Somalia: Al Shabab loses Afgoye and Afmadow. Is Kismayo next?
鈥⑻�A version of this post appeared on the blog 听The views expressed are the author's own.
On Friday, troops from Somalia鈥檚 Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)听, in what the Associated Press called 鈥渢he biggest victory over al-Shabab since the pro-government forces took control of the capital last August鈥� (more听). Further south, troops from the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), who have been fighting in Somalia since October, took the town of听听from al Shabab some time between yesterday and today (Kenyan troops also took the town of听). The KDF鈥檚 next major goal is to听鈥� al Shabab鈥檚 鈥渓ast key bastion鈥� 鈥� by August.
McClatchy says the importance of听听lies in the fees al Shabab charges at the port. Its loss would therefore deprive the group not only of territory but of much of its income.
Brief fighting occurred in Kismayo earlier this week, when Kenyan warships reportedly came under fire and听听in response. 鈥淔or the past couple of months,鈥� VOA says, 鈥淜ismayo has come under fire targeting al-Shabab from air and sea.鈥�
Here is a map showing Afgoye, Afmadow, and Kismayo, as well as the capital Mogadishu.
Military conquests by the government and its allies are coming at the same time as听听鈥� namely a framework for holding presidential elections by August 20. This combination has generated significant optimism about Somalia鈥檚 future. It is important to note, though, that there has been some criticism of and disagreement with that line.听, for example, notes that the Kenyan intervention in Somalia has lasted much longer than Kenyan leaders first implied it would, and decries 鈥渦nacceptable side effects鈥� of the conflicts, namely bombings inside Kenya that seem to be reprisals by al Shabab and its sympathizers.听, meanwhile, asks important questions about what political arrangements conquerors will create in areas formerly held by al Shabab:
The question is, and we see that everywhere, what kind of political answer you give to the population after having beaten Shabaab. In Beledweyne and Boosaaso, two big cities that have been taken from Shabaab, the Ethiopians promoted their friends, their allies. That makes a lot of sense. But if you don鈥檛 have local reconciliation with clans that explicitly supported Shabaab 鈥� because they had some good interest to do that, some very real interest beyond the jihaadi rhetorics 鈥� if you don鈥檛 do that, then sooner or later you create tensions and new problems come up.
[...]
So if you look at the very short term, you may believe that there are still incidents, but there is no longer a battle, and therefore the situation is going to improve. If you take a longer perspective, however, then it becomes a very concerning issue. Look at Mogadishu: the number of people who were killed last week is basically the same as the number of people who were killed ten or twelve weeks ago, so that means that the intensity hasn鈥檛 diminished. What has changed is the targeting.
To put it in a nutshell: it is very dangerous for the Somalis and the international community to assess the condition of the current war with the parameters of what was the war in 2011. And I believe that is exactly the mistake the Ethiopians made in 2007. They had been able to crush Shabaab in December [of 2006] in a very easy and very radical manner, because they fought face-to-face, and of course Shabaab couldn鈥檛 confront a professional army and therefore lost with many casualties. But then Shabaab shifted to an urban-style guerrilla, and that created a new problem for the Ethiopian army.
What do you think? Where is this all headed?
鈥撎�Alex Thurston听is a PhD student studying Islam in听Africa听at听Northwestern University听and blogs at听.
