Fighting terror, together? The questions facing France and West Africa.
When French President Emmanuel Macron summoned the presidents of Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania to the French city of Pau for a summit on counterterrorism last week, the backdrop was somber.
Two months earlier, during a late night anti-terror operation in Mali, two French military helicopters had collided in the moonless sky, killing all 13 soldiers on board. It was the French military鈥檚 highest single-day death toll since 1983. Meanwhile, in the capitals of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, protestors marched in the streets with a message for Mr. Macron and his troops. 鈥淔rance,鈥� their signs read, 鈥淕et out.鈥�
The soldiers鈥� deaths, combined with the French army鈥檚 tepid welcome in the region, had raised a looming question: What was France doing fighting West Africa鈥檚 war on terror, anyway? And was it even a fight they could win?听
Why We Wrote This
Fighting a force that crosses boundaries, like terrorism, takes partnership. But what should that actually look like? France鈥檚 forces in West Africa, where the colonial past hangs over its relationships, are an urgent case study.
Those questions have grown more pressing in recent months, as a new series of jihadist attacks have rattled the region 鈥� 89 Nigerien soldiers killed at an army outpost this month, and another 71 in December; 14 Burkinab茅 civilians, including 7 children, killed by a roadside bomb; a series of bloody attacks on military bases in Mali. Across the region, the death toll from terror is growing. Three years ago, 770 people died in terror attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Last year, it was .听
But experts say ending the attacks will be far more complicated than simply bolstering French presence in the region. Violent conflicts in the region have local roots, they say, and demand localized solutions. Many West African armies have struggled to fight jihadism, but听France鈥檚 involvement runs the risk of drawing the country into an ultimately unwinnable fight.
鈥淛ihadism is only a symptom of the problem of weak states in the Sahel,鈥� says Marc-Antoine P茅rouse de Montclos, a French political scientist and the author of 鈥淯ne Guerre Perdue: La France au Sahel鈥� (A Lost War: France in the Sahel). 鈥淔ighting it cannot be the ultimate solution. That solution is political, and it鈥檚 in the hands of Africans, not the French.鈥�
An evolving mission
The summit in Pau offered few reforms. In a statement after the two-hour meeting, the six presidents 鈥渞eaffirmed their common determination to fight together against terrorist groups鈥� in the Sahel 鈥� the 2,400-mile tract of arid land just south of the Sahara. Mr. Macron pledged 220 French troops to join the 4,500 already there, and the five African presidents affirmed that yes, they really did want the French to stay.
鈥淎ny time that a country asks that the French army leave, we will go,鈥� Mr. Macron snapped at a Malian journalist who noted the opposition to the French military there. But until then, West Africans should ask themselves 鈥渨ho dies for their children.鈥�
Mr. Macron鈥檚 defensiveness points to what experts say is the paradox of the French fight against terror groups in the region. It is hard for them to stay. But it would be harder for them to go.
鈥淚t has become a kind of trap,鈥� says Niagal茅 Bagayoko, a French political scientist and expert on extremism in the Sahel. 鈥淔rance can鈥檛 afford to leave this war, or to lose it.鈥�
That is in part because what France does in Africa 鈥渋s closely linked with its place in the world,鈥� she says 鈥� a main stage for its military interventions and aid. Since African independence in the 1960s, France has played a muscular role in the wars and conflicts of its former colonies, and it currently has in African countries (plus another two in African territories of mainland France).
When the current wave of French troops first arrived in the Sahel region seven years ago, Dr. Bagayoko says, the situation was different. They had a single, specific goal: help the Malian government drive back a constellation of rebel groups in the country鈥檚 rural north, many of them drawn from mercenaries who had returned home from Libya after that country鈥檚 2011 collapse.
But as the insecurity began to seep over the region鈥檚 porous borders, the boundaries of the mission grew blurry. Instead of ending neatly, 鈥渢hat fight [in Mali] became the beginning of something else.鈥�
Ostensibly, she says, France鈥檚 aims were to drive back terror groups and help the region鈥檚 governments reclaim control of territory threatened by militants. But in a region where the boundaries between Islamic terror, local rebellion, and simple banditry are often paper-thin, that quickly became a nearly impossible fight. Even helping governments reclaim their territory was a fraught mission in countries ruled by autocrats who often enjoyed little popular support.听
Over the years, the French government has claimed that fighting jihadism in the region in the global struggle against terrorism. But despite the affiliation of some local militants with Al Qaeda and ISIS, 鈥渨e are far from a global jihad in this region,鈥� Dr. P茅rouse de Montclos says. 鈥淯nder the name 鈥榯errorist鈥� you find so many things, and in this case, the groups called terrorist by the West are mostly very local, and fighting for very local agendas.鈥�
Troubled past
The shadow of France鈥檚 colonial history also hangs over its current presence in the region. Despite having a French president who speaks of the 鈥渃rimes of colonization鈥� and has promised a more equitable relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa, many here remain skeptical that the French could ever have Africans鈥� best interests at heart.听
Indeed, as opposition has built to the French military presence in the region, a parallel fight against French economic influence reached its own crescendo. In December, Mr. Macron and Alassane Ouattara, the president of Cote D鈥橧voire, announced the end of a controversial French-backed regional currency called the CFA. The currency, which had existed since the colonial era, was pegged to the euro and required member states to keep half their foreign exchange reserves in the French treasury. (A new currency, the eco, will remain pegged to the euro but lose the other elements of French control.)
The anti-CFA movement and the protests against the French military 鈥渁re surfing the same wave of discontent,鈥� says Paul-Simon Handy, an expert on violent extremism in the Sahel at the Institute for Security Studies in Dakar. 鈥淔rance needs to do a serious analysis of its Africa policy to understand why it is losing the sympathy of so many sections of the population.鈥�
