海角大神

When Turkey鈥檚 military campaign launched in dramatic fashion a week ago, with tanks and allied Syrian rebels seizing a key border town from Islamic State (IS) within hours, the question was how much Turkey might change the balance of power in Syria鈥檚 war.

Now it is clear that Turkey鈥檚 move was a limited, two-prong approach: Push IS militants back from the border after their attacks in Turkey; and prevent Syrian Kurds from linking cantons under their control into a de facto Kurdish statelet.

But even such limited objectives carry risks that analysts say can grow with each passing day, depending on how NATO-ally Turkey chooses to navigate the potential Syrian quagmire.

On Tuesday the US military announced a loose agreement between Turkish-backed forces and the US-backed Kurdish YPG militia that Washington hopes will end skirmishes between the two. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Monday had called on both sides 鈥渢o not fight with one another鈥� and instead focus on fighting IS.

But friction with the United States is just one issue for Turkey in a complex, multilayered battlefield. Other risks, analysts say, include inciting more regional Kurdish resentment that could worsen Turkey鈥檚 fight against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants inside Turkey, and military overreach inside Syria that yields more casualties than Turks are ready to bear.

Those risks are separate from Turkey鈥檚 broader strategic desire to see the end of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad鈥檚 rule 鈥� an aim that today seems all but forgotten as Turkey focuses instead on Kurdish autonomy and IS as bigger threats.

鈥淭here is an almost inevitable escalatory track in terms of [Turkey鈥檚] troop commitment and the military鈥檚 presence in Syria,鈥� says Julien Barnes-Dacey, a senior policy fellow in Brussels with the European Council on Foreign Relations.

鈥淪o much will depend on what the Turks achieve in the next weeks or months, because at the moment it seems that there is no exit strategy,鈥� says Mr. Barnes-Dacey. 鈥淩eliance on Syrian rebels who have not proven capable of holding territory in the past 鈥� and who are likely to be dependent on a continued Turkish presence 鈥� could quickly turn into a more problematic and costly exercise.

鈥淭urkey is in a very precarious situation, and there are big question marks about the sustainability of a combined anti-Kurdish, anti-Assad front,鈥� says Barnes-Dacey. 鈥淯ltimately, something will have to give 鈥� and it鈥檚 more likely to be the broader Syrian question.鈥�

No 'permission' for Kurdish state

Turkey says it has killed 25 鈥渢errorists鈥� in villages in its own airstrikes, and lost one soldier to a YPG rocket. A Syrian group that compiles casualty reports stated that 41 civilians were killed Sunday聽in the same areas.

Turkish media reported Tuesday that 108 artillery strikes had been carried out in the previous 24 hours, and that the day before, 10 villages in the area of the captured IS town of Jarablus had been 鈥渃leansed.鈥�

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said military action will continue 鈥渦ntil there is no longer a threat鈥� 鈥� from IS or from Kurdish militias that Turkey considers terrorists. Turkey is 鈥渄etermined to take steps to guarantee its citizens鈥� security,鈥� he said Tuesday in a message to mark Turkey鈥檚 annual Victory Day.

鈥淭he fight is the greatest source of our confidence,鈥� said Mr. Erdogan. 鈥淲e did not give permission for the establishment of a Kurdish state in Syria."

That leaves open Turkey鈥檚 new hard-power commitment to the five-year Syria war, in which Ankara has long-indicated that thwarting Syrian Kurdish ambitions of autonomy 鈥� which could provide safe haven for the PKK 鈥� take priority over undermining Mr. Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies on the battlefield.

For Turkey, clearing IS from the border is a 鈥済reat benefit,鈥� but it is 鈥渁lso their biggest weakness,鈥� says Aaron Stein, a Turkey expert and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

New opportunities for IS

鈥淓xacerbating Kurdish anger at the Turkish government has boomerang effects in the southeast [of Turkey], and helps sustain that [PKK] insurgency,鈥� says Mr. Stein. 鈥淚S [also] has a pretty strong foothold inside of Turkey, and it doesn鈥檛 take much to put together the types of attacks that they have been carrying out.鈥�

It鈥檚 a Catch-22, he says: Turkish troops will almost certainly have to stay on the ground in Syria, 鈥渂ecause they can鈥檛 risk IS launching a counterattack and their Turkey-backed rebels losing territory 鈥� that would be embarrassing, and politically unwise,鈥� says Stein.

Likewise, the longer they stay, he says, 鈥渢he more potshots from an antitank missile pop up, and if they push up past the border you have to start worrying about IEDs.鈥�

The Pentagon, meanwhile, has declared as 鈥渦nacceptable and a source of deep concern鈥� the fighting over the weekend between Turkey and Turkish-backed forces and the US-backed YPG militia, which was meant to have withdrawn to the east of the Euphrates River, according to US and Turkish officials.

鈥淎s ISIS watches its enemies fight each other, that will present new opportunities for it to move forward and launch new attacks and seize new territory,鈥� says Barnes-Dacey, the Brussels analyst.

鈥淔or the first time in a long time, Turkey is in play in a meaningful way in this conflict, but the direction of travel is uncertain,鈥� he says. 鈥淚 think there are limited ambitions, and perhaps more importantly, capabilities, in terms of what the Turks can achieve with this intervention.鈥�

How long to stick around

The Turkish media have been full of reports on the operation and its significance.

The incursion into Jarablus is a first step 鈥渢oward a broader geography of anticipated military action鈥� for Turkey, which will enhance Ankara鈥檚 鈥渞ight to speak on drawing the map in Syria鈥� in the future, wrote Ismail Numan Telci of Sakarya University in the pro-government Star magazine.

But holding on to such influence will not be easy, even though Turkey has decades of experience with cross-border operations in northern Iraq 鈥� many of them much bigger and pushing deeper 鈥� in pursuit of the PKK.

Those operations also exposed logistical weaknesses, and often ended within weeks, notes Stein. If clearing the border of IS 鈥渆nds up being their ambition,鈥� then Operation Euphrates Shield will be 鈥渞elatively easy.鈥�

鈥淭he question then becomes, how long do you stick around? And I don鈥檛 think they have an answer to that,鈥� says Stein. 鈥淭he cost of waging an insurgency is next to nothing, compared to occupying even a small strip of territory.鈥� It鈥檚 not that the military isn鈥檛 prepared to take casualties, it鈥檚 that the politics are not ready to sustain something like this 鈥� even if the losses are comparatively small.鈥�