海角大神

Diplomacy is codified on paper but its success is defined in action. In Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry and the P5+1 world powers have reached a听听飞颈迟丑 Iran. This provides a short window in which Iran will gain limited sanctions relief and the opportunity to show good faith in addressing international concerns over nuclear weaponization. As President Obama听, this deal intends to 鈥渃reate time and space鈥澨齠or a broader agreement to prevent an Iran that鈥檚 armed with nuclear weapons.

Let鈥檚 face it, nuclear diplomacy with Iran was always going to be messy; this issue is too technical, too politically complex, and too emotionally laden to allow anything else. As an extension, the global reaction to this deal has been predictably polarized. To some, it represents Obama鈥檚 greatest accomplishment 鈥� an extraordinary feat of leadership and peacemaking. To others however, this is a disaster 鈥� a modern successor to Munich.

The truth is somewhere in between.

On the positive side, the most obvious benefit is that this deal offers something new. After 10 years of failed negotiations, brooding mistrust, and continued Iranian nuclear advancement, Geneva has injected new meaning to the process. At a basic level, the deal puts Iran on the record. By incentivizing Iranian compliance with a re-enforced inspections regime, this agreement will test whether Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is serious when he claims that Iran has nothing to hide. This honesty benchmark is crucial and long overdue. If the ayatollah breaks his word, he will only have himself to blame for the consequences that听.

That being said, this deal offers more than simple trust-building opportunities.

First, by allowing for more intrusive inspections, especially at Fordow and Natanz, the deal will allow inspectors to gain a greater knowledge as to whether Iran鈥檚 claims of peaceful research are true or false. In this regard, the deal brings a little bit of light to a nuclear program that has been hidden in the dark for far too long.

Second, by halting the construction of Iran鈥檚 heavy water facility at Arak, the deal produces a short-term delay to the potential for an Iranian plutonium-based nuclear weapons capability.

Third, by 鈥渄iluting鈥� Iran鈥檚 existing stock of 20 percent medium-enriched uranium, Iran鈥檚 short-term ability to produce a nuclear bomb has also been delayed.

Fourth and perhaps most important, by committing Iran to a low percentage cap on enrichment, the deal begins to address the defining issue: the question as to what minimum and maximum enrichment-level will define Iran鈥檚 nuclear program going forward.

As I鈥檝e听, Iran is extraordinarily unlikely to ever accept a deal that completely precludes any measure of enrichment. At the same time, from the US/EU perspective, unless Iran鈥檚 enrichment program is limited to a low level (and can be verified as such), Iran鈥檚 ability to actualize a nuclear weapons program would be intolerably high.

Of course, there are also negatives here.

First, although Iran has agreed not to operationalize further centrifuges, their existing enrichment mechanisms remain in place. And while it鈥檚 true that if the new inspections are effective, Iran鈥檚 capability won鈥檛 be an issue (the inspectors will be able to verify whether or not the regime is complying with its commitments), that 鈥渋f鈥� remains a big question.

Remote-access monitoring, such as a CCTV provision, is a lot different from physical-access monitoring. And physical-access monitoring itself has various degrees. If Iran prevents inspectors from no-notice spot checks or if it attempts to evade their inquiries, inspections will serve no purpose in gauging whether Iran has continued to develop its nuclear program.

Certainly, negotiators have to guard against a potential effort by Iranian hardliners to use this deal as the new status quo. They need to be careful here. From听听to听, Iran has a long record of covert activities. Again, the next six months will show whether President Hassan Rouhani is a puppet of Khamenei or an honest, empowered leader in his own right.

Until then, this deal is only a piece of paper. Just as the 鈥渁nti-deal鈥� crowd is wrong to听听in the womb, so too is the 鈥減ro-deal鈥� crowd wrong to crow with听听The only sensible reaction is one of hopeful but healthy scrutiny. Perhaps Republican Senator Jeff Flake听, 鈥淛ust heard President Obama describe nuclear deal with Iran. Look forward to studying details.鈥�

听is a blogger and a contributor to听,听,听and听. He's a US Citizen but grew up in London.