Why some see Latin America's populists in Donald Trump
Donald Trump might not be terribly well regarded in Latin America. Still, to understand el pelo de elote, some say, one should look south.
As the US election season has unfolded, a mounting number of academics, commentators, and assorted Latin Americanists have reflected upon what they see as uncanny parallels between Mr. Trump and the continent's long line of caudillos and populist leaders.
It鈥檚 generally not meant as flattery.
鈥淔or the first time, this feels like an election in a populist Latin American country,鈥� lamented the Miami Herald鈥檚 Andr茅s Oppenheimer . 鈥淯ntil now, political civility was a distinctive American trait.... I have seen too many of these improvised 鈥榮aviors of the fatherland鈥� in Latin America, and they always end up destroying their countries.鈥�
A notoriously slippery category, the term 鈥減opulism鈥� suffers from the same problem as 鈥渇ascism鈥�: as the Argentine political theorist Ernesto Laclau 鈥淥n Populist Reason,鈥� it鈥檚 rarely given precise meaning, often deployed as a pejorative, and at best, reduced to a series of general traits that can sometimes grow to include just about any politician or associated movement. And groundswells of anti-elite movements from both the left and right of the American political scene largely lead back to the problem of deepening inequality 鈥� a problem that can鈥檛 be airbrushed over, whatever the flaws of any single candidate.
鈥淧opulism tends to be prevalent in very unequal societies,鈥� Tufts University political economist Katrina Burgess 鈥淟atin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world 鈥� we鈥檙e no longer so far behind, if you look at our Gini coefficient,鈥� referring to a common measure of income inequality.
Still, many of the voices likening Mr. Trump to figures such as Venezuela鈥檚 Hugo Ch谩vez, Ecuador鈥檚 Rafael Correa, or historical leaders like Venezuela's Sim贸n Bol铆var聽and the Perons聽of Argentina consistently point to a clear set of common trademarks in political style. There鈥檚 to gain and rouse followers; invocations of humiliation at the hand of foreign powers; exaggerated gestures of machismo; violence at rallies; and perhaps most importantly, the claim to holding the secret to lifting the country from its malaise.
鈥淎 crucial component of this tradition is the assertion that role of 鈥榯he people鈥� is less to delegate power to representatives than to give it away to a patrimonial center 鈥� king, viceroy, dictator, or president 鈥� who organizes social energy through corporatist arrangements and his own charisma,鈥� Mexican historian Enrique Krauze in September. 鈥淭he leader promises, in effect, that 鈥業 alone can fix it鈥�.鈥�
Nor has yawning inequality alone determined the rise of this brand of populists. In a 1991 study, political scientists Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings for populism in the 1930s and 1940s: with regional governments unable to levy taxes on the wealthy, politicians found it easier to mobilize the working classes around policies that sought to replace foreign imports with domestic production.
That policy sounds a lot like Trump鈥檚 creed of 鈥淎merica First.鈥� And as much of the Republican Party has grown more deeply opposed to redistribution, this history may suggest that conservatism in a time of such inequality may hinge its viability on similar claims.
