In Iran, a hardline hunt for 鈥榠nfiltrators鈥 has political target, too
Iranian hardliners鈥 fear of Western cultural influence has morphed into anxiety over an 鈥渋nfiltration project鈥 by the US, Israel, and others, spurring arrests of alleged enemies, including even government officials.
Iranian hardliners鈥 fear of Western cultural influence has morphed into anxiety over an 鈥渋nfiltration project鈥 by the US, Israel, and others, spurring arrests of alleged enemies, including even government officials.
She once won Iran鈥檚 Book of the Year prize for a scholarly examination of fertility rates. But the Iranian-born academic was arrested last November, accused of 鈥渋nfiltration鈥 and 鈥渆spionage鈥 鈥撀爌art of a widening crackdown inside Iran against alleged enemies of the Islamic Republic.
Dr. Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi, a research fellow at the Australian National University and citizen of both Iran and Australia, was released from prison in late January.
But her incarceration is just one of dozens that signify a new round of 鈥渟ecuritization鈥 in Iran, a clampdown marked by the heightened activity of the intelligence and security apparatus. Environmentalists, women鈥檚 rights activists, and lawyers have increasingly been targeted. Even a member of Iran鈥檚 nuclear negotiating team is now behind bars.
That result is the culmination of a transformation among hard-line elements in Iran, from a stated fear of a Western 鈥渃ultural invasion,鈥 above all, to apparent anxiety about an 鈥渋nfiltration project鈥 by the United States, Israel, and other enemies, analysts say.
The clampdown began during the Obama years, with such high-profile cases as the 544-day imprisonment of Washington Post correspondent Jason Rezaian, who was accused of being the CIA 鈥渟tation chief鈥 in Tehran. But the current escalation has coincided with President Trump鈥檚 expressed determination to impose 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥 against Iran.
The bulk of security arrests are made by the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which reports directly to Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Its ideologues 鈥撀爀choing Mr. Khamenei 鈥 have been stepping up warnings of enemy infiltrators, going so far as to claim that all levels of the regime have been penetrated and must be 鈥渇undamentally cleansed.鈥
But that all-powerful IRGC arm is often in competition with the Ministry of Intelligence, controlled by the relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani, with the rivalry sometimes boiling down to disputes as basic as who is, and who is not, a spy.
Caught in the middle have been Iranians with dual US, UK, or Canadian citizenship, environmentalists working to protect Iran鈥檚 endangered Asian cheetah population, women鈥檚 activists determined to change mandatory hijab laws, lawyers who have sought to defend them, and many others.
鈥淥nce Mr. Khamenei changed his language from 鈥榗ultural invasion鈥 to the notion of specific infiltration, he opened the way for all these arrests,鈥 says Farideh Farhi, a veteran Iran expert at the University of Hawaii.
鈥淐ultural invasion was a broad concept of McDonald鈥檚 coming, of cultural changes,鈥 says Ms. Farhi. 鈥淚nfiltration is infiltration inside the government, and that completely changed the game. It shows a sense of insecurity. It has had consequences that we see.鈥
Amnesty sees 鈥榬epression鈥
Amnesty International estimates that at least 63 environmental activists and researchers were detained in 2018, among some 7,000 Iranians that the human rights group calculates were arrested, most during antigovernment protests, in what it calls a 鈥渟hameless campaign of repression.鈥
This week, Iran鈥檚 top judge asserted that Iran held no 鈥減olitical prisoners,鈥 and said 50,000 inmates would be pardoned or have their sentences shortened to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
But those are not likely to include long-standing 鈥渟ecurity鈥 cases, such as those of US-Iranian businessman Siamak Namazi, held since October 2015, or his father, Baquer Namazi, 82, also a dual citizen and former UNICEF diplomat. Both were convicted of 鈥渃ollaborating鈥 with an enemy power. They are among several other US and US dual citizens imprisoned in Iran.
As the Islamic Republic marks its four-decade birthday, it faces multiple challenges. Among them: an economy crippled by renewed US sanctions, corruption, and mismanagement; a society deeply divided by the rigors of that revolution; and a political space that is gridlocked, pitting hard-line factions staunchly against Mr. Rouhani.
They vilify the president for reaching out to the West, and for believing that the 2015 nuclear deal he agreed to with the US and other world powers would remove all sanctions and jump-start the economy, in exchange for restricting Iran鈥檚 nuclear program.
It was while that nuclear deal was being finalized that Khamenei鈥檚 warnings of 鈥渋nfiltration鈥 took on greater urgency, expanding into a catch-all action framework 鈥 and license to arrest 颅鈥 for Iran鈥檚 hard-line IRGC intelligence arm.
Weeks after the July 2015 deal was agreed, for example, Khamenei stated that the nuclear talks were 鈥渏ust their [US] tool for infiltration and imposing their will.鈥 Addressing IRGC commanders on Sept. 16 that year, Khamenei used the term 鈥渋nfiltration鈥 34 times in a single speech, warning that the enemy鈥檚 aim was 鈥渨eakening 鈥 our revolutionary and religious beliefs.鈥
The pace of warnings has barely eased, and their scope has widened. In late 2017, Khamenei said: 鈥淥ur officials must beware the presence of enemy-assigned infiltrators in decision-making institutions [and] must find out what the enemy is up to.鈥
Likewise last spring, after IRGC intelligence had stepped up arrests, and Iran was reeling from periodic labor and economic protests nationwide, Khamenei described a multitude of enemy tactics on a 鈥渢ough battlefront 鈥 in this war,鈥 which ranged from 鈥渕anipulating decision-making processes鈥 to 鈥渃ausing economic and financial turmoil.鈥
Caught in the net, beside the Americans,聽has been Canadian-Iranian Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani, a central bank adviser and member of Iran鈥檚 nuclear negotiating team. He was arrested in mid-2016 and sentenced in October 2017 to five years in prison, despite protests of his innocence by Rouhani officials.
Taking direct aim at the president and his allies, the IRGC intelligence arm last September produced a 21-minute propaganda film broadcast on state-run TV. It cast him as a spy and said one aim of Western nations 鈥渨as to put an infiltrating agent inside our negotiating team.鈥
Also snared have been dual UK-Iranian citizens such as Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, a charity worker held since April 2016 on spying charges she denies, and Abbas Edalat, a computer science professor at Imperial College London held for eight months last year. Ironically, he had founded an organization called the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII).
After Mr. Edalat鈥檚 release in late December, CASMII said that such a 鈥渕isunderstanding鈥 by Iran鈥檚 security apparatus should be seen in the context of 鈥渕ulti-pronged attacks and open threats of the US, Israel, and their allies to destabilize the Islamic Republic of Iran 鈥撀爄ncluding massive spending on economic warfare, espionage, and psychological operations against Iranians.鈥
Was environmentalist a spy?
But the case that perhaps tells most about the prevailing ideology of the 鈥渋nfiltration project鈥 and the political divisions between Iran鈥檚 intelligence branches is the arrest of nine environmentalists a year ago who worked for the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation.
Two weeks after their arrest, Kavous Seyyed-Emami, a renowned Iranian-Canadian professor who founded the wildlife body, mysteriously died in prison in what authorities called a suicide 鈥撀燼 conclusion rejected by Mr. Seyyed-Emami鈥檚 family.
The Tehran prosecutor asserted that the wildlife foundation had been set up as a cover to collect data about sensitive defense and missile bases, and to 鈥渋nfiltrate鈥 Iran鈥檚 scientific community 鈥渦nder the guidance鈥 of operatives of the CIA and Israel鈥檚 Mossad.
Four of the researchers have reportedly been charged with 鈥渃orruption on earth,鈥 a crime which can carry the death penalty, and others with spying. Human rights monitors allege that detainees were subjected to months in solitary confinement, death threats, and physical abuse to force confessions.
Throughout, advisers to the president and the Ministry of Intelligence have repeatedly dismissed the IRGC claims against the environmentalists. One reformist lawmaker tweeted last May that ministry experts, based on 鈥渋ndisputable evidence and documents,鈥 had found 鈥渘o proof鈥 of espionage.
Amid the intelligence tug of war, Rouhani reportedly set up a committee of his security ministers to press for their release.
Then last month, an extraordinary story appeared about the 鈥渧ictim of infighting鈥 between intelligence services. Citing unnamed sources 鈥 which some believe may have been from inside the president鈥檚 office 鈥 the Zeitoon website reported that Israeli operatives had long ago contacted Seyyed-Emami, asking for his collaboration.
According to Zeitoon, Seyyed-Emami then informed the Ministry of Intelligence, which asked in turn if he would take part in a counter-espionage effort, by providing the Israelis with incorrect information. Seyyed-Emami allegedly agreed.
鈥淔or quite some time then, he delivered wrong map data and false numerical facts to the Israelis under the supervision of the Ministry of Intelligence,鈥 Zeitoon wrote. It was this activity, monitored by IRGC intelligence and unknown to Seyyed-Emami鈥檚 colleagues, which led to the arrests, the website reported.
鈥淚f this narrative is correct, then it suggests that [IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Taeb鈥檚] enmity, his partisanship [against Rouhani] is to the extent that he would sabotage an ongoing disinformation campaign,鈥 says an Iranian analyst outside the country, who asked not to be named and is familiar with such cases.
鈥淲hat this also tells us is that these groups are being targeted,鈥 says the analyst.
Targeting Rouhani
Because Rouhani has criticized the IRGC in the past, there is a 鈥渃lear element of partisanship, that they want to beat up on Rouhani because they feel he is on the ropes now, the [nuclear deal] has almost collapsed, and 鈥榳e can go in for the strike and cut him off at the knees,鈥欌 says the analyst.
As that power struggle continues, the need to root out infiltrators has not faded from the to-do list of Iran鈥檚 most strident revolutionaries.
A lengthy speech last August by Alireza Pourmasoud, a hard-line researcher and ideologue connected to the IRGC, traces the 鈥渞oots of infiltration鈥 back to pre-revolutionary times in the 1960s and 1970s.
Mr. Pourmasoud argues that the CIA, MI6, and Mossad planted agents inside SAVAK 鈥撀爐he intelligence service of the pro-West Shah, a close ally of the US and Israel 鈥 who then seamlessly embedded themselves in the security structure of the Islamic Republic, where they and their recruits continue to secretly wreak havoc to this day.
鈥淭his network has to be unmasked, we need to know who is doing what,鈥 Pourmasoud says in a shortened version of the speech made more concise for easier circulation, which emerged in recent weeks.
鈥淭oday the ones who are harming the revolution 鈥 are hidden as religious people who act pretty well, they say their prayers in such a committed way that provoke your jealousy,鈥 says Pourmasoud.
鈥淚t鈥檚 all about some fundamental cleansing that has to be done in our country,鈥 he concludes. 鈥淭hey do infiltrate our establishment from the top, places that you cannot even believe.鈥