Europe鈥檚 worry: Would America care about us if Donald Trump were president?
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
In the United States, President Joe Biden鈥檚 political allies have spent the past week trying to calm Democratic Party anxiety over his stumbling debate performance against Donald Trump.
But another set of allies was equally shaken: America鈥檚 key overseas partners in its efforts to contain China鈥檚 expanding ambitions and to push back against Russia鈥檚 invasion and occupation of Ukraine.
For months now, concern has been growing among European member states of NATO and major allies in the Asia-Pacific region like Australia, South Korea, and Japan, over the prospect of a second Trump administration.
Why We Wrote This
Joe Biden鈥檚 poor debate performance has worried America鈥檚 allies overseas, who fear it might open the way to a second presidential term for the unpredictable Donald Trump.
But in the wake of Mr. Biden鈥檚 debate ordeal, the concern has edged closer to alarm.
It is being fueled by a growing expectation that if Mr. Trump wins in November, they can no longer reliably assume that the world鈥檚 wealthiest and most powerful democracy will remain interested, involved, and invested in checking the reach of powerful autocracies.
And they鈥檙e worried that U.S. domestic political constraints mean that even if Mr. Biden wins, Washington may not be able to show anything near the interest, involvement, and investment that have shaped world politics ever since World War II.
The allies鈥� debate anxiety was especially evident regarding future U.S. backing for Ukraine.
Mr. Trump used the debate to reiterate his opposition to the scale of support the Biden administration has given Kyiv, and insisted that if he won the election, he鈥檇 secure a peace agreement even before taking office.
He said Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 terms for a settlement were unacceptable. But his past acceptance of Russian claims on Ukraine left European leaders assuming that, at a minimum, he would recognize Russia鈥檚 control of the land it has seized by force.
While allied leaders avoided public comment on the debate, other prominent European politicians were far less reticent, with some taking the extraordinary step of calling on the Democratic Party to choose a new election standard-bearer.
Former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi summed up the mood. 鈥淛oe Biden can鈥檛 do it,鈥� he posted on X. 鈥淐hanging horses is a duty for everyone.鈥�
Poland鈥檚 foreign minister, Rados艂aw聽Sikorski, reached back into history. Noting that a failure to 鈥済rasp the importance of succession鈥� had begun the decline of the Roman Empire, he added that 鈥渋t鈥檚 important to manage one鈥檚 ride into the sunset.鈥�
The chair of the German parliament鈥檚 defense committee was blunter. 鈥淭he fact that a man like Trump could become president again because the Democrats are unable to put up a strong candidate against him would be a historic tragedy that the whole world would feel,鈥� said Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, whose Free Democratic Party is a member of the country鈥檚 ruling coalition.
A longtime former chair of the German parliament鈥檚 foreign affairs committee also homed in on the international implications. 鈥淭his night will not be forgotten,鈥� Norbert R枚ttgen said. 鈥淭he Democrats have to rethink their choices now. And Germany must prepare at full speed for an uncertain future.
鈥淚f we don鈥檛 take responsibility for European security now, no one will.鈥�
That, of course, is exactly what Mr. Trump has been demanding of U.S. allies in Europe for a long time.
It may be that Europe鈥檚 growing investment in defense over the past few years would dissuade a reelected President Trump from withdrawing from U.S. alliances altogether, as he suggested he might in his first term.
It may also be that the prospect of his possible return was one of the reasons behind the higher European defense spending.
Yet the main catalysts have been Russia and China, and the real sense of threat that their democratic neighbors feel in the light of the Ukraine invasion and China鈥檚 expanding military presence in the South China Sea.
President Biden and U.S. allies have made efforts to 鈥淭rump-proof鈥� more robust security relationships.
In Asia-Pacific, Mr. Biden has put together a three-way partnership with Australia and Britain to provide nuclear submarines for the Australians. He has beefed up the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan.
And at Camp David last summer, he put America鈥檚 arms around an historic rapprochement between the leaders of South Korea and Japan 鈥� pointedly including tripartite consultation mechanisms intended to outlast his time in the White House.
A similar effort has been underway with Ukraine. The most recent example: At its summit last month, the G7 leading industrialized nations agreed to pay the interest on a $50 billion loan it will take out on Ukraine鈥檚 behalf.
Still, the allies recognize there are stark limits, at least in the short term, to how effectively they can compensate for any major reduction in America鈥檚 international presence and commitment.
They are also worried that the retreat is already underway, at least on Ukraine; President Biden struggled for months last year to win congressional approval for America鈥檚 most recent aid package.
One leading Japanese foreign policy expert, former diplomat Kunihiko Miyake, lamented after the debate that Mr. Biden 鈥渕ight have imploded,鈥� suggesting that Mr. Trump could have a clear run at the White House.
鈥淯nlike eight years ago,鈥� he said, 鈥渨e are much more prepared, as are other European and Asian allies.鈥�
But he added a caveat. 鈥淪till, Mr. Trump is unpredictable.鈥�
