Why the US and China settled for a trade truce
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| Boston and Beijing
An irresistible force 鈥 President Trump鈥檚 trade agenda 鈥 has met an immovable object known as China Inc., and the result is an uneasy truce.
Both sides over the weekend backed away from threatened tariffs. China agreed to buy more US energy and farm goods and, on Tuesday, cut its tariffs on imported cars from 25 percent to 15 percent.聽聽
The challenge for both sides is that the nub of their trade conflict 鈥 technological prowess 鈥 has no easy answers. The United States relies on its technological edge and its huge market to keep ahead of its economic rivals. China, which is by some measures a larger economy, is determined to rival or surpass the US in key technologies, such as artificial intelligence and robotics. For now, say trade analysts, this tension will likely play out as a soft rivalry rather than a trade war, as Mr. Trump had threatened to unleash.
Why We Wrote This
The current trade tensions between the United States and China are part of a deeper rivalry over new technologies and the commercial advantage that they confer on companies.
The confrontation is part-and-parcel of the duel between two economic and political systems, one with lots of government control (China) and the other (the US) more market-oriented. And it鈥檚 unlikely to be assuaged by a face-saving trade deal, no matter how many Illinois soybeans China might purchase to try to reduce the US-China trade deficit.
鈥淭he trade imbalance, that鈥檚 the surface of the cannonball, but at the core of the cannonball is this techno-nationalism,鈥 says Erik Lundh, senior economist with The Conference Board in New York. 鈥淭here鈥檚 a little phrase that I鈥檝e been hearing [in trade circles] and it goes: 鈥楴o trade war but no trade peace.鈥 鈥
Technological tug of war聽
The current tug of war over China鈥檚 ZTE Corp., a telecom manufacturer, has come to symbolize this technological conflict.
For the US, ZTE reflects the kind of double-dealing typical of China when it comes to keeping its word, in this case sanctions. After China pledged to uphold US sanctions against Iran and North Korea, ZTE nonetheless sold US technology to both nations from 2010 to 2016. The US Commerce Department investigated and last year ZTE agreed to pay a $1.2 billion fine and discipline the employees involved.
When ZTE didn鈥檛 discipline them and tried to hide that fact, the Commerce Department responded in April with a seven-year ban on buying US parts. That pushed ZTE to the brink of collapse because without US parts it couldn鈥檛 keep manufacturing its telecom equipment and mobile devices. Its Hong Kong-listed shares were suspended last month.
In an apparent move aimed at securing Chinese support for a planned North Korean summit, President Trump said last week the US penalty was too harsh on ZTE.
But he got a sharp bipartisan rebuke from Congress. On Tuesday, the Senate Banking Committee unanimously passed a bill prohibiting the administration from softening the ZTE penalties as well as imposing stricter export controls and national-security reviews of Chinese high-tech deals in the US. The same day 27 senators, including leaders from both sides of the aisle, wrote a letter urging US departments to reject any easing of tech-export controls in any future US-China trade deal.
China may draw a different conclusion from the ZTE debacle.
That one of its technology stars, employing nearly as many people as Google, could implode because of US policy serves as a reality check. For all its prowess in artificial intelligence and supercomputing 鈥撀爓here experts say it may be a year ahead of US challengers 鈥撀燙hina remains woefully behind in other aspects of technology, such as specialized microprocessors. That means聽redoubling efforts to boost its own technology base to reduce its reliance on key parts from the US and Europe.聽
鈥淭his punishment on ZTE does not encourage but forces the Chinese government and Chinese companies to depend on themselves more, because we have lost our trust in this global value chain,鈥 says Tu Xinquan, executive dean of the China Institute for WTO Studies at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. 鈥淭hat's really serious鈥.It will [erode] trust in the global value chain, especially in the US supply.鈥
But neither China nor the US can turn their backs on their technology trade without important economic consequences.
For the US, China serves not only as a source of finished goods 鈥撀爐hink cellphones and TVs - but also for low-cost tech components in complex global supply chains. And especially in the Chinese tech sectors that the US Commerce Department had targeted for tariffs, a large chunk of China鈥檚 exports to the US are really sales of components from US-owned or affiliated companies in China, according to 聽by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Thus, the lion鈥檚 share of China鈥檚 high-tech exports are not coming from indigenous companies like ZTE but from foreign firms ranging from Apple to Cisco Systems that have expanded their manufacturing operations in China. And any tariff on those imports will be a tax on US or other foreign companies and their global supply chains, writes Mary Lovely, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute. 鈥淯S firms rely on global supply chains to remain internationally competitive.鈥
Fewer joint ventures for technology transfers
China, too, can ill afford to go it alone. shows how Chinese companies in recent decades have improved their technological know-how via mandatory joint ventures with foreign firms, such as US and German automakers. That practice has come under sharp criticism recently from the US.
This practice has waned since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. One reason is the rules of the WTO. Another is that fewer companies were investing in China, says Wolfgang Keller, professor of economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder. 鈥淚f you require a domestic partner, you will have 鈥 fewer takers.鈥
While the initial tech transfer from joint ventures proved extremely useful, China 鈥 in an increasing number of areas 鈥 has allowed multinationals to set up their own operations.
These trans-Pacific realities make a trade war less likely, despite the current confrontation. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think this is going to be a sea change one way or another,鈥 says Mr. Keller. 鈥淚t鈥檚 going to be an evolving process.鈥澛犅