海角大神

Iran and its alliance of regional militias are seeking once again to defend the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as Sunni Islamist rebels make swift territorial gains in a surprise offensive.

But the array of forces, supported by Russian air power, that prevailed over anti-Assad insurgents and preserved his rule a decade ago during the first phase of Syria鈥檚 devastating civil war, is weaker today, and not focused on Syria.

Iran and its regional 鈥淎xis of Resistance鈥� fighters, chief among them Lebanese Hezbollah, are all degraded and distracted after more than a year of war with Israel.

Syrian government troops melted away in the face of the offensive launched last week from the rebel-held northwest province of Idlib. Within days, Islamist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was once affiliated with Al Qaeda, had captured Syria鈥檚 second city of Aleppo.

By Thursday, rebels had taken control of Hama, 80 miles to the south. HTS, designated a terrorist group by the United States, sent messages to Syrian minority groups to reassure them of freedom and protection, prompting Aleppo 海角大神s to put up Christmas decorations.

Nevertheless, there has been consternation but not panic in Iran about the investment of billions of dollars over many years, both to defend Mr. Assad and to create the Axis, which aims to counter Israeli and American influence in the Mideast.

Iran-backed Shiite militias from Iraq reportedly have sent hundreds of fighters to Syria, to help defend an Axis ally that serves as a critical weapons route between Iran and Lebanon. Hezbollah is also trying to mobilize for Syria, but its leadership has been decimated and its units degraded by 14 months of escalating conflict with Israel.

That fight culminated in a ceasefire coming into effect Nov. 27 鈥� the day the Syrian rebels launched their offensive.

鈥淭his whole thing is coming at the worst moment for Iran and the Axis, and I think also explains the timing on the side of the rebels,鈥� to take advantage of the relative weakness of Mr. Assad鈥檚 allies, says Hamidreza Azizi, an expert on Iran鈥檚 role in Syria at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

鈥淐ompared to a decade ago, Iran has fewer resources to invest in the Axis. ... So I can see why they are quite concerned,鈥� he says.

Two pivotal events have changed the safety net dynamic for Mr. Assad and for Iran, Mr. Azizi says. The first was Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which diverted Moscow鈥檚 focus and prompted it to withdraw some troops and hand over some bases to the Syrian army even as it kept an air capability in the country.

The second was the October 2023 attack by Axis-member Hamas on Israel. That triggered Hezbollah鈥檚 first rocket strikes on Israel in solidarity, as well as attacks from Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen, ostensibly to stop Israel鈥檚 onslaught in Gaza.

鈥淥bviously everybody in the Axis started to get distracted, and focused on the Gaza front, especially those actors whose presence was significant in the Syrian war,鈥� Mr. Azizi says.

Iran鈥檚 supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei complained on X this week that the Sunni extremists were "good news for enemies" of Islam by drawing the world鈥檚 attention away from the 鈥渋ssue of Palestine.鈥�

鈥淭he current moment [in Syria] shows how significant the Iranian and Iran-backed manpower was, because they were able to prevent further advances by the rebels. But when there is nobody on the ground over those areas, they [the rebels] come again,鈥� says Mr. Azizi. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 the problem: Airpower alone can鈥檛 secure victory.鈥�

To be sure, Israel has used airstrikes to kill several senior Iranian commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Qods Force, who were responsible for operations in Syria and Lebanon.

鈥淲hat is Iran capable of doing, and not capable of doing? Clearly its command structure in Syria is damaged,鈥� says Mohammad Ali Shabani, editor of the London-based news website Amwaj.media, which focuses on Iran, Iraq, and Arabian Peninsula countries.

Those networks, steeped in long-standing personal relationships, will take time to reestablish. But Iran can afford its military work in Syria, he says, and does not have an overall manpower problem, considering its past advisory role and the deployment of relatively few of its own troops.

鈥淭hese are personal relationships that are hard to reconstitute,鈥� says Mr. Shabani, noting for example Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike in April on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus.

General Zahedi was in charge of all the Levant and of funneling weapons to Lebanon and Syria. He was reportedly the only non-Lebanese person to sit on Hezbollah鈥檚 top Shura Council, while also exercising 鈥渧eto power鈥� over its subordinate military Jihad Council. His death triggered an unprecedented direct Iranian retaliation against Israel, with 300 missiles and drones.

鈥淢any other, if not all, members of the Jihad Council are [also] dead. So they are all in a state of reconstituting these structures,鈥� says Mr. Shabani, whose website first reported the significance of General Zahedi.

Nevertheless, Mr. Shabani explains why, practically and politically, Iran may not be more urgently coming to Mr. Assad鈥檚 aid.

鈥淒o I believe [pro-Assad forces] can seize back all of Syria? No. They couldn鈥檛 even do that last year, or last month,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut is it enough to keep Assad in power? Pick up a map, and look at what Iran鈥檚 objectives are in Syria.鈥�

Those objectives include ensuring cross-country routes for Iranian weapons to reach Lebanon and key destinations in Syria, including Damascus, areas close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and Qusayr, where Hezbollah had a significant victory in 2012.

鈥淸Rebels] have taken Aleppo. It鈥檚 a loss, for sure. But is this integral to Assad maintaining power? No. Is it integral to Iran鈥檚 core interests in Syria? No,鈥� says Mr. Shabani. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 see Iran rushing to Assad鈥檚 aid. Not because they don鈥檛 want to keep him in power 鈥� but because they want him to better appreciate their role.鈥�

Four days after the rebel offensive erupted, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi flew to Damascus to reassure Mr. Assad. According to news reports, the two detailed the support that needs to be provided for Syria.

In a show of calm, Mr. Araghchi was later filmed eating at a fast-food restaurant in Damascus. But in a diplomatic push, he then flew to Ankara to meet his counterpart from Turkey, which has backed factions of the Syrian opposition.

Iranian media reported Monday that Iranian Qods Force Gen. Javad Ghaffari arrived in Damascus to lead Iranian 鈥渕ilitary advisers鈥� and help the Syrian army battle the advancing rebels. He has often been lauded in Iran for safeguarding Aleppo in 2016, but earned the title 鈥淏utcher of Aleppo鈥� by opponents of Iran who recall brutal tactics there.

In Parliament Dec. 1, Iran鈥檚 President Masoud Pezeshkian called on聽Muslim nations to 鈥渋ntervene and not allow America and Israel to take advantage鈥� in Syria. Yet when asked on state television the next day about the chances of a direct Iranian military engagement in Syria, Mr. Pezeshkian twice dodged the question, and noted instead his government鈥檚 diplomatic efforts.

It is not yet clear if several hundred Iran-backed fighters from Iraq have made it to Syria, as reported, or if orders to fight have been given to those members of the Axis already on the ground in Syria, who are mostly Shiite Afghans.

As rebels advanced Thursday, the HTS commander, Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, issued a request to Iraqi politicians to 鈥渄o their duty鈥� to prevent Iran-aligned militias from intervening 鈥渋n what is happening in Syria.鈥�