Early in the Afghanistan war, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld praised US Special Operations Forces for the pivotal role they played in routing the Taliban. Later, as the Taliban returned to Afghanistan and the US military became mired in a protracted counterinsurgency fight, senior US officials once again turned to special operators. This year, President Obama publicly pointed to the traditionally hush-hush force鈥檚 role in killing Al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden.
In the wars to come, their role is only likely to grow, says Mr. Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Throughout the Cold War and up until 9/11, the Pentagon 鈥渋nsisted that Special Forces maintain an ability to partner" with the forces of other countries, he says.
Today, they have become premier irregular warfighters in their own right. As a result, they are less focused partnering with foreign forces and stabilizing those countries from within, 鈥渓eaving a lot of that to the regular old military,鈥 says Frier
That鈥檚 because in many ways the scale of the rebuilding task in Iraq and Afghanistan simply exceeded the ability of Special Forces. 鈥淚t was almost a foregone conclusion that you鈥檇 have to involve regular ground forces in this Herculean task,鈥 adds Freier.
The result: 鈥淚t has really freed up space for special operators to focus on this 鈥榙irect action mission鈥 鈥 or targeted strikes on high-value insurgents. 鈥淭his has always been part of their repertoire, but until 9/11 it was more discreet,鈥 Freier adds. 鈥淚t was not the normal routine of the Special Forces.鈥
In the decade of fighting America鈥檚 current wars, Special Forces have become 鈥渢hese fine tuned instruments,鈥 he adds. Whether they eventually return to their traditional mandate of operating with the indigenous forces of partner states remains to be seen.
Yet their role in the future is likely not to be limited to the war on terror, Freier says. 鈥淢y sense is that we鈥檝e learned a great deal about the value of using discreet operators to handle some of these missions that require low visibility entry, discretion, and striking high value targets in the most discriminating fashion,鈥 he adds.
Bombings through Predator strikes, for example, 鈥渃an鈥檛 verify that you鈥檝e got the target 鈥 that sort of positive identification is only possible face-to-face."
What is clear, Freier says, is that the demand for special operators 鈥渋s going to remain quite high for some time to come.鈥