NATO: Does old squabble over costs mask US shift away from Europe?
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Brussels
When President Trump told a rally in Montana last week that Americans are 鈥渟chmucks鈥� for carrying the defense burden of wealthy European countries, he set the stage for another contentious meeting with US allies at the NATO summit here Wednesday.
But the bit of coarse presidential hyperbole also raised anew a question that has nagged US presidents since the end of the cold war. It鈥檚 a question that has only sharpened under an 鈥淎merica first鈥� president who broadly questions the many multilateral arrangements the United States has led since World War II.
In short, it鈥檚 this: Is NATO worth it? Do American taxpayers, and what Trump refers to as the American 鈥減iggy bank,鈥� get their money鈥檚 worth for participating in and indeed leading Europe鈥檚 defense?
Why We Wrote This
US presidents have long wrestled with the question, Is NATO worth it? A consensus might be: Yes, though Europe should pay more. But leaders there worry that something more fundamental is at play.
Some national security experts concur with Trump鈥檚 campaign pronouncement that NATO is 鈥渙bsolete,鈥� insisting that the 29-nation organization has outlived its purpose and is too bureaucratic and unwieldy. The legitimate common threats the alliance members face, they say, could be more efficiently met through less costly coalitions of willing partners, depending on the particular threat being addressed.
But many others say that the US, as the world鈥檚 sole superpower, gets more than what it pays for out of an alliance that provides it with partners for its far-flung military operations 鈥� Afghanistan is one example 鈥� and that buttresses a Western-led global order on which America鈥檚 prosperity rests.
Europe鈥檚 wealthy countries should indeed pay their 鈥渇air share鈥� (as Trump says) of the cost of this bulwark of transatlantic stability and prosperity, these other experts say 鈥� but that doesn鈥檛 negate the good deal they see the US getting from NATO.
鈥淣ATO is probably the best military alliance in history, there鈥檚 not much doubt that the United States would be less secure and less prosperous if it had to do on its own what it has been able to do collectively with its NATO allies,鈥� says Michael O鈥橦anlon, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy issues at the Brookings Institution in Washington. 鈥淚n that sense it鈥檚 been and still is an excellent bargain for the American taxpayer.鈥�
But being a 鈥済ood deal鈥� for Americans doesn鈥檛 change the reality that NATO is also a 鈥渂ad deal in the sense that we are paying more than our fair share,鈥� Mr. O鈥橦anlon adds. 鈥淥n that part Donald Trump is right 鈥� but it鈥檚 also true he鈥檚 not the first American president to point this out.鈥�
Doubts about the need for a cold-war military alliance blossomed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the brief advent of the 鈥渆nd of history鈥� period. The 9/11 attacks 鈥� and more recently聽Western fears of a revanchist Russia 鈥� quieted much of the questioning of NATO鈥檚 continued existence.
The US burden
But at the same time the alliance鈥檚 newfound purpose prompted both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama to demand of European allies that they reverse steady declines in defense spending and take on more of the burden of meeting the new security challenges.
Mr. Obama even chided America鈥檚 NATO allies as 鈥渇ree riders.鈥�
Critics of the North Atlantic alliance like to point out that US military expenditures account for about 70 percent of NATO members鈥� total military spending. Others call this a misleading figure, since the US as a superpower has global reach and ambitions well beyond those of its NATO partners.
More to the point, says O鈥橦anlon, is the fact that while Europe鈥檚 collective gross domestic product is slightly higher than that of the US, its military spending is less than half that of the US. While the US spends more than 3 percent of GDP on defense, only 8 of NATO鈥檚 29 members are expected this year to reach the alliance goal of each member spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024.
Germany, Europe鈥檚 largest economy, spends just over 1 percent of GDP on defense. Indeed, it was the news from Germany鈥檚 defense minister that Europe鈥檚 economic powerhouse, while increasing military spending annually, would reach only 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024 that appears more than anything to have set off Trump鈥檚 tirade against NATO allies.
On the other hand, analysts in Europe are quick to point out that US pressures have gotten results.
Value of the alliance
Recent studies show Europe to be the region of the world with the fastest-rising defense budgets 鈥� a title long held by the Middle East 鈥� says Tomas Valasek, a former NATO ambassador for the Slovak Republic who is now director of Carnegie Europe in Brussels.
鈥淭he defense core of the alliance is surprisingly healthy, more NATO members are taking on new duties, and perhaps most important, one could argue that the ability to convince somebody like Russia not to do something foolish against any member of the alliance has never been better,鈥� Mr. Valasek says. 鈥淭he role NATO plays in preventing that kind of destabilizing conflict has to be worth quite a lot to the US,鈥� he adds.
Moreover, he points out that NATO in recent years has deployed Forward Defense Battlegroups in the three Baltic counties and Poland 鈥� one of which, in Lithuania, is led by Germany, a development Valasek deems 鈥減olitically remarkable.鈥�
Still, some analysts say it is not so much Trump鈥檚 fractious rhetoric over military spending and unfair burden-sharing, but a much broader questioning of the value of the transatlantic alliance to the US, that has European leaders worried.
鈥淲hat鈥檚 troubling is not that the American president is pressuring European allies on spending, that鈥檚 an old story,鈥� says Ian Lesser, executive director of the German Marshall Fund鈥檚 Transatlantic Center in Brussels. 鈥淲hat has many people anxious is the much more worrisome possibility that this president, instead of really caring that much about what European allies are spending on defense, just doesn鈥檛 see Europe and the alliance built with them as central to American geopolitical interests.鈥�
Adds Mr. Lesser, 鈥淲hat more people are wondering is if what we are witnessing might be the end of America鈥檚 100-year-old pivot to Europe.鈥�
Defending wealthy countries
However it is not just the current occupant of the White House, but some national security analysts as well who question the value of NATO to the US.
鈥淵es, in my humble opinion, NATO is obsolete, maybe more like a zombie 鈥� dead but still walking,鈥� says Michael Desch, director of the International Security Center at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana.
In Dr. Desch鈥檚 view, the problem with NATO is not so much what it costs the US, but how its structure, with the US at its helm, discourages European countries from matching their powerful economies with a defense that would allow them to stand on their own feet.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not that the spending is going to break our bank, nor is it that we are getting nothing for our money,鈥� says Desch 鈥� who considers Trump鈥檚 red-meat rhetoric about allies at political rallies and the president鈥檚 mixing of transatlantic security issues with trade differences 鈥渉am-handed at best.鈥� The problem he sees 鈥渋s that we are spending a lot to defend wealthy countries that face a threat nowhere near what it was at the time of the cold war.鈥�
Yes, he adds, the US is doing some important things with European allies, but in his view it鈥檚 nothing that requires keeping up a bureaucratic structure 鈥渢hat has outlived its purpose.鈥�
NATO defenders say that kind of thinking far underestimates Russia鈥檚 aggressiveness and the threats that failing to stand up to Russian provocations in Eastern Europe could eventually pose to US peace and prosperity. Moreover, they say, it overlooks the post-cold-war tasks NATO has taken on in counterterrorism and in stabilization efforts, including armed forces training and development in Afghanistan and the southern Mediterranean region.
This week鈥檚 summit is set to approve a new NATO training mission for the Iraqi military.
Not 'normal times'
But NATO backers acknowledge that positions like those espoused by Desch seem to be closer to the president鈥檚 thinking on the uncertain value to the US of a military alliance like NATO.
Valasek of Carnegie Europe says the irony he sees is that this week鈥檚 NATO summit is set to formalize a number of collective-defense initiatives that under normal conditions could demonstrate the alliance鈥檚 value 鈥� including to US taxpayers. For example, NATO leaders will put their stamp on a new deterrence plan aimed at boosting the capacity to deliver forces in short order to back up the forward-defense battalions 鈥� a measure intended to reassure NATO鈥檚 eastern-most members and to deter Russia.
But for the transatlantic alliance, these are not 鈥渘ormal times,鈥� he says. The problem that is dawning on European leaders is not a US president haranguing them to spend more, he says, but a US president who 鈥渕ay not see Europe鈥檚 defense as a core American interest.鈥�
鈥淚鈥檓 beginning to think that the NATO allies鈥� spending is just a red herring, that it doesn鈥檛 really matter what the Europeans spend on defense,鈥� Valasek says. 鈥淲hat matters is that whatever else we do in this alliance between America and Europe, we know that the president鈥檚 heart is not in it.鈥�
