海角大神

It has been only 32 years 鈥� not that long ago, really 鈥� since President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III were sworn in. Their short four years in office, 1989-92, were rich in tumultuous events and policy decisions that continue to resonate today.

Historian and public policy analyst Diana Villiers Negroponte describes the two longtime friends and tennis-buddy Texans as 鈥渋mbued with the modesty of gentlemen who sought power not to aggrandize themselves but to serve a nation.鈥� Her new history, 鈥淢aster Negotiator: The Role of James A. Baker, III at the End of the Cold War,鈥� has a deliberately narrow focus, per Mr. Baker鈥檚 directive.

(In the interest of full disclosure, I covered the beginning of the George H.W. Bush presidency when I was a CBS News White House correspondent. I first came to know Diana and her husband, John Negroponte, about 10 years later during his stint as United Nations ambassador during the George W. Bush presidency. The three of us remain good friends.)

Beginning with the foreword, written by the first President Bush in 2014, 鈥淢ajor Negotiator鈥� highlights the men鈥檚 closeness. Mr. Bush writes of Mr. Baker, 鈥淟ooking back, I was blessed to have him by my side during four years of historic change in our world.鈥澛犅�

The two men were determined to make a clean break from the Reagan years. They did not want to be viewed as Ronald Reagan鈥檚 third term, despite having filled senior positions in his administration.聽Both men wanted to assert fresh ideas and to bring in new people. Of Mr. Baker, Dr. Negroponte writes, 鈥淭he guiding principle of his national security team was the stable management of the international system and the avoidance of risk.鈥� The Bush-Baker team successfully put that strategy into practice in ending the Cold War, German reunification, Desert Storm, the Madrid peace conference, and the variety of political reforms they encouraged in Latin America.

The importance of allies

鈥淣ot a shot between Cold War enemies was fired.鈥� That鈥檚 the author鈥檚 bottom-line measure of success for the Bush-Baker management of the end of the Soviet empire and the reunification of Germany.聽In great detail, she describes how the men supported Mikhail Gorbachev through a series of internal machinations that kept him in power until the Soviet Union was dismantled and the Russian flag had been raised.聽Allowing the Soviets to dissolve peacefully 鈥� reinforcing Mr. Gorbachev鈥檚 decisions not to repress dissidents within his country 鈥撀爈ed to the ascendancy of the United States as the sole superpower. 鈥淏ut how we have used that position is another question,鈥� Dr. Negroponte says.聽

With her own work coinciding with that of other historians and journalists writing about Mr. Baker, she suspects that interest in the Bush-Baker foreign policy is rooted in a need to stabilize the world order following four years of acrimony with traditional allies and an embrace of autocrats during Donald Trump鈥檚 presidency. Examining what worked in the last years of the Cold War reveals the importance of working with allies, she says.聽鈥淏aker formed coalitions.聽He never considered that America should act alone.鈥�

Dr. Negroponte also details the successful execution of the first U.S. war in Iraq, Desert Storm, weaving together competing strands of history and decision-making. Mr. Baker took a hands-off role in dealing with China, in part because of Mr. Bush鈥檚 own expertise in the region, where he served as U.S. envoy in the 1970s.聽The administration was criticized for not taking a stronger stand against Chinese repression of dissidents during the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing from April to June 1989. But Dr. Negroponte emphasizes that the U.S. decision to keep talking with the Chinese resulted, one year later, in their abstaining, rather than vetoing, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, which provided the legal authorization for the first Gulf War.聽

鈥淵ou can鈥檛 destroy the Chinese,鈥� she says.聽鈥淵ou must assert your objections and punish the leaders who commit ruthless actions, but you don鈥檛 cut off relations.鈥�

What if?

Asked what might have happened if the Bush-Baker team had had a second term, Dr. Negroponte points to two issues. 鈥淭hey would not have expanded NATO eastward into Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which was seen as a deep threat by the Russians,鈥� she says. And the U.S. might not have intervened in the civil war in the Balkans. The Europeans had assured the Americans that they could handle the conflict 鈥渋n their backyard鈥� among the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians as Yugoslavia came apart. Also, Mr. Baker questioned the U.S. security motive for intervening, she says.聽聽

The Clinton administration changed course on both of those policies, Dr. Negroponte explains, in large part because Madeleine Albright, Clinton鈥檚 U.N. ambassador and, later, secretary of state, was an 茅migr茅 from Czechoslovakia and felt a responsibility to 鈥渞escue her people.鈥澛犅�

There has been relatively muted criticism of Mr. Baker鈥檚 actions during and even after his stint as secretary of state.聽He and his team have been widely praised for their deliberate and effective media management.聽With a smile, Dr. Negroponte says that Mr. Baker needed the media to persuade the American public that his actions were rational. His standard operating principle was, 鈥淵ou feed the crocodiles, or you are on the menu.鈥�

Jacqueline Adams is co-author of 鈥淎 Blessing: Women of Color Teaming Up to Lead, Empower and Thrive.鈥�