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An American gift to the Afghan Taliban that portends more war and less peace?

That is how President Donald Trump鈥檚 sudden decision this week to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan is seen by Afghan government negotiators at stalled peace talks in Doha, Qatar 鈥撀爀ven as Taliban insurgents talk peace but continue the fight.

Prior to the presidential election Nov. 3, Mr. Trump tweeted that all American troops, including those in Afghanistan, who are serving as part of a NATO force, should be 鈥渉ome by Christmas!鈥�

Then, a week after the president fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper, who opposed the drawdown, the Pentagon announced Nov. 17 that the remaining 4,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be cut to 2,500 by Jan. 15 鈥� five days before President-elect Joe Biden takes office.

For Afghans, it鈥檚 the latest example of how American political timelines can affect their own battlespace 鈥� sometimes with deleterious effects 鈥� as the war has ground on since the U.S. toppled the Taliban and its Al Qaeda 鈥済uests鈥� in late 2001, after the Sept. 11 attacks.

For some at the Doha talks, the decision is a rushed bid to conclude America鈥檚 longest-ever war, with potentially grave consequences for the future of Afghanistan.

鈥淲hen you see in the middle of this that there is a hurry from the American side which will not help the process, it is worrisome,鈥� says Fawzia Koofi, a member of the government negotiating team who was wounded in an assassination attempt in Kabul, four weeks before intra-Afghan talks began on Sept. 12.

鈥淭he Americans will not stay forever, but I know in the meantime [withdrawal] has to be done properly, it has to be in a way that will help reduce violence,鈥� says Ms. Koofi, contacted in Doha.

A NATO warning

Deep concerns were voiced quickly by NATO, as well.

鈥淲e now face a difficult decision. We have been in Afghanistan for almost 20 years, and no NATO ally wants to stay any longer than necessary,鈥� NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said in a statement the day the withdrawal was announced. 鈥淏ut at the same time, the price for leaving too soon or in an uncoordinated way could be very high.鈥�

鈥淎fghanistan risks becoming once again a platform for international terrorists to plan and organize attacks on our homelands,鈥� he said.

Ms. Koofi, a former lawmaker and women鈥檚 rights activist who has participated in talks with the Taliban since last year, says the new U.S. emphasis on pulling out speedily has led to a 鈥渨rong perception鈥� among the Taliban that they are in a win-win situation.

鈥淚t will give the Taliban a position that, 鈥楴o matter if we don鈥檛 win at the negotiating table, we will win on the battlefield,鈥欌�� she says. 鈥淪o they will try to even further delay achieving something concrete on the negotiation table.鈥�

The U.S.-Taliban deal

Last February, after a year of negotiations between the U.S. and Taliban insurgents 鈥撀爓ho today control or have influence in more than half of the country 鈥� the U.S. and Taliban signed a deal.

The text of the agreement trades a complete U.S. and NATO pullout by the end of next April 鈥撀爌lus 5,000 Taliban political prisoners released up front 鈥� for Taliban promises to prevent Afghan soil from being used for militant attacks abroad, as well as participation in intra-Afghan talks, where a cease-fire is only 鈥渁n item on the agenda.鈥�

Americans have spoken of a conditions-based withdrawal, and say the Taliban privately committed to an 80% reduction of violence. While the U.S. stuck to its incremental pullout schedule 鈥撀爓hich has now been sped up 鈥撀爐he Taliban has escalated violence across the country, in attacks that have left thousands more Afghans dead and tens of thousands displaced.

U.S. officials have chastised the Taliban for 鈥渃ar bombs, IEDs and targeted killings鈥� against civilians, but not slowed the withdrawal. And, after an especially heavy Taliban offensive last month to seize Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province 鈥撀爓hich required U.S. airstrikes to push insurgents back 鈥撀爐hey claimed to have worked out a 鈥渞e-set鈥� and 鈥渟trict adherence鈥� of terms with the jihadists.

Nevertheless, another offensive aimed at Kandahar earlier this month involved 3,500 Taliban attackers and required U.S. airpower to defeat, the Washington Post reported. It quoted an Afghan national police commander as saying the Taliban would not have been stopped were it not for U.S. airstrikes.

Taliban 鈥渁ll like Trump鈥�

鈥淭he Taliban were very worried when Trump lost [the election], because they knew Trump just wanted to get out and didn鈥檛 care,鈥� says a Western official in Kabul who asked not to be identified further.

鈥淭hey all like Trump [because] they also felt like they had Trump in their pocket, because he鈥檚 so desperate to get out. He didn鈥檛 understand the conflict and didn鈥檛 bother understanding it,鈥� says the official.

The feeling in Kabul is that 2,500 U.S. troops is 鈥渞eally bare bones.鈥�

鈥淭he bottom line is: The more you drill down the numbers, the more you get to people who are not just logistics support, but people who actually have a day job,鈥� says the official. 鈥淚t will be very difficult for somebody to be a full-time mentor to the [Afghan] Special Forces, at the same time in the evening packing up his equipment.鈥�

Indeed, the sense that the White House drafted a lopsided deal with the Taliban and is speeding the U.S. withdrawal at the expense of the Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani 鈥撀爓hich has little leverage at the negotiating table without U.S. military force backing him up 鈥� is causing pushback in Washington.

One reason former Secretary Esper was fired by Mr. Trump was reportedly a classified memo he wrote arguing against a further pullout, given stepped-up Taliban attacks.

鈥淚 believe it was political. There was no tactical, operational or strategic merit to doing this,鈥� retired Gen. John Allen, the former commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan until 2013, said at an online security event this week run by the Soufan Center.

Debate inside the Taliban

In Doha, Taliban leaders have routinely expressed their desire for an inclusive, negotiated solution to end the war. They have also publicly claimed that their views have evolved since the late 1990s, when they ruled Afghanistan with an uncompromising, hardline fervor, which forced women indoors and banned girls鈥� education.

And yet, along the front lines and among insurgent commanders and fighters, the Taliban message has been consistent: that the Doha deal means they achieved 鈥渧ictory鈥� in war.

鈥淭he jury is still out,鈥� says Michael Semple, an Afghanistan expert at Queen鈥檚 University Belfast who lived and worked for years in the country.

鈥淏ut as far as the evidence that is readily available 鈥� like what鈥檚 happening on the battlefield 鈥撀爐he Taliban seem prepared to have a go at grabbing [military victory]. They certainly haven鈥檛 done anything to prepare their base for political compromise inherent in a deal,鈥� says Mr. Semple.

News of an accelerated U.S. drawdown to 2,500 鈥撀燼nd fewer American military capabilities when the next fighting season rolls around 鈥撀犫�渟trengthens the hand and the resolution of those inside the [Taliban] movement who would like to pursue military victory rather than a negotiated settlement,鈥� he says.

One benefit of doing a peace deal is that any interim and new government will include the Taliban, and crucially have support 鈥� and sizable funding 鈥撀爁rom the U.S. and key donors. By contrast, 鈥渨inning鈥� on the battlefield means the Taliban standing alone, ruling over a population that widely rejects them, and almost certainly sparking another civil war.

鈥淲e shouldn鈥檛 dismiss this point that there will be counsel within the Taliban saying, 鈥楧on鈥檛 do it! Don鈥檛 do it!鈥欌�� says Mr. Semple. 鈥淏ut those who say, 鈥楲ook, we can wind this up now, we can sweep the board,鈥� they are going to be louder and more confident.鈥�

So far, he adds, the Taliban have tried to 鈥渃alibrate their violence, rather than reduce it,鈥� to score gains while avoiding being declared in breach of the deal.

鈥淚f the U.S. accelerates its withdrawal, goes beyond that which it is committed to with the Taliban 鈥撀爄t is essentially rewarding a breach of conditions, rather than punishing,鈥� says Mr. Semple. 鈥淏ack in the real world of hardball war and peace diplomacy, if you reward bad behavior, you are encouraging more of it. And hence, it is less likely that you can marshal the Taliban towards a negotiated agreement.鈥�

That result adds to the exasperation in Doha, where peace negotiators like Ms. Koofi watch every day as the death toll climbs and the fighting continues. She recalls the maxim, often repeated in Afghanistan, that the Americans may have the watch, but the Taliban have the time.

鈥淚t is frustrating.... People from both sides are being killed for something that we could actually prevent,鈥� says Ms. Koofi. 鈥淚t鈥檚 just the people of Afghanistan who do not have enough time to be a continuous victim, and it鈥檚 the Americans who should have time enough to avoid a complete collapse, once again.鈥澛犅�