海角大神

Islamic State and its supporters are managing the聽most aggressive and effective online recruitment and聽incitement campaign of any terrorist group in history.

This situation highlights a monumental intelligence failure. Indeed, it's stunning to consider there's no clear policy that could contain the online influence capacity of a terrorist group striving to show it is a more competent nemesis to the US and its allies than al Qaeda.

Nowhere is this failure more evident than on social media. Islamic State members have converted social media platforms managed by American companies like Twitter into cyber sanctuaries, from which the terrorist group amplifies narratives engineered to stimulate plots聽to kill Americans and our allies. As the terrorism caseload managed by the FBI suggests the Islamic State is accelerating the radicalization process that culminates in violence,聽it鈥檚 time to get more serious about denying terrorists access to these tools.

According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, Islamic State militants demonstrate a聽"particular affinity for Twitter."聽On Twitter, propagandists, recruiters, and supporters use thousands of accounts to build and reinforce support for the group. Even though Twitter has suspended many Islamic State-linked accounts, its聽global network of devotees is undeterred.聽

This week, posts by聽Sally Jones聽exemplify Islamic State's social media savvy, along with just how comfortable Islamic State members are on Twitter. A British national, Ms. Jones has been聽branded a specially designated global terrorist by the US. Not only did she聽use a Twitter account to聽issue terroristic threats聽against Britain, and to聽harass a New York Times journalist聽who covers the Islamic State; she did it after following FBI, Pentagon, and US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Twitter accounts.聽

Jones'聽late husband Junaid Hussain, who was killed in a drone strike in Syria during 2015, headed up Islamic State's Hacking Division when it breached USCENTCOM's Twitter account.

Since聽2014,聽Islamic State members have used social media to encourage Muslims to either聽emigrate to the 鈥渃aliphate鈥� to help the group defend and expand its territorial holdings, or kill the group鈥檚 enemies at home.

In an address posted online in May, Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, who doubles as the group鈥檚 spokesman and manager of its terrorist operations in the West, advised supporters to execute attacks in the US, rather than joining the group in the caliphate. Now the go-to site for links to Islamic State leaders' missives,聽Twitter is an echo chamber for these directives.

Undermining and discrediting these messages isn't something the intelligence community and law enforcement can manage on their own.聽Yet it would be quite easy to disrupt the Islamic State propaganda machine if Twitter and other social media companies changed the way they do business.聽

For instance, Twitter could block anyone from posting content when their account is聽accessed through a virtual private network (VPN).聽Since militants understand聽that the intelligence community can use online activities to track聽terrorist elements, the Islamic State聽encourages supporters to use VPNs聽to mask their physical locations when online.聽

Denying posting capabilities unless geolocation settings are enabled on a device would be another useful measure.聽

Alternatively, social media companies such as Twitter could charge a monthly fee for users who either wish to access their accounts when using VPNs, or post content when geolocations settings are disabled. By restricting payment options to debit and credit cards issued by major financial institutions, Twitter and other companies would further deter illicit actors from converting their technologies into tools used to support criminal activity, or to threaten our national security.

But rather than emphasize disruption of the Islamic State鈥檚 online activities by effectively encouraging social media companies to pursue these measures 鈥� or telling Congress there may be a need to compel them to do so 鈥� the intelligence community has opted to monitor terrorists' online activities. Yet perhaps聽Twitter鈥檚 recent decision聽to limit national security managers鈥� capabilities to do that聽will result in a new聽strategy.

Privacy advocates will surely聽cry foul about聽these proposed measures. Some of their arguments are legitimate, even if they dually serve to benefit terrorists and many other actors who enjoy an absence of such policies when using social media for illicit purposes.

Indeed, one can imagine terrorists like Sally Jones are most appreciative of their enthusiasm. But the rest of us must prioritize聽our national security over the privacy concerns of some social media users.

Michael S. Smith II is cofounder and COO of Kronos Advisory. Mr. Smith has served as a contributing expert to the Congressional Anti-Terrorism Caucus and the Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Follow him on Twitter聽@MichaelSSmithII.