Mutiny fizzled, but it put Putin on the back foot
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
The coup, if that鈥檚 what it was, has failed. But one legacy, in particular, could complicate Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 determined efforts to put it in the past.
It is the sound of silence 鈥� from both Mr. Putin himself and his allies, most importantly China 鈥� as the mutineers approached Moscow.
The inescapable impression was of a president unsettled, uncertain, and simply unable to quash the most serious challenge in his 23 years in power 鈥� and of previously full-throated supporters hedging their bets until the outcome was clear.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onPresident Vladimir Putin weathered the immediate threat to his power last weekend, but his moment of weakness is giving even his allies pause for thought about their relations with Moscow.
It also brought home how the war against Ukraine 鈥� intended to buttress Mr. Putin鈥檚 and Russia鈥檚 standing 鈥� has, at least so far, had the opposite effect.
None of this necessarily means his hold on power is in danger. Nor will this impinge on his top short-term priority 鈥� to reestablish stability and his personal control, after the show of defiance by his longtime prot茅g茅, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner militia group.
Mr. Putin was keen this week to project a message of normality, declaring that 鈥渃ivil war鈥� had been averted and shunting off Mr. Prigozhin and a rump of his fighting force to the neighboring client autocracy of Belarus.
Yet the echoes of the sound of silence as the militia advanced, largely unimpeded, to within 120 miles of Moscow last Saturday could continue to reverberate.
That鈥檚 especially true because of what Mr. Putin did say, before he retreated into silence, in a brief address at the beginning of the rebel advance. It wasn鈥檛 just the sense of alarm he conveyed, or his warning of a 鈥渄eadly threat鈥� to the nation 鈥� jarringly different from his image, cultivated over two decades, of a leader in supremely confident control.
It was also the frank admission that in Rostov-on-Don, where Mr. Prigozhin鈥檚 militia had captured the Russian army鈥檚 southern command headquarters without a shot, the situation was 鈥渄ifficult,鈥� and that 鈥渢he work of the civil and military authorities is blocked.鈥�
Reestablishing a semblance of post-putsch normality with allies and partners abroad may prove easier, since those relationships are rooted in shared practical interests. And once the rebellion failed, a range of foreign governments did issue statements of support for Russia.
Yet the silence from them as the crisis was underway suggests they may harbor new doubts about Russia鈥檚 future course, and about Mr. Putin鈥檚 ability to navigate the twin challenges of the Ukraine war and unrest within the Russian military.
China matters most: Mr. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping sealed a 鈥渘o-limits鈥� partnership days before Russia invaded Ukraine last year. Economically the far weaker partner, Russia has become especially reliant on China since the invasion ruptured trade ties with the West.
Beijing also has a powerful, geopolitical interest in the alliance. It sees Mr. Putin鈥檚 Russia as a key partner in its central foreign policy priority: challenging America鈥檚 dominant place on the world stage.
Still, China said nothing about Mr. Prigozhin鈥檚 putsch until it was over.
Beijing broke its silence during a visit by Russia鈥檚 deputy foreign minister the following day. Even then, the statement was a response to Moscow鈥檚 readout of the talks, which said China had backed the 鈥淩ussian leadership鈥� in its response to the crisis.
China鈥檚 version did reaffirm the alliance. But it pointedly omitted mention of Mr. Putin鈥檚 leadership, saying only that Beijing supported Russia in 鈥渕aintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity.鈥�
Moscow鈥檚 efforts to secure backing from other foreign friends fell flat.
Mr. Putin contacted a number of leaders while the outcome hung in the balance, including Turkey鈥檚 President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an, a NATO member with whom he has built strong personal ties. Moscow鈥檚 account was that Mr. Erdo臒an offered 鈥渇ull support for the steps taken by the Russian leadership.鈥� Turkey鈥檚 version was that Mr. Erdo臒an simply urged Mr. Putin to act with 鈥渃ommon sense鈥� and that the Turkish president was ready to help achieve a 鈥減eaceful resolution as soon as possible.鈥�
Even a call to Kazakhstan鈥檚 President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who used Russian troops last year to quell public unrest, ended with the Kazakh leader telling Mr. Putin that the putsch was a purely internal Russian affair.
The sound of silence was not limited to Mr. Putin鈥檚 friends.
The United States, in coordination with its own key allies in Europe and Asia, agreed on its need to keep mum as well.
This was partly for the same reason that China and other countries were loath to weigh in: They could not know how this unprecedented challenge to Mr. Putin would end.
But for Washington, there were other considerations as well 鈥� especially relevant as the world waits to see how Mr. Putin will move in the weeks ahead to demonstrate that he is undaunted and back in command.
Washington and its NATO partners did not want to provide Mr. Putin with political ammunition for accusations that the putsch was instigated by the West. And more generally, they did not want to risk making a confused and volatile situation in Russia even worse.
Their ultimate fear? A collapse of central control, even if it is Mr. Putin鈥檚 control, over a sprawling Eurasian power armed with nearly 6,000 nuclear weapons.
