US Navy lags in minesweeping, despite years of warnings and big defense budgets
The U.S. military is the mightiest and most well-funded in the world. Earlier this week, the administration requested a record $200 billion from Congress to further fund the war in Iran, which followed an announcement last year of a plan to raise the base defense budget to $1 trillion.
That doesn鈥檛 mean it can get whatever it wants. On March 14, President Donald Trump asked U.S. allies for help to protect ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
That help has not been forthcoming, though seven countries on Thursday saying that they supported the possibility of forming a coalition to reopen the narrow passage 鈥� a gesture short on specifics.
Why We Wrote This
The U.S. military is the most powerful and best-funded in the world, but sea-mine defense has become an example of how key capabilities can be lost or neglected. Now, the Navy must scramble to address minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz.
In the meantime, American Marines are on their way to the region, and the Trump administration is reportedly considering plans to send even more troops in a bid to restart commercial shipping in the strait.
Part of that effort might involve demining the waterway. Despite Iranian threats to deploy mines liberally, it is unclear how many, if any, mines U.S. forces would need to contend with. Some聽reports say a dozen have been confirmed in the Strait; others argue that if Iran had mined the waters already, it would be posting social media videos to prove it.
This is another arena in which the U.S. military is anything but dominant.
Demining is hard work for which the U.S. Navy is ill-prepared, analysts say. They cite warnings dating back to 1991 that highlighted the deterioration of the Navy鈥檚 capabilities for mine countermeasures.
鈥淲e definitely need to put more emphasis on MCM [mine countermeasures] and end the neglect that has plagued this area for years,鈥� Vice Adm. Stan Arthur, then commander of the 7th Fleet, wrote in the U.S. Naval Institute鈥檚 nearly 35 years ago.
It has been, the聽Center for Maritime Strategy聽put it last year, 鈥渁n exploitable gap in America鈥檚 maritime defenses.鈥�
Well aware of this shortfall, officials at Central Command, which runs U.S. military operations in the Middle East, estimated last week that it has destroyed 16 minelaying vessels and a number of storage bunkers for naval mines.
What happened to the U.S. military鈥檚 minesweeping capabilities?
The short answer is that in the high-tech aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the counterinsurgency campaigns of the new millennium, the Navy did not prioritize minesweeping.
The Center for Maritime Strategy study also warned that the U.S. military was dismantling its 鈥渁lready-limited鈥� minesweeping measures without reliable replacements.
鈥淭he current state of American minesweeping capability is grim,鈥� it reported, echoing decades of warnings since the Korean War, in which enemy mines caused 70% of all U.S. Navy casualties and sank four U.S. naval vessels.
At the height of the Cold War, the Navy had plenty of specialized ships and even helicopters dedicated to mine countermeasures. 鈥淭he U.S. Navy understood that the ability to keep sea lanes open was fundamental to every other mission it might be asked to perform,鈥� notes Emma Salisbury, a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute鈥檚 National Security Program.
But in subsequent decades, the Navy drew down its MCM forces. The 鈥渃ritical institutional blow,鈥� as Dr. Salisbury calls it, came in 2006, when the Navy dismantled its Mine Warfare Command.
As a result, the Navy鈥檚 minesweeping capabilities atrophied as their central organization was lost, she adds. With that loss went advocacy for minesweeping 鈥渨hen it came to the defense budget process.鈥欌��
The Navy had planned to replace its minesweepers with specially equipped Littoral Combat Ships, or LCSs. But that was also a bust. A from the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that the LCS fleet has 鈥渟everal significant challenges, including the ship鈥檚 ability to defend itself if attacked and failure rates of mission-essential equipment.鈥�
Other standard-issue LCSs are being decommissioned just a couple of years after commissioning because of the 鈥渞idiculous amount of problems鈥� with their design and technology, says Ethan Connell, a lead researcher at the Taiwan Security Monitor, an online research initiative at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and co-author of the Center for Maritime Security study.
The U.S. government tried to sell some of these ships to Greece in 2024, but Greek officials declined because of their expense and unreliability.
鈥淚t would have been absurd to accept them,鈥� Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias said at the time. 鈥淣o, a thousand times no.鈥�
Why and how have U.S. allies with smaller militaries retained theirs?
They had to, largely because World War II-era mines were 鈥� and are 鈥� still being discovered in seas and along shorelines.
鈥淚 know in the [United Kingdom] there are regular press stories about someone finding an old naval mine that鈥檚 washed up on a beach,鈥� Dr. Salisbury says. 鈥淥bviously, they need to be very carefully disposed of, so a lot of the capabilities have been used since then to help get rid of those.鈥�
Over the years, NATO allies France, Germany, and the U.K. have retained these minesweeping skills, analysts say. The Italian Navy recently bought five minesweepers for $1.75 billion, 鈥渁 sensible allocation of resources for a critical capability,鈥� according to the Center for Maritime Strategy report.
Belgium and the Netherlands in particular are 鈥渞eally good鈥� at doing the job, with capabilities 鈥渙ut of all proportion to their overall fleet size,鈥� Dr. Salisbury adds.
As a result, 鈥淎merica鈥檚 most capable mine warfare training鈥� now happens at the Naval Academy in Belgium, she notes. The absurdity, she adds, is that the U.S., 鈥渨ith a defense budget billions of dollars larger than any of these nations, is borrowing expertise in Belgium.鈥�
Where do U.S. minesweeping capabilities stand now?
Until last year, the Navy had eight Avenger-class minesweeping ships, all roughly 40 years old and made of laminated oak, which is designed to not trigger mines. But the U.S. retired half of those ships in 2025. The remaining four are currently docked in Japan.
The Navy had also planned to replace the Avengers with LCSs, equipped with high-tech helicopters and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) for mine-hunting.
But the LCS ships came in roughly 70% over budget, with mine countermeasures technology available only about 30% of the time, one study found.
鈥淚t has so many single points of failure,鈥� Mr. Connell says.
One notable issue is that the USVs have trouble seeing mines. During tests off the California coast, they often failed to detect mines 鈥� or mistakenly 鈥渟aw鈥� mines that weren鈥檛 there.
鈥淚f that鈥檚 happening off the clear waters of southern California, think about what it鈥檚 going to do in the turbid and murky waters of the Strait of Hormuz,鈥� Mr. Connell adds.
There are currently three LCSs that could do the job. Their home port is in Bahrain, but two of them are now in Malaysia. The other is in the Indian Ocean.
Even if those ships could get to the Middle East quickly with their working technology intact, the demining process is time-consuming.
It takes about six hours to prepare and calibrate systems before each mission. Then, when a potential mine is detected, the LCS sends out a USV to gather and analyze data. 鈥淚f it鈥檚 questionable, it sends the drone out again. It does a different pattern to gather more data, and then it analyzes it again,鈥� Mr. Connell says.
It can take four hours per mine, conservatively, from detection to destruction, he adds.
鈥淚t鈥檚 a very, very slow, painstaking business.鈥�
