State Department cuts raise a question: What is the US national interest?
-
Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Washington
As he prepared for a July trip to Malaysia to attend a regional meeting of ministers 鈥� his first visit to Asia as secretary of state 鈥� Marco Rubio turned to the State Department鈥檚 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs鈥� multilateral affairs office.
The experts鈥� task: to bring Mr. Rubio up to speed on the complexities of U.S. interests in the vast Indo-Pacific 鈥� a region the Trump administration has declared to be its top priority in an era of intensifying big-power competition.
Before Mr. Rubio had even returned home from the meeting, however, the State Department announced that the East Asian multilateral affairs office was being shuttered, and its experts shown the door.
Why We Wrote This
The Trump administration says it is downsizing the State Department to make it more nimble. Critics say the staff cuts will hobble the agency.
That was just one small piece of a larger downsizing and streamlining of State Department operations. More than 1,350 officers and diplomats 鈥� many of them with extensive experience in critical areas of the world 鈥� were fired. Entire offices, such as the one for East Asian multilateral affairs, were dismantled.
Mr. Rubio describes the reforms as a drive to create a more nimble and efficient State Department for the 21st聽century. Supporters of President Donald Trump鈥檚 鈥淎merica First鈥� foreign policy, in Congress and elsewhere, say the department had strayed from serving U.S. national interests. Instead, they see it promoting what Mr. Rubio calls a 鈥渞adical ideology鈥� and a 鈥渨oke鈥� agenda, putting issues such as women鈥檚 rights, climate change mitigation, and democratization above the interests of the American people.
Many foreign policy experts and experienced diplomats, though, warn that the loss of expertise in so many critical areas of foreign policy dangerously weakens the depth and breadth of U.S. diplomatic capabilities.
鈥淭he world is complex and only getting more complex, but when I look at the reform, I see that the understanding of that complexity has been squashed out,鈥� says Piper Campbell, a retired U.S. diplomat who specialized in Asia and now chairs the Department of Foreign Policy and Global Security at American University in Washington.
The downsizing, she adds, means 鈥渨e lose perspective, and we lose expertise, at a time when they are more needed than ever.鈥�
鈥淲hat the world sees from all this turmoil ... is retreat, U.S. callousness, U.S. transactionalism, and unreliability,鈥� says Gregory Poling, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington.
鈥淣one of these are things you want to be showcasing,鈥� he says, 鈥渆specially in a region where you are competing with the power you maintain is your biggest rival,鈥� which is China.
U.S. foreign policy streamlined, or shrunk?
The elimination of the East Asia bureau鈥檚 multilateral affairs office will weaken Washington鈥檚 influence and image in the critical South China Sea region, Mr. Poling says, and leave U.S. strategy at the mercy of a 鈥渓ess coordinated, more unpredictable, and more politically driven foreign-policy planning process.鈥�
State Department officials say the reforms will instead streamline the foreign policy process and eliminate costly duplication of functions.
In remarks before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July, Michael Rigas, the deputy secretary of state for management and resources, said the downsizing is aimed at building a more efficient foreign policy apparatus focused on U.S. national interests.
鈥淔or too long, single-issue offices have mushroomed in number and influence,鈥� he said, 鈥渙ften distorting our foreign policy objectives to serve their specific interests, slowing down the department鈥檚 ability to function.鈥�
For Mr. Poling, the reduction in the number of experts and the range of their expertise risks being 鈥渄isastrous鈥� for U.S. global relations, not least in Asia.
He points to India鈥檚 recent drift 鈥� away from its role as a key U.S. partner in countering China鈥檚 regional rise and toward closer relations with both Beijing and Moscow 鈥� as a prime example of how a weakened foreign-policy process is affecting big-power relations.
鈥淭he India relationship is in real crisis, and much of the blame for that is structural,鈥� he says. 鈥淎 depleted State Department is left to react to decisions coming from a president who has made clear he doesn鈥檛 want advisers who will steer him away from what he wants to do.鈥�
Reform long overdue?
Proponents of Secretary Rubio鈥檚 overhaul say it is long overdue, and necessary to recenter U.S. foreign policy on core national interests.
In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, A. Wess Mitchell, a former assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, argues that the post-Cold War era of unchallenged U.S. supremacy allowed the nation鈥檚 diplomacy to go soft, preoccupied by 鈥渇ix the world鈥� social and environmental issues.
That means the State Department no longer serves the interests of all Americans and is ill-equipped to take on the challenges of a world dominated by big-power rivalries, argues Dr. Mitchell, now a principal at the Marathon Initiative in Washington.
鈥淭he progressive causes that the department has embraced in recent years may be popular in California or Sweden,鈥� he writes, 鈥渂ut they are often irrelevant or even antagonistic to the world鈥檚 developing countries and traditional societies, many of which are located in the very parts of Asia and Africa that are at the forefront of great-power competition.鈥�
Advocates of the 鈥渟oft power鈥� approach do not agree.
鈥淎merica鈥檚 strength has always come from integrating our foreign policy with our values,鈥� says Uzra Zeya, who served as undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights during the Biden administration.
Those values include 鈥渟upport for universal freedoms, free and fair elections, women鈥檚 and LGBTQ rights,鈥� says Ms. Zeya, who now heads Human Rights First, a New York based advocacy group. And those principles also sit comfortably with big-power competition, she says. 鈥淚t is not an either/or.鈥�
U.S. national security and prosperity 鈥� and thus the interests of the American people 鈥� will be best served by pursuing both, she says, offering an example. 鈥淲e know from experience that peace agreements that involve women ... last longer. That is a positive for the women who are empowered,鈥� she adds, 鈥渂ut it also enhances international security and ends up serving all of us.鈥�
Ms. Campbell, of American University, says she has noticed recently a rising confidence among Chinese scholars that a U.S. retreat from soft-power initiatives and alliance-building is enabling China鈥檚 global rise.
鈥淒iplomacy is about influencing others to want to work in the same direction that we do,鈥� she says. 鈥淭hat is not 鈥榮oft鈥� or 鈥榳oke,鈥� it鈥檚 smart and strategic.鈥�
