Panetta and Petraeus differed in their assessment of the Benghazi attack. The initial intelligence reports provided to the president suggested that the attack in Benghazi was 鈥渢he work of mob protesters rather than an organized assault.鈥�
Petraeus, working with CIA analysts, had come to this conclusion and presented it in the White House situation room the day after the attack.
鈥淚 questioned it from the beginning,鈥� Panetta writes, 鈥渘ot because I had different information, but because it seemed to me that most spontaneous demonstrators don鈥檛 arrive for a protest carrying rocket-propelled grenade launchers.鈥�
Petraeus 鈥渄efended the theory of his analysts, however, arguing that there was so much weaponry floating around Libya that it was plausible in this instance.鈥�
That theory was made into talking points for the House Intelligence Committee. 鈥淎lthough they weren鈥檛 intended for use by UN ambassador Susan Rice, she used them during several interviews she gave that weekend,鈥� undercutting the claim by some, Panetta argues, that the talking points 鈥渨ere specifically written for Rice so she could 鈥榤islead鈥� the country,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭o the contrary, it was the working premise of CIA analysts as of that time.
That 鈥渋ntelligence is difficult and often contradictory,鈥� he adds 鈥渟hould surprise nobody.鈥�
