海角大神

鈥淭he president is on the line, sir.鈥� To which Israel鈥檚 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could have been forgiven for wondering, as the call was put through: Which president?

For within the space of a couple of days last week, he spoke not only to U.S. President Joe Biden but also to the man who preceded him in office and now hopes to return, Donald Trump.

Headlines worldwide highlighted Mr. Biden鈥檚 call. He urged Mr. Netanyahu to capitalize on the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar by negotiating a cease-fire and hostage release in Gaza.

But it was Mr. Trump鈥檚 very different message that will likely weigh more heavily on Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 mind as he decides when, and whether, to act on Mr. Biden鈥檚 appeal.

And this 鈥淭rump factor鈥� makes it vanishingly unlikely that he will move before America votes Nov. 5.

There is an important caveat, potentially more encouraging to those in the Middle East, in Washington, and around the world who are desperate to see negotiations and de-escalation in Gaza.

It is that no matter who wins the U.S. election, Mr. Netanyahu may well face renewed pressure from Washington to 鈥渢ake the win鈥� 鈥� as Biden administration officials have been urging 鈥� and join in that process.

For now, however, the Israeli prime minister is clearly minded to pay less attention to Mr. Biden than to Mr. Trump.

The immediate reason is that the former president has been echoing the Israeli leader鈥檚 own words on the campaign trail.

After Israel killed the Hamas leader, Mr. Trump criticized President Biden鈥檚 call for Mr. Netanyahu to move toward a cease-fire. 鈥淏iden is trying to hold him back,鈥� he said. 鈥淎nd he should probably be doing the opposite actually.鈥�

On the phone call last week, Mr. Trump went further on another Mideast front where the Biden administration has been urging Israeli caution: the expected military response to Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile attack early this month.

鈥淛ust do what you have to do,鈥� Mr. Trump told Mr. Netanyahu.

But the roots of Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 preference for Mr. Trump over President Biden 鈥� and over the Democratic Party candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris 鈥� run deeper.

Breaking with the bipartisan approach to U.S. politics that all previous Israeli leaders adopted, Mr. Netanyahu has in recent years openly aligned himself with the Republican Party.

Twice he has done a political end run around a Democratic president by accepting a Republican invitation to address Congress to argue against administration policy.

In 2015, he attacked President Barack Obama for pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran.

Earlier this year, Mr. Netanyahu turned his back on President Biden鈥檚 efforts to promote a hostage-release deal and to persuade him to engage with a 鈥渄ay after鈥� plan for Gaza that would lead to an eventual two-state peace with the Palestinians.

During Mr. Trump鈥檚 tenure as president, he and the Israeli leader were close allies, a partnership buttressed by Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 personal ties with Mr. Trump鈥檚 son-in-law and Mideast envoy, Jared Kushner.

They jointly produced a diplomatic breakthrough, dubbed the Abraham Accords, normalizing Israel鈥檚 ties with historically hostile Gulf Arab states without requiring Mr. Netanyahu to make any commitment to a future Palestinian state.

The Trump administration also broke with longtime U.S. policy by formally endorsing Israeli gains from the 1967 Six-Day War. Washington recognized Israel鈥檚 annexation of the Golan Heights from Syria, and its declaration of the disputed city of Jerusalem as its capital.

Given Vice President Harris鈥� full-blown support for a two-state peace deal and her outspoken concern over the level of civilian casualties in Gaza, there is no doubt Mr. Netanyahu would far prefer to see Mr. Trump win the U.S. election.

So why, then, the caveat? Why might a second Trump administration also exert pressure to embrace a day-after deal not unlike the one Mr. Biden has been working so hard to advance?

One key reason is the very quality in Mr. Trump that benefited Mr. Netanyahu the first time around: his intensely personal, if often mercurial, approach to political relationships.

Mr. Netanyahu, himself, experienced the full effects after the 2020 U.S. election.

Mr. Trump fumed over what he saw as the Israeli leader鈥檚 betrayal when Mr. Netanyahu ignored claims the election had been 鈥渟tolen鈥� and congratulated Mr. Biden on his victory.

The chill thawed only recently, when Mr. Netanyahu made a concerted effort to repair their relationship.

But there鈥檚 another reason that the Biden day-after plan could remain on the table no matter who wins next month.

It鈥檚 that Mr. Trump has a closer, unfrayed relationship with another Mideast leader, Saudi Arabia鈥檚 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Saudi Arabia, the most influential of the Arab states in the region, decided not to join the Abraham Accords.

Yet the crown prince has been a central player in Mr. Biden鈥檚 postwar plan for Gaza, hoping to secure a formal U.S. defense guarantee, and an Israeli commitment to the idea of a two-state peace, in return for taking the financial and political lead in Gaza鈥檚 reconstruction and future security.

That鈥檚 a pitch the prince will likely make to Mr. Trump, too, if he wins.