海角大神

The rise of Asia is the single most important historical development听of our era. Yet, few voices from the region have stepped forward to address what role Asia, and above all China, must play in shaping Globalization 2.0 鈥撎齛n interdependent world in which no single nation has the upper hand.

In his new book, 鈥淭he Great Convergence: Asia, the West and the Logic of One World,鈥� Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, at last rises to the challenge. In a way, it is no surprise that a former UN ambassador from one of the smallest countries in Asia has the largest vision. Singapore 鈥� probably the most global state anywhere 鈥� has thrived by its wits in navigating the ever-shifting rapids of globalization.

Mr. Mahbubani鈥檚 magnum opus is so far the most comprehensive and objective proposal out there to update the world institutions 鈥� the United Nations, the Bretton Woods organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the World Trade Organization 鈥� by accommodating them to the rise of the rest. Indeed, he evinces more faith in those institutions than their Western founders, who, as he acidly notes, are starting to see their own creation as a disadvantage now that power is shifting away from their control.

With characteristic Asian pragmatism, Mahbubani鈥檚 essential argument is not for the creation of new institutions that enshrine the global power shift, but rather for closing the 鈥渄emocratic deficit鈥� by filling up the old bottle of the West鈥檚 rule-based system with the new wine of the rising rest. For Mahbubani, the old institutions should remain, but under new management. In a departure from his trademark agitating manner, what makes Mahbubani鈥檚 proposals so provocative is their very moderation.

Indeed, by Mahbubani鈥檚 lights, the greatest paradox of the present historical moment is that the 鈥渃ommon norms鈥� that have made Asia successful and are the basis of 鈥渢he logic of one world鈥� have been adapted from the West. In this, the long-time apostle of non-Western modernity arrives at the mirror-image conclusions of historian Niall Ferguson, the long-time champion of the virtues of Western imperialism. Mahbubani鈥檚 common norms more or less overlap with Mr. Ferguson鈥檚 famous 鈥渒iller apps鈥� of modernization, which Ferguson sees as becoming more robustly embraced these days in the East than the West. Neither could be further from Samuel Huntington鈥檚 鈥渃lash of civilizations鈥� thesis.

The common norms for Mahbubani are: modern science and logical reasoning, free-market economics, a social contract that accountably binds ruler and ruled, and multilateralism. Ferguson鈥檚 six killer apps are: competition, science, property rights, modern medicine, consumer society, and the work ethic.

Mahbubani and Ferguson avoid the loaded term 鈥渄emocracy鈥� as a norm or an application. For Ferguson, 鈥渃ompetition鈥� would seem to encompass not only multi-party contests, but also meritocratic performance competition within one party, as in China. For Mahbubani, the West was the first to leap ahead by destroying feudalism, but democracy is not yet universally shared. In China, he nonetheless sees a kind of systemic accountability of the party to the masses since it must 鈥渆arn its legitimacy daily鈥� through performance.

It is in this interstice, which separates values from norms and apps, where the rub lies. The challenge is precisely how to establish effective institutions of governance based on common interests 鈥� or even 鈥渙ne logic鈥� 鈥� but not preceded by a common identity rooted in a common value system.

For Mahbubani, employing the one logic of common norms that we all share as an operating system is sufficient to sustain a rules-based system.

This, however, implies tilting toward the geo-civilizational worldview of the East, in which incommensurate values coexist in one world with many systems. That contrasts with the stubborn geo-political worldview of the West, which sees territories and ideologies as either won or lost.

Mahbubani is not naive. He exhaustively inventories the geopolitical stumbling blocks that can throw a wrench into his optimism (e.g. China vs. India, sea lanes between Japan and China, an Iranian nuclear detonation, etc). At the same time, his trust in the allegiance to a rules-based system in the West from whence it emanated seems to me grounded in a time warp.

Indeed, the greatest stumbling block from my point of view is how the democratization of global institutions Mahbubani proposes will be frustrated by the democratic publics of the West. It鈥檚 democratization vs. democracy.

First, these publics are turning ever more inward to protect themselves from the very winds of competition the post-WW II system has unleashed. We see this not only with China-bashing in the US. We also see how difficult it is for democratic European states to make the tough reforms necessary to maintain the competitiveness required to finance their generous welfare state in the face of the double challenge of demographic demise and the rise of the rest.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has put the issue squarely: Europe has 7 percent of the world population, produces 25 percent of global product, and accounts for 50 percent of social spending. That will be tough to maintain as Europe鈥檚 proportion of global production shrinks. Today, the continent is paralyzed by this prospect.

Second, and most important, the UN and the Bretton Woods system were put in place after World War II, when the democratic American public still trusted its elites enough to agree to delegate power to institutions that would benefit all. That trust in the 鈥渂est and brightest鈥� was shattered by the Vietnam War, trampled during the counterculture 鈥�60s, de-legitimated during the Reagan and New Right war on government, and finally laid to rest by the advent of the dis-intermediating information revolution.

If there is any flaw in this otherwise excellent volume, it is Mahbubani鈥檚 projection of East Asia鈥檚 trust in elites onto the West, where their legitimacy has fatally withered.

Finally, as Mahbubani readily acknowledges, the Pax Americana period of a rules-based international system that provided global public goods also served US interests. But, as former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has said in the European context, where values and identity much more closely coincide than, say, between China and the US, 鈥渋t was believed that formalized rules would be enough鈥� to contain the imbalances within the eurozone without a full fiscal and political union. 鈥淏ut this foundation of rules turned out to be an illusion: principles always need the support of power; otherwise听they cannot stand the test of reality.鈥�

Even if the old rules-based听system invented by the West ought to be maintained, it cannot be so without the full engagement of China and the United States. No reorganization of the UN or the IMF or the WTO will matter if these two powers don鈥檛 buy in. Given the weakness of elites in the US, this suggests that China 鈥� while its Communist Party autocracy is still invested with legitimacy and the broad allegiance of its public 鈥� needs to drive any new embrace of the global rules-based system in a way that provides common public goods for all.

Clearly, China鈥檚 leaders need to get ready for prime time. America, which can鈥檛 even decide at home how much government it wants and is willing to pay for, is in no position to take the lead in shaping a new world order that accommodates the interests of new players on the block. American democracy hasn鈥檛 even managed to rein in the 鈥渢oo big to fail鈥� financial firms that instigated the global crisis in 2008-2009. They are bigger now than before. Americans can鈥檛 even agree to ban assault weapons on their own turf, no less achieve non-proliferation globally.

The danger is that this moment could be a repeat of 1914 鈥� when a system of shaky alliances with waning and waxing powers jockeying for advantage was tripped into world war by a small event. The hope, which Mahbubani so optimistically and thoroughly sketches out in his vision, is that the immediate period ahead can be like the early 1950s, when enduring institutions that kept the peace and promoted prosperity to the benefit of all were constructed.

A world adrift desperately needs global thinkers, most of all from Asia. Kishore Mahbubani fits the bill with this signal work at this critical time. The kind of robust institutions he calls for in his book are all that will stand between us and 1914 all over again. Let鈥檚 pray his optimism is justified.

Nathan Gardels is editor-in-chief of NPQ and the Global Viewpoint Network of Tribune Media Services. He is co-author with Nicolas Berggruen of 鈥淚ntelligent Governance for the 21st Century: A Middle Way Between West and East.鈥�

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