After Afghanistan, what kind of wars does Pentagon want to fight?
As the last of the U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan and closed the books on the longest war in American history, the general consensus seemed to be that politicians won鈥檛 be asking the Pentagon to do that again anytime soon.
The 鈥渢hat鈥� includes sending hundreds of thousands of troops, as was the case at the height of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, to win hearts and minds in a counterinsurgency campaign. For 20 years, the U.S. military was enlisted in the laudable if unrealized goal of creating a representative democracy 鈥� or at least a tolerably functioning inclusive state.聽
Yet the Pentagon鈥檚 boots-on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan will nonetheless leave a lasting imprint on military doctrine in ways that will continue to shape its leaders. That鈥檚 even as their focus pivots to what many consider to be the Department of Defense comfort zone of 鈥済reat power competition鈥� in places like Asia.聽
Why We Wrote This
Politicians may be eager to turn the page on intractable counterinsurgency wars, as they did after Vietnam. But military leaders recognize that they may have to fight another such war in the future.
鈥淎 whole part of the pivot to Asia and great power competition 鈥� there is a threat there, and I don鈥檛 want to minimize it 鈥� but the enthusiasm with which this administration and the previous administration has seized on that threat is also the desire to fight the kind of wars we want to fight,鈥� says Frederick Kagan, an architect of the surge of U.S. forces into Iraq and senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.聽
In the wake of Vietnam, and again with America鈥檚 inglorious exit from Afghanistan, counterinsurgency has undoubtedly become 鈥渃ompletely unfashionable,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut it鈥檚 an American myth that says we always get to choose the wars we fight.鈥澛�
The failures of Afghanistan will be scrutinized on Capitol Hill this week, with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifying before Senate and House Armed Services lawmakers on Tuesday and Wednesday. And while the failures of nation-building聽that relies聽on military might seem apparent, there are still聽conventional conflicts where聽U.S. military power can excel. But the experiences in Afghanistan also offer lessons for U.S. enemies, too.
The wars the Pentagon wants to fight 鈥渁re always rapid, high-intensity, and decisive,鈥� says retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, who helped to write the Army鈥檚 counterinsurgency field manual and is now a visiting professor of national security at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. And, on that front, the American military remains unparalleled.聽
Yet for that very reason, military leaders who grew up on the battlegrounds of Iraq and Afghanistan are well aware that 鈥渢he wars our smart enemies will choose will be slow, grinding, and indecisive, largely as a result of our conventional military successes,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey will be much more like Vietnam and the counterinsurgency phases of Iraq and Afghanistan than World War III with China.鈥�
Leaders would ostensibly seem ready to put the counterinsurgency field manuals on a high shelf, not to be dusted off for quite some time, as they did post-Vietnam. However, 鈥渕y overriding thought is that we may no longer be interested in counterinsurgency, but doesn鈥檛 mean that insurgencies are no longer interested in us,鈥� Dr. Nagl adds.
For now, though, the Senate Armed Services Committee鈥檚 Future of Defense Task Force 2020 report warns that China represents 鈥渢he most significant economic and national security threat to the United States over the next 20 to 30 years.鈥� Because of its nuclear arsenal and ongoing efforts to undermine Western democratic governments, Russia 鈥減resents the most immediate threat.鈥澛�
That means that defense budgets will be getting boosts in areas like long-range rockets and missile defense, as well as artificial intelligence and biotechnology. These 鈥渨ill have an outsized impact on national security鈥� since 鈥渢he potential of losing this race to China carries significant economic, political, and ethical risks鈥� for the U.S., the task force report argues.聽
Even as its priorities pivot, however, Pentagon leaders will continue to face a range of global threats and responsibilities.
At a typical news conference earlier this month, for example, the press secretary fielded questions on reports of North Korea鈥檚 successful test of long-range cruise missiles; accountability for a drone strike meant for an Islamic State operative that accidentally killed civilians, including children; prospects for counterterrorism operations in Africa; response to a measles outbreak among Afghan evacuees; National Guard involvement in a demonstration in support of Jan. 6 Capitol Hill rioters; and concerns that Guinean Special Forces trained by U.S. Green Berets had launched a military coup against their government.聽
For threats that range from predictable to far-fetched, the Pentagon must have plans in place. That said, 鈥淲e tend to have champagne strategies on beer budgets,鈥� says retired Brig. Gen. Tom Cosentino, who previously served as the commandant for the National War College. 鈥淲hen it comes time to start making choices on where to put our resources, I think it鈥檚 inevitable coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan and dealing with a pretty aggressive Chinese competitor, we鈥檙e going to see a shift into much more high-tech and high-intensity conflict focus.鈥澛�
Mr. Cosentino recalls his time in midcareer military classrooms. 鈥淚 remember very well sitting in my intel officer鈥檚 advanced course in 1990 to 1991 and talking about low-intensity conflict, and putting it in the context of Latin America, El Salvador, the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas], and so on. It never really leaves the doctrine. It鈥檚 there 鈥� it鈥檚 just how much of an emphasis it gets, and how much training you put against it.聽
鈥淚f demands on the military are to fund rockets and missile defense to help with an island-chain deterrent strategy in the Pacific, then that鈥檚 where the money will go. And one of the bill payers could be that capacity to do counterinsurgency,鈥� he adds. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think it gets lost, but follow the money.鈥澛�
That said, since 9/11 the U.S. military has developed a 鈥減retty good ability鈥� and knowledge within its special operations forces to pivot from counterterrorism operations to the training operations that are often at the core of hearts-and-minds campaigns, Mr. Cosentino says.
And while politicians may shy away from counterinsurgency for a time, the awareness of the importance of winning over civilians in what鈥檚 known as 鈥減opulation-centric warfare鈥� is likely to stay with military leadership. 聽
It is certainly a lesson that Moscow has embraced as it has watched the U.S. efforts聽to win over the population聽in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Dr. Kagan says.
鈥淔ascinatingly, the guys who really got this was the Russians.鈥� He points to hybrid warfare campaigns that include targeting the U.S. population with social media barrages in its efforts to disrupt U.S. elections.聽
Such developments are at the heart of the 鈥渘ever agains鈥� of Afghanistan, he adds. 鈥淲e cannot repeat the post-Vietnam mistake of jettisoning everything we just learned about this conflict.鈥� Though the number of troops with combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan will inevitably wash some of the knowledge out of the ranks, 鈥減eople will fight to retain it.鈥澛�
In the upper echelons of military strategic thinking, many of the critical lessons of America鈥檚 post-9/11 wars are yet to be determined, but will make 鈥減erfect curriculum鈥� for the National War College and other military institutions of higher knowledge, Mr. Cosentino says.聽
鈥淲e鈥檙e always trying 鈥� at least if we鈥檙e effective 鈥� to put things in an historical context, to open the aperture of our students to think more strategically about the intersection of hard and soft power, how that operates,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd how you make the hard decisions.鈥�
