In response to Trump鈥檚 foreign policy strategy, US allies try 鈥榙e-risking鈥�
-
Ned Temko Columnist
| London
A new policy mantra is taking hold among the United States鈥� oldest allies as they address their growing concern about Washington鈥檚 reliability as a partner.
鈥淒e-risking鈥� is the word they鈥檙e using.
And perhaps nothing better conveys the depth of their nervousness than the lineage of the term.
Why We Wrote This
A great 鈥渄e-risking鈥� is underway. Some of the oldest allies of the United States are trying to reduce dependencies on Washington amid President Donald Trump鈥檚 鈥淎merica First鈥� overhaul of foreign policy.
Originally coined by investment managers, it entered the political lexicon several years ago 鈥� as shorthand for European countries鈥� efforts to reduce potentially damaging dependencies on the West鈥檚 most powerful rival: China.
Now, it鈥檚 being applied to the relationship with Washington.
In both word and deed, allies are embracing 鈥渄e-risking鈥� as a common-sense response to President Donald Trump鈥檚 鈥淎merica First鈥� overhaul of U.S. foreign policy.
Just as Europe鈥檚 de-risking with China deliberately stopped short of a full 鈥渄ecoupling鈥� 鈥� which would have been impractical and potentially self-harming because China is the Europeans鈥� second-largest trading partner 鈥� America鈥檚 allies don鈥檛 want, and aren鈥檛 seeking, an outright split with Washington.
The U.S. is the European Union鈥檚 top trading partner. It鈥檚 also the West鈥檚 security linchpin: the core of the 80-year-old NATO alliance, which includes both much of Europe and Canada.
Yet a range of moves by Mr. Trump since returning to the White House has left allies questioning the long-term stability of their partnership.
They鈥檝e been unsettled, and angered, by the president鈥檚 frequent, often unpredictable use of tariffs as a tool of economic and political leverage.
On defense, Mr. Trump鈥檚 European allies no longer see eye to eye with Washington on what they regard as the single greatest threat to Europe鈥檚 security: Russian aggression.
In seeking to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine, the Trump administration has signaled it is seeking 鈥渟trategic stability鈥� 鈥� as well as revived economic ties 鈥� with Moscow.
But the Europeans fear U.S.-brokered peace could in effect reward Russian President Vladimir Putin for invading Ukraine, and embolden him to attack other European neighbors.
The stability of NATO, meanwhile, was called into question for European allies by Mr. Trump鈥檚 campaign to take over Greenland, the autonomous territory of alliance member Denmark.
All that helps to explain why 鈥渄e-risking鈥� was explicitly deployed last weekend by political leaders and panelists at the continent鈥檚 premier annual defense meeting, the Munich Security Conference.
And there are growing signs the change in approach goes beyond mere words.
A number of NATO members have begun looking at scaling back purchases of the alliance鈥檚 premier stealth fighter jet 鈥� the United States鈥� F-35 鈥� in part because of a concern that they鈥檒l be left to rely on American manufacturer Lockheed Martin and the U.S. government to green-light software updates and other future upgrades.
Last week, Canada announced a new military investment strategy with the aim of redirecting funding 鈥� three-quarters of its purchases currently go to U.S. manufacturers 鈥� toward domestic suppliers. As part of this overall shift, it is also reviewing a planned purchase of up to 88 F-35s, only 16 of which it is formally committed to buy.
Spain has recently ruled out buying the F-35. Germany and Portugal say they鈥檙e still considering whether to go ahead with purchases.
Economically, too, there have been moves to 鈥渄e-risk.鈥�
The EU, as well as Britain and Canada, have embarked on efforts to diversify their trade, negotiating a series of new agreements with India as well as other Asian and South American economies.
European countries are also increasingly concerned about the dominance of major American companies in their technology infrastructure.
In January, French Prime Minister S茅bastien Lecornu announced that government officials would no longer be using U.S.-owned applications like Zoom and Microsoft Teams for video conferencing. Instead, they鈥檒l be moving to a French-made system.
This followed a directive in July for all French public-sector employees move away from using WhatsApp for work-related messaging, in favor of a messaging app designed by the French government 鈥� expanding on an earlier order applying to government ministers and their staff.
Austria鈥檚 military has abandoned its use of Microsoft Office in favor of an open-source alternative, LibreOffice.
Efforts also appear to be beginning in Europe to address the near-total dominance of Visa and Mastercard 鈥� both headquartered in the U.S. 鈥� in the continent鈥檚 card-payment transactions.
Last month, in the wake of Mr. Trump鈥檚 efforts to gain control of Greenland, Aurore Lalucq, the chair of the economic affairs committee in the European Parliament, issued an 鈥渦rgent鈥� call for Europe to put in place a payments system of its own, arguing that Mr. Trump might otherwise choose to 鈥渃ut us off completely.鈥�
While there is no sign other European politicians feel that鈥檚 a real threat, Ms. Lalucq鈥檚 social media post did chime with their broader sense of a need for 鈥渄e-risking鈥� their reliance on the U.S.
In Britain this week, the country鈥檚 major banks, alongside representatives from Visa and Mastercard, held an initial meeting on the establishment of a U.K.-based card payments company.
If all goes well, the expectation is that it could be in place by the end of the decade.
That points to a wider challenge for U.S. allies: the 鈥渄e-risking鈥� efforts will take time.
As the allied leaders are all aware, the best-case scenario in the meantime is to reduce the urgency of getting them in place.聽That will mean engaging with Mr. Trump, doing all they can to keep relations on an even keel.聽And, if not fully repairing the Western alliance, at least keeping it from fraying further.
