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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu waged one of his signature political and diplomatic battles against the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement. The losing effort contributed to his alienation from former President Barack Obama, who brokered the deal.

President Donald Trump, who has been warmly embraced by Mr. Netanyahu, ran for office in part on criticism of the deal, from which he withdrew the United States. He then embarked on a campaign of renewed 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥� against Iran.

Now Tehran, too, has walked away from the agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which it signed with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, along with the European Union.

Following the Jan. 3 U.S. assassination of the powerful Qods Force commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran said it would no longer refrain from its production of enriched uranium as proscribed in the agreement.

And Israel, once again, faces the prospect of its arch enemy being as little as six to 10 months away from having enough fuel to create its first nuclear device. Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 office declined to comment for this story.

For all of its flaws, experts say, the JCPOA would have brought Israel 鈥� and the rest of the world 鈥� a hiatus of about 10 years from confronting the prospect of a nuclear Iran.

But now, Israel could find itself back in the same dilemma it faced before it was signed: 鈥淒o nothing and accept Iran on the verge of being a nuclear military force, or strike back,鈥� says Raz Zimmt, an Iran expert at Israel鈥檚 Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

鈥淚 don鈥檛 think in Jerusalem there鈥檚 someone who believes, if Iran is months away from a bomb, that President Trump ahead of elections will do something on his own,鈥� says Dr. Zimmt, a research fellow at the Tel Aviv think tank. 鈥淗e might tell an Israeli prime minister 鈥榊ou have a green light to act,鈥� but this is not something an Israeli prime minister would like to consider. The bottom line is we are in a very risky situation right now.鈥�

Most senior Israeli intelligence and military officials were not as emphatically opposed to the deal as Mr. Netanyahu was, although none of them saw it as a 鈥済ood deal鈥� because restrictions on Iran鈥檚 nuclear development would begin phasing out after eight years 鈥� but this time with international legitimacy and no threat of international sanctions.

Nevertheless, they hinted at relief that extra time had been bought ahead of what鈥檚 called the 鈥渂reakout time鈥� for Iran to become a nuclear power.

Iran鈥檚 ambitions: Deterrent or threat?

Despite the latest crisis, Iran is still allowing for international inspections 鈥� the last vestiges of the deal to remain in place. They also have not closed the door to future negotiations on a deal, but as their research and development continues, it may prove difficult to turn the clock back on any progress they make in the meantime.聽

On Sunday the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany urged Iran to return to full compliance with the deal.

Some Israeli experts, among them Elisheva Machlis, a senior lecturer at Bar-Ilan University, argue that Iran is ultimately a rational actor.

Despite the threat Iran potentially poses as a nuclear power, she says, it鈥檚 important to ask if Iran would seriously consider actually using nuclear weapons.

鈥淭he question is always: Why does Iran need nuclear technology? What is it for?鈥� says Dr. Machlis, arguing it should be understood as part of its regional strongman strategy. 鈥淚f it鈥檚 really for deterrence, the question is, 鈥楢re they really going to use nuclear weapons?鈥欌��

She also argues that Iran, still battle-scarred from a long war with Iraq that lasted for most of the 1980s, is loath to engage in full-scale confrontation and prefers to operate with proxies. She says that鈥檚 why Iranian officials have been sending out signals they don鈥檛 want to further inflame tensions with the United States.

But whatever Iranian intentions are, few in Israel suggest it not take the threat of a nuclear Iran seriously. Of all the myriad threats facing the Jewish state, a nuclear Iran is considered existential, not just by Mr. Netanyahu, but by security officials across the board.

鈥淣o Israeli prime minister will say, 鈥楲et鈥檚 wait and see if Iran is serious.鈥� No one will take that risk,鈥� says Dr. Zimmt. 鈥淲ith all the damage [conventional ballistic] missiles can do, they cannot eliminate the state of Israel. But nuclear weapons can do that.鈥�

America鈥檚 role

But Israel鈥檚 options are considered to be limited. Israel can push for more international pressure, namely through intensifying economic sanctions, or the U.S. or Israel could launch a military strike that would seek to destroy Iran鈥檚 nuclear capabilities.

鈥淚 think at this stage Israel prefers a lower profile and to leave it to President Trump to take initiatives concerning Iran,鈥� says Dr. Zimmt. 鈥淭he Israeli policy is to not interfere too much, to support American economic pressure on Iran, and not to make statements that would indicate it would use force.鈥�

Some Israeli analysts note, however, that with U.S.-Iran relations at low ebb and the two nations at loggerheads over nuclear sanctions, the strategic situation is deteriorating.

鈥淭his is the situation and it鈥檚 worsening all the time,鈥� says Ephraim Asculai, who worked in the past for the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and is now a senior researcher at the INSS.

鈥淎nd the deal is dying because Iran is really withdrawing slowly from all prohibitions of the deal. It was not a good deal to begin with, but it鈥檚 getting worse now,鈥� says Dr. Asculai, who adds he has some concerns about whether the U.S. would stand behind its pledge to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. 鈥淎s the Iranians accumulate more enriched uranium, the situation is getting more dangerous.鈥�

Dr. Ascoulai and others argue that it鈥檚 essential to push further economic sanctions ahead, which have proven effective in weakening Iran. And he calls on Europeans to be as forceful as possible on sanctions as well.

Future negotiations

But Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center-Herzliya, a private research college, sounds a more hopeful note.

The inspections the Iranians are still allowing are still better than what existed before the Iran deal, he argues.

鈥淭he question is political will: whether they want to make a nuclear weapon or not,鈥� Mr. Javedanfar says. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think they want that. What I think the Iranians are doing by taking these steps on removing limitations on enrichment and number of centrifuges 鈥� is 鈥� to strengthen their hand in negotiations with America.

鈥淚f there is a Democrat in the next White House or if [Mr.] Trump is re-elected they know they will have no other choice but to sit down and talk to them,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey will have no other choice because of the economic situation.鈥�

Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of research in the Israeli army鈥檚 intelligence branch who recently served as head of Israel鈥檚 Ministry of Strategic Affairs, argues that only intense and ongoing pressure on Iran will result in a nuclear deal that actually prevents Iran from creating a nuclear weapon.

鈥淭his deal should have never been born. It鈥檚 proof of the weakness of the West that Iran was given carte blanche to have a nuclear arsenal,鈥� he says.

鈥淲e should remain focused on preventing Iran from moving forward and 鈥� say they are no longer contained,鈥� says Mr. Kuperwasser, senior project manager at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, a conservative research institute. 鈥淭his should concern everyone.鈥�