This message, specifically, involved telling Iraqi officials and military leaders that they had better learn everything they could from US trainers, because the US was leaving in December 2011.
鈥淎s the Iraqis stand up, the US can stand down,鈥� was the oft-repeated credo of US commanders in the region in the run-up to the US military鈥檚 2011 departure.
Now that the US is back in Iraq again, does this mean that other international partners will expect the US to come back and rescue them whenever they need it, which in turn might be a disincentive to absorbing the skills that US troops are trying to impart whenever the Pentagon decides to take on a training mission elsewhere in the world?
鈥淚 think this is a challenge that is a tradeoff between giving partner forces enough support that you鈥檙e going to be there for them, but not creating a dependency on the US,鈥� Scharre says. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 what we鈥檝e been grappling with for a decade-plus in Iraq and Afghanistan.鈥�
The tricky part is figuring out what behavior that a hard cutoff date, for example, may inadvertently incentivize, he adds.
鈥淚f you tell partners, 鈥楲isten, we鈥檙e leaving so you guys have got to figure this out,鈥� for them 鈥榝iguring this out鈥� may not mean 鈥榗oming together to solve sectarian disputes,鈥� 鈥� Scharre says. 鈥淚t may mean 鈥榓rm yourselves for the coming civil war.鈥� This may be in their best interest 鈥� but it鈥檚 not in our best interest.鈥�
