海角大神

Relations between the U.S. and Russia, which have been in a deep freeze since the Kremlin鈥檚 intervention in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea six years ago, may be showing the first small signs of a thaw. And that鈥檚 in part because of the Trump administration鈥檚 hardening stance toward its main superpower rival, China.

The most significant indication of a possible reset came last week, with the announcement the United States had agreed to meet Russian negotiators in Vienna later this month to discuss the future of the decade-old New START agreement on nuclear arms control.

That鈥檚 important in itself. New START, which limits the number of nuclear warheads Washington and Moscow can have, was negotiated by the Obama administration and is due to expire early next year. President Donald Trump has already pulled Washington out of a number of other arms treaties. If New START were allowed to lapse, the world would be without any formal arms control arrangements for the first time in almost half a century.

The mere fact that the Vienna meeting is taking place does not guarantee a deal will be struck. First, there are the complex technical issues involved in any arms control deal. President Trump鈥檚 White House has devoted far less attention or preparatory work to structured diplomatic encounters than have past administrations.

Political and strategic considerations on both sides could also slow progress. Russia may not think it鈥檚 worth seeking an early deal as November鈥檚 U.S. presidential election approaches. The Trump administration, for its part, has been arguing that New START and other arms control accords are worth little unless they include China, too.

Not so bad, after all?

But in the wake of mixed signals, the decision to enter negotiations on New START does suggest reluctance in Washington to see these last arms control limits simply expire.

That鈥檚 not the only sign President Trump is interested in some form of reengagement with Russia at a time when he is adopting an increasingly hostile tone toward China over the COVID-19 pandemic.

Last month, the White House arranged the dispatch of dozens of ventilators to help Russia deal with COVID-19. Interestingly, that came a month after Russia flew a planeload of medical supplies to New York 鈥� pointedly organized by two Russian companies subject to the U.S. economic sanctions imposed after Russia鈥檚 2014 annexation of Crimea.

President Trump also said this month that he plans to invite Russian President Vladimir Putin to the next meeting of the Group of Seven economically advanced democracies, due to take place in the U.S. 鈥� despite Russia鈥檚 suspension from the G-7 since Moscow鈥檚 intervention in Ukraine.

As with the New START talks, an invitation in itself would not necessarily mean any early move toward a thaw in relations. Again, there are likely to be obstacles, both practical and political: European G-7 members are less keen on a rapprochement with Russia, especially if it is aimed against China, and many members of the U.S. Congress on both sides of the aisle are skeptical as well.

They have not forgotten Russia鈥檚 interference in the 2016 presidential election 鈥� something that President Trump has downplayed or dismissed but which was confirmed not only by U.S. intelligence agencies but by a bipartisan majority on the Senate intelligence committee. That鈥檚 one reason the president has been frustrated in his long and openly stated desire to engage with the Russian leader and get a 鈥渇resh start鈥� on ties with Moscow.

But again as with New START, the underlying message of the president鈥檚 statement on the G-7 is important. It highlights the relevance of the administration鈥檚 growing tensions with China.

President Trump didn鈥檛 just mention adding President Putin to the guest list. He criticized the existing G-7 structure 鈥� grouping the U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan 鈥� as outdated. And he proposed inviting the leaders of a trio of democracies in China鈥檚 own neighborhood: India, Australia, and South Korea.

We鈥檝e been here before, in reverse

Whatever pushback he might get from the current G-7 to a formal expansion of the group, the broader strategic and geopolitical aim 鈥� paying much warier attention to China鈥檚 growing power 鈥� could well gather momentum. It could also outlast the Trump administration.

It was President Trump鈥檚 predecessor, President Barack Obama, who launched a diplomatic and military 鈥減ivot to Asia鈥� to take account of Beijing鈥檚 growing international influence and ambitions. And since the outbreak of COVID-19, which Chinese officials initially kept under political wraps, attitudes toward Beijing have been hardening among both Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress.

While there鈥檚 far less bipartisan appetite for easing sanctions or warming ties with Russia, the China factor could, over time, change that calculation.

In superpower diplomatic history, there is what might be called a mirror-image precedent for just such a diplomatic recalibration: President Richard Nixon鈥檚 surprise 1972 visit to China. That move, establishing diplomatic ties after decades of shunning Beijing鈥檚 Communist regime, was in part designed to strengthen America鈥檚 diplomatic hand against its main rival, the Soviet Union.

On the chess board of international strategy, could President Trump now be attempting a reverse Nixon gambit?