Diplomacy is codified on paper, but its success is defined in action. To some, the six-month deal with Iran represents an extraordinary feat of leadership and peacemaking. To others it is a disaster 鈥� a modern successor to Munich.
The truth is somewhere in between.
On the positive side, the most obvious benefit is that this deal offers something new 鈥� after 10 years of failed negotiations, brooding mistrust, and continued Iranian nuclear advancement. Second, by incentivizing Iranian compliance with a reinforced inspections regime, this agreement will test whether supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is serious when he claims that Iran has nothing to hide.
Third, by allowing for more intrusive inspections the deal will allow inspectors to gain a greater knowledge as to whether Iran鈥檚 claims of peaceful research are true. Fourth, by halting the construction of Iran鈥檚 heavy-water facility at Arak, the deal also produces a short-term delay to the potential for an Iranian plutonium-based nuclear weapons capability. Fifth, by 鈥渄iluting鈥� Iran鈥檚 existing stock of 20 percent medium-enriched uranium, Iran鈥檚 short-term ability to produce a nuclear bomb has also been delayed.
Finally, by committing Iran to a low percentage cap on enrichment, the deal begins to address the defining issue: the question as to what minimum and maximum enrichment level will define Iran鈥檚 nuclear program going forward.
Of course, there are also several negatives to the deal.
First, although Iran has agreed not to operationalize further centrifuges, its existing enrichment mechanisms remain in place. And while it鈥檚 true that if the new inspections are effective, Iran鈥檚 weapons capability won鈥檛 be an issue, that 鈥渋f鈥� remains a big question.
Remote-access monitoring is a lot different from physical-access monitoring, which itself has various degrees. If Iran prevents inspectors from no-notice spot checks or if it attempts to evade their inquiries, inspections will serve no purpose in gauging whether Iran has continued to develop its nuclear program.
Certainly, negotiators have to guard against a potential effort by Iranian hard-liners to use this deal as the new status quo. And Iran has a long record of covert activities. The next six months will show whether President Hassan Rouhani is a puppet of Mr. Khamenei or an honest, empowered leader in his own right.
Until then, this deal is only a piece of paper. Just as the 鈥渁nti-deal鈥� crowd is wrong to burn diplomacy in the womb, so, too, is the 鈥減ro-deal鈥� crowd wrong to crow with gleeful triumphalism.
The only sensible reaction is one of hopeful but healthy scrutiny.
Tom Rogan is a blogger and a contributor to The Guardian, TheWeek.com, and The National Review Online.
