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When President Trump launched 59 tomahawk cruise missiles in April over evidence Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had again used chemical weapons on civilians, proponents of a deeper US involvement in Syria rejoiced.

Here was the sign they鈥檇 been waiting for, that Mr. Trump would go beyond former President Barack Obama鈥檚 narrowly focused effort to degrade and eventually defeat the so-called Islamic State.

The tomahawks announced 鈥� at least these advocates thought 鈥� a more expansive strategy combining the battle to destroy ISIS in Syria and neighboring Iraq with fights Mr. Obama never wanted to get into. Among them, a deeper role in Syria鈥檚 civil war on the side of the forces arrayed against Mr. Assad, and a specific effort to prevent Assad鈥檚 allies, above all Iran, from laying even deeper roots in Syria and the region.

Now the proponents of deeper Syria involvement are wondering if it was all wishful thinking.

As the Pentagon prepares to release in the coming weeks the revised strategy on ISIS and Syria that Trump ordered shortly after his inauguration, signs are multiplying that the strategy won鈥檛 deviate substantially from Obama鈥檚. And that has some Syria analysts worried.

鈥淭hus far the Trump administration has simply continued the strategy that it inherited from the Obama administration, and nothing indicates that鈥檚 about to change,鈥� says Jennifer Cafarella, an expert on Syria and Islamist extremist organizations at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington.

鈥淭he tomahawk strike was a tactical deviation, it was something Obama was not willing to do, but it now appears that it was an isolated action that did not portend a change in the overall policy towards Syria,鈥� Ms. Cafarella says. 鈥淗owever, the same limited strategy is not going to address Syria鈥檚 deeper conflicts,鈥� she adds, 鈥渁nd that means it鈥檚 not going to really destroy ISIS and keep it or some equivalent from coming back.鈥�

The Trump administration鈥檚 principal goal remains to destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria by ending the group鈥檚 hold on territory and wiping out as many of its leaders and fighters as possible. Beyond that, administration officials indicate the US aim is to calm the fighting in Syria鈥檚 other war 鈥� a civil war now in its seventh year 鈥� so that the country鈥檚 warring factions can find a political solution and Syria鈥檚 millions of internally displaced and far-flung refugees can eventually return home.

Root causes

At a White House press briefing last week previewing the president鈥檚 trip to Europe 鈥� including Trump鈥檚 first meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin 鈥� national security adviser H.R. McMaster described US priorities in Syria as 鈥渢he need to deescalate the Syrian civil war, to defeat ISIS there, and to end that disastrous humanitarian catastrophe.鈥�

And in a statement Wednesday night, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that the priority after ISIS鈥檚 鈥渇raudulent caliphate鈥� is dismantled should be on achieving 鈥渟tability鈥� so that Syrians can begin rebuilding their lives. Noting Trump planned to raise the Syrian conflict when he meets Mr. Putin Friday, Mr. Tillerson singled out Russia as having special responsibility in stabilizing Syria since it is the 鈥済uarantor鈥� of the Assad regime.

The problem some Syria analysts see with this strategy is that it does nothing to address the root cause of a conflict that created the space for ISIS to come in and lay hold to large swaths of Syrian territory: the Assad regime and its despotic and murderous rule over Syria鈥檚 Sunni Muslim majority.

If anything, Pentagon officials are suggesting a 鈥渂e our guest鈥� approach to Assad regime troops 鈥� and allied forces including Iranian-led militias 鈥� seeking to seize territory abandoned by ISIS fighters as they continue to retreat from the Sunni-populated territory they held for more than two years.

Other Syria analysts warn that as US-backed Syrian opposition forces continue to advance with the assistance and guidance of about 1,000 US troops 鈥� for example in the battle to take back the city of Raqqa, the ISIS administrative capital 鈥� the US is becoming a de facto occupier in Syria.

Growing risk of clashes

And one serious risk some foresee of a sustained US presence in Syria is a growing likelihood of the US confronting 鈥� and clashing with 鈥� not just Assad government forces, but outside supporters including Iran.

That has begun to happen, for instance, in Syria鈥檚 southeastern desert, where US special forces and their anti-Assad allies repeatedly have exchanged fire with Iranian-backed militias near a strategically important border crossing at Tanf.

鈥淭he US is creating a zone of influence over an expanding chunk of Syrian territory as the forces it is backing take control of more and more land,鈥� says Nicolas Heras, a fellow in Middle East security affairs at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. 鈥淏ut if an advancing Assad feels he needs to dislodge the US,鈥� he adds, 鈥渢he Iranians will be there to help him do it.鈥�

So far the US military says it has no interest in confronting Iran or in stopping Assad from retaking territory abandoned by ISIS fighters. Indeed, in a recent press conference, the spokesman for the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in Baghdad said any effort by Assad forces and their allies to take back territory still held by ISIS 鈥渨ould be welcomed鈥� by the US-led coalition.

鈥淲e as a coalition are not in the land-grab business. We are in the killing-ISIS business,鈥� said Army Col. Ryan Dillon. 鈥淭hat is what we want to do, and if the Syrian regime wants to鈥� recapture of ISIS-held territory, 鈥渨e absolutely have no problem with that.鈥�

Still, Mr. Heras believes the US could end up in a clash with Iran if the Syrian forces that the US and Iran are each supporting end up battling for the same territory. If Iran were to kill US forces, even inadvertently, that could lead to a major confrontation between the two adversaries, he posits.

Moreover, a fight between the US and Iran could draw in the Russians, who otherwise have no interest in coming to blows with the US in Syria, Heras says.

A long presence in Syria

The US denials of 鈥渓and-grab鈥� interests to the contrary, Mr. Heras says the US is already the dominant power influence over about a quarter of Syrian territory holding as much as 15 percent of the Syrian population 鈥� a chunk he expects will expand as US and US-backed forces advance.

鈥淥ver time and given the trends we see, as much as 40 percent of territory and 25 percent of the population could end up in a US zone of influence,鈥� Heras says. 鈥淥bviously that鈥檚 significant.鈥�

The real question, he says, is what does the US plan to do with the areas of Syria it more or less controls? Heras speculates the US will seek to keep small 鈥渇orward-operating bases鈥� in the territory controlled by US-backed forces for maintaining a counterterrorism mission and 鈥渇or keeping tabs on the Iranians.鈥� He expects the US military, already granted broad leeway by Trump to formulate Syria operations, will still be in Syria at the end of the president鈥檚 term in 2020.

But others say such a strategy will do little to achieve what the US insists is its main goal in Syria 鈥� destroying ISIS and keeping it (or some facsimile, perhaps Al Qaeda) from roaring back.

鈥淯ntil policy changes, until the US formulates a strategy that includes taking on Assad in a way that politically empowers the local Sunni populations and allows them to believe they have a future in Syria, we are not going to definitively win the war against ISIS,鈥� says ISW鈥檚 Cafarella. 鈥淭he coalition may be winning every tactical battle,鈥� she adds, 鈥渂ut we鈥檙e not going to win the war because we鈥檙e not addressing the reasons the population accepted ISIS in the first place.鈥�

The US so far is showing no interest in repeating the kind of costly and heavy-footed political reconstruction projects it carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the zones US-backed forces have taken back from ISIS, the US military has focused on bringing in food and other emergency supplies while leaving the heavy lifting of reestablishing services and addressing political grievances to hastily formed local councils.

But Cafarella says the Trump administration is mistaken if it thinks such a limited strategy 鈥� one that paves the way for Assad to reassert his rule over Sunni-populated territory to boot 鈥� will deliver a decisive victory for the Pentagon鈥檚 鈥淚SIS-killing business.鈥�

鈥淪o far the US has been operating in Syria with blinders on, trying to ignore the civil war, but the civil war has found us,鈥� she says. 鈥淓ither we realize that and make addressing the political issues part of our strategy,鈥� she adds, 鈥渙r one way or another, ISIS comes back.鈥�