海角大神

Recently Pakistan agreed to reopen the supply routes that connect Afghanistan with NATO supplies from the Arabian Sea. The decision was made after US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton apologized for US airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers seven months ago. The announcement seems like a ray of hope after a line of scandals that have marred the US-Pakistan relationship. But in many ways, this is just an upturn in an otherwise vicious cycle: America鈥檚 very dependence on Pakistan is the key source of regional instability. The only way out is to find an efficient alternative.

After the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, Pakistan became America鈥檚 main overland link to Central Asia. As a result, Washington has relied on Rawalpindi, Pakistan鈥檚 military headquarters, for access to Afghanistan. In fact, this dependence has existed for decades, from America鈥檚 efforts to balance, and later fight, the Soviets until today鈥檚 war in Afghanistan.

The problem is that Rawalpindi makes use of America鈥檚 dependence on its geography to secure economic and military aid, while surreptitiously backing the militants it is supposed to be fighting 鈥� from the Taliban to Lashkar-e-Taiba and even segments of Al Qaeda. The existence of these groups, in turn, forces America to rely on Pakistan even more. Along with fears about Pakistan鈥檚 nuclear arsenal, this dependence limits Washington鈥檚 ability to decisively deal with the Pakistani military鈥檚 double game.

As Hussain Haqqani, the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington, has written, as far back as 1947, Pakistan鈥檚 leaders saw that 鈥淧akistan could extract a good price from the United States鈥�in view of Pakistan鈥檚 strategic location.鈥�

Rawalpindi鈥檚 stance is unlikely to change, as the Pakistani army also supports these militants in an effort to ensure Pakistan鈥檚 domestic cohesiveness. The Baluch, Pashtun, and Kashmiri ethnic groups straddle Pakistan鈥檚 borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and India. Their calls for self-determination challenge Pakistan鈥檚 internal security and national defense.

To divert the groups from their demands for independence, Islamabad has lent logistical, military, and ideological support to pan-Islamic militants in those regions 鈥� using an ideology of "pan-Islamism" that would unite all of these ethnic groups聽under the banner of Islamic Pakistan.聽This redirects the groups'聽revolutionary fervor toward external enemies.

Thus Washington鈥檚 dependence on Pakistan effectively amounts to American support for a Pakistani military-economic complex that churns out terrorists that are used as strategic weapons. The same complex is the world鈥檚 most flagrant nuclear proliferator. American backing 鈥� $25 billion in (mostly military) aid over the decade since 9/11 鈥� also reinforces the domestic dominance of the Pakistani military, which pursues confrontation with India, quashes domestic dissent, and lionizes Islamists at the expense of domestic development.

A military 鈥渁lliance with the United States,鈥� Mr. Haqqani wrote, 鈥渂ecame as important a part of鈥�consolidating the Pakistani state as Islam and opposition to Hindu India.鈥�

After 10 more turbulent years in the region, it remains unclear what benefits Washington鈥檚 indiscriminate support has produced. When Islamabad closed its supply routes to NATO several months ago, Washington was finally forced to face facts: Based on little common ground, the relationship is mutually destructive.

Seeking a backup, NATO expanded its use of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a northern route from the Baltic and Black Seas, across Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia to Afghanistan. This shift reduced Washington鈥檚 dependence on Pakistan for over 70 percent of its supplies and fuel in previous years to less than 30 percent by the end of 2011.

But Russia and Kyrgyzstan have already threatened to close their supply lines seeking political concessions, while the northern route forces Washington to turn a blind eye to some of Central Asia鈥檚 most unsavory dictators. And because supplies have to cross thousands of miles and dozens of borders over a mix of road, rail, and sea, the northern route can cost more than five times shipping via the Arabian Sea.

Not to mention, the last time Washington abruptly abandoned Islamabad 鈥� in 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 鈥� it was forced to return, hat in hand, to resume its geographic dependence on Pakistan in 2001, lacking a viable alternative.

Yet there is an important means of accessing Central Asia that is noticeably absent from this calculus: the Chabahar Road, which connects the Gulf of Oman to Afghanistan鈥檚 relatively stable western border. The Indian-constructed Chabahar Road and burgeoning railway end Pakistan鈥檚 monopoly on Afghanistan鈥檚 seaborne trade, which has been a key enabler of Islamabad鈥檚 malicious influence in Kabul.

Owing to Pakistan鈥檚 closed borders, India has used Chabahar to ship aid to Afghanistan (including 100,000 tons of wheat in April), purchase and transport minerals from the Hajigak mine in Afghanistan, and even serve as a counterweight to China鈥檚 regional presence. At 135 miles in length, the road is much shorter and more stable than any of the routes in Pakistan, making it perhaps the most efficient means of reaching Afghanistan.

Then why doesn鈥檛 NATO use this route? Because the Chabahar road lies in Iran, a country with which Washington does not have particularly warm relations. In fact, Washington and its allies are looking to further isolate, and are even prepared to attack, rather than engage with Iran. This approach is in many ways futile: Countries like China, India, Turkey, and Russia continue to trade with Tehran, whose influence throughout Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, South Asia, and elsewhere has by some accounts expanded, in spite of Washington鈥檚 30-year cold shoulder.

US-Iran relations 鈥� including the recent P5+1 dialogue in Moscow 鈥� have focused on Iran鈥檚 nuclear program and relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia. But Washington appears to have forgotten that, in the wake of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran ensured the cooperation of its local allies and provided intelligence to the United States.

And the two countries鈥� interests, particularly in opposing the Taliban and enhancing trade in Central Asia, align almost perfectly. Individual NATO countries have begun bilateral discussions with Iran on employing the Chabahar route for the Afghan campaign, but without American support, they are unlikely to go very far.聽聽

Admittedly, given domestic and international political constraints and Washington鈥檚 singular drive to curb Iran鈥檚 nuclear program, an understanding of this sort appears improbable. But the next round of talks with Iran ought to consider a surprising reality: By weaning Washington off its dependence on Pakistan and even reorienting Afghanistan鈥檚 future, Iran may be an important solution to the problems that cost America blood and treasure.

Neil Padukone is a Fellow at the and the author of a forthcoming book on the future of conflict in South Asia.