 鈥� capital rioters?
| RIO DE JANEIRO
The rioters erupted in cheers as soldiers marched into Brazil鈥檚 presidential palace on Jan. 8. 鈥淭he Army is here!鈥� shouted a man draped in a Brazilian flag, pumping a fist in the air.
Inside, people were ransacking Brazil鈥檚 halls of power in hopes of provoking a military coup that would annul an election they believe 鈥� without evidence 鈥撀爓as stolen from former president Jair Bolsonaro. In this moment, they thought the Army was finally answering their pleas; instead, soldiers began handcuffing the insurrectionists.
鈥淭he Army handed us over to the police,鈥� one woman said in a social media video filmed on a bus transporting rioters to a police detention center, tears streaming down her face. 鈥淯ntil an hour ago, we trusted the Army, we trusted that it would protect us. And the Army betrayed us.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onMany South American countries with histories of brutal military dictatorships worked to weaken the role of the armed forces in government. The Jan. 8 capital riots underscore Brazil鈥檚 ongoing struggle to keep the military out of politics.
Mr. Bolsonaro spent much of his political career currying favor with the armed forces and, during his presidency, handed out thousands of top government jobs to current and former Army officers. Fears mounted in recent months over whether the armed forces would protect the country鈥檚 young democracy or side with Mr. Bolsonaro鈥檚 fervent supporters. During his time in office, the far-right populist routinely attacked democratic institutions, made baseless claims about election fraud, and spoke nostalgically about Brazil鈥檚 brutal military dictatorship, which lasted from 1964 to 1985.
On Jan. 8, when the military refused to prop up attempts to overthrow President Luiz In谩cio Lula da Silva, just a week into his new term, global observers declared the failed coup a win for democracy. But new details on the Army鈥檚 role in the worst attacks in the history of Brazil鈥檚 democracy point to a more complicated path ahead for South America鈥檚 largest country.
In Brazil, like elsewhere in the region, the military has long played a prominent role in politics, historically presenting themselves as a stabilizing power in times of political chaos.聽But while countries like Argentina and Chile have worked to demilitarize their governments following brutal military rule, Brazil has struggled to keep the Army out of politics since its return to democracy.
Authorities now say the Army was complacent or even complicit in the attacks, turning a blind eye as rioters plotted in camps outside military headquarters, failing to bolster security of federal buildings ahead of the riots, and impeding the police from arresting key organizers in the hours after the insurrection.
As authorities scramble to pinpoint those responsible for planning, inspiring, and financing the attacks on Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidential offices, larger questions loom over Brazil鈥檚 democratic health and whether Lula, as the president is frequently called, can succeed in reigning in an increasingly powerful military that appears unwilling to fully step back from politics.
鈥淭his is perhaps the biggest challenge facing Lula,鈥� says Juliano Cortinhas, an international relations professor at the University of Bras铆lia and a former official at Brazil鈥檚 defense ministry.聽But,聽鈥渋f we don鈥檛 see thorough reform, we will continue to run the risk of a coup,鈥� he says.
鈥淥ur democracy will remain under threat.鈥�
A political project
Brazil鈥檚 21-year dictatorship was marked by censorship, torture, and repression 鈥� but few of the military leaders responsible were ever punished. And while steps were taken to shrink the Army鈥檚 role in politics, experts say democratically elected governments 鈥� including that of Lula, during his first two terms in office from 2003 to 2010 鈥撀燿idn鈥檛 do enough to rein in the military鈥檚 power.
鈥淭hat was the left鈥檚 greatest error 鈥撀爊ot bringing the military under control,鈥� says Mr. Cortinhas, noting both Lula and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, treaded too carefully in bids to avoid confrontation or revolt. 鈥淭hey chose not to deal with the problem at the time. And it just snowballed.鈥�
Boundaries between the Army and politics further deteriorated under Mr. Bolsonaro, who handed over more power to the military in an effort to win their loyalty. In an unprecedented move, he even asked the Army to monitor and audit last year鈥檚 presidential votes.
But the military鈥檚 close ties with Mr. Bolsonaro have eroded public trust and tarnished its image in the eyes of many Brazilians. A of 28 countries placed Brazil near the bottom of the list when it comes to trust in the armed forces.
鈥淭he military has become a tool of the right 鈥� and what happened in Bras铆lia is proof,鈥� says Daniela Maia, a pet groomer in Rio de Janeiro who voted for Lula. 鈥淭he Army has sold out.鈥�
Even among more conservative Brazilians, the Army鈥檚 role in this month鈥檚 attacks has raised questions.
鈥淭he Army did nothing,鈥� says Ana Evelin Rodrigues, a hairdresser in Rio, who supported Mr. Bolsonaro but condemns the Jan. 8 violence. 鈥淚 believe in the military. ... But they stood by as the vandalism happened.鈥�
Even if Lula takes action, the military may not retreat quickly from politics. Military candidates made inroads in last year鈥檚 elections, consolidating the Army鈥檚 political presence. Gen. Hamilton Mour茫o, who served as Mr. Bolsonaro鈥檚 vice president, won a seat in the Senate, while Gen. Eduardo Pazuello, who led Brazil鈥檚 botched response to the pandemic as health minister under Mr. Bolsonaro, was elected to Congress.
Such electoral victories allow the military to amass political power without challenging democratic norms, says Army Reserve Col. Marcelo Pimentel, who has written about the military鈥檚 role in Brazilian politics. 鈥淭here is no need for a coup 鈥撀爐he military wants to win elections,鈥� he says. 鈥淭here is a political project underway.鈥�
Failure to respond
Authorities in the federal government have been quick to blame the attacks in Bras铆lia this month on poor security planning and a sluggish response by police and military officials. Following the riots, Lula accused 鈥渃onniving agents鈥� within the armed forces of facilitating the riots.
鈥淚 am convinced that the door of the Planalto Palace was opened for these people,鈥� he told reporters, referring to the presidential offices. 鈥淪omeone facilitated their entry.鈥�
For 10 weeks before the riots, demonstrators camped out in tent cities outside military buildings across the country, protesting Mr. Bolsonaro鈥檚 narrow defeat in the October 2022 runoff election. Claiming the vote was rigged to favor the left, they demanded the military stop Lula from taking power on Jan. 1.
While the Army did not yield to these demands, experts say it sent mixed signals when it failed to dismantle the tent cities. Authorities now believe plans to storm federal buildings were hatched in the camp in Bras铆lia, just meters from the military鈥檚 headquarters.
鈥淭hese camps were set up with the authorization - and even the protection - of senior commanders,鈥� says Colonel Pimentel. He says it is highly unusual for the Army to allow a political demonstration in a military area. 鈥淭his literally brings politics to the doorstep of the Army barracks.鈥�
Authorities are questioning why protesters could so easily break into the presidential palace, which is normally guarded by a unit of military troops made up of roughly 900 officers, according to experts. On Jan. 8, despite intelligence agencies issuing warnings of possible violence, were on duty.
鈥淭he military likely didn鈥檛 order the attack. But they closed their eyes and let it happen,鈥� says Jo茫o Roberto Martins Filho, a political science professor at the Federal University of S茫o Carlos and author of several books on Brazil鈥檚 military.
of the attack appear to show officers hindering the arrest of rioters. In the hours following the riots, top military officials to the protest camp, which facilitated rioters fleeing arrest.
Lula now faces the tall task of holding the military to account and rooting out officers sympathetic to the far-right from top posts within his government. Many citizens, rattled by the physical attacks on their democracy, are looking for a firm response.
鈥淚 want to see the military doing its job and serving the people,鈥� says Ms. Maia, the pet groomer.
When he took office, Lula struck a conciliatory tone, stopping short of reshuffling the country鈥檚 Defense Ministry 鈥� long under the control of the military 鈥� and even appointing an ally of the Army as minister.
Following the riots, the leftist vowed to 鈥渄emilitarize鈥� the government鈥檚 defense apparatus, placing his personal security in the hands of police, and taking control away from the military. He also tasked the Justice Ministry with bringing order to the capital.
Yet, some Brazilians don鈥檛 see empowering the military as a bad thing. Even with trust in the armed forces dwindling, Brazilians appear to have even less confidence in other authorities: just 6% trust political parties, while 63% believe in the armed forces,聽聽by Brazilian think tank Funda莽茫o Getulio Vargas.
For Sebasti茫o de Jesus, a building superintendent in Rio, the military isn鈥檛 a threat. He lived through Brazil鈥檚 dictatorship and isn鈥檛 interested in another assault on democracy. But he sees the military as Brazil鈥檚 protector.
鈥淚t鈥檚 hard to know who to trust 鈥� the politicians are all the same,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut I trust the military. They have always looked out for the people.鈥�
Editor's note: This story has been updated to correct the spelling of Army Reserve Col. Marcelo Pimentel's last name.聽
