海角大神

Just days after Turkey鈥檚 failed coup attempt on July 15, pro-government newspapers splashed front page 鈥渘ews鈥� that CIA agents had orchestrated the bid to topple President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an from a resort island near Istanbul.

The luxury Splendid Palace Hotel, an Ottoman-era landmark with two silvery rooftop domes, may seem like an unlikely and high profile staging post for regime change 鈥撀燼nd in fact it is.

But anti-Americanism has surged in Turkey, where Vice President Joe Biden arrives on Aug. 24 to reassure the NATO ally that the US and Turkey still stand together against terrorism. He鈥檒l try to assure the country also that the US stands with President Erdo臒an against the coup attempt, which has prompted a host of fresh conspiracy theories and new enemies in the popular imagination, from the island foreign policy conference to the White House.

Such rhetoric is not new: It has grown since 2013, prompted by Washington鈥檚 criticism of Erdo臒an鈥檚 heavy-handed crackdown on Gezi Park protests that year. Later came disputes over the Syrian war,聽with the US critical of what it saw as Turkish encouragement of Islamic jihadist fighters. More recently, US military support to Syrian Kurds, whom Turkey considers terrorists, attracted Turkey鈥檚 ire in the fight against the self-declared Islamic State.

Washington nonetheless maintains its high-level ties to Ankara. Turkey allows US jet fighters to use its Incirlik airbase to launch attacks against IS in Syria and Iraq. And Washington has provided satellite intelligence in recent years to enable precision Turkish attacks on Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) bases in northern Iraq.

But even as Turkish politicians and pundits alike publicly suggest that such cooperation may be at risk, with Turkey hinting at a 鈥渟trategic rebalancing鈥� toward Russia and Iran, analysts say close financial and strategic ties will limit how far Turkey鈥檚 anti-Americanism can go.

Mr. Biden鈥檚 visit may be key to finding that limit. Turkey-US relations 鈥渁re medium sugar now,鈥� Prime Minister Binali Yildirim told journalists over the weekend, referring to a semi-sweet version of Turkish coffee. Noting that the US is a strategic ally and that 鈥渆very family experiences problems,鈥� he said Biden 鈥渋s coming to Turkey to make the coffee sugary.鈥澛�

Top of Turkey鈥檚 agenda will be demands for the extradition from Pennsylvania of Fethullah G眉len, a cleric and friend-turned-foe of Erdo臒an whose return to Turkey to face charges has become a litmus test for improving US-Turkey ties.

During 16 years in exile in the Pocono Mountains, Mr. G眉len has marshaled a network of followers 鈥� accused of infiltrating all pillars of the Turkish state 鈥� who are widely blamed here for the coup attempt. Tens of thousands of Turks have been purged from the bureaucracy, judiciary, and military, with some 17,740 arrested at last count on suspicion of links to what Turks now call the 鈥淔ethullah Terrorist Organization,鈥� or FET脰.

鈥淲hen the US asks us to extradite someone with an arrest warrant, we do not ask about evidence,鈥� said Mr. Yildirim, noting frustration at US legal requirements to provide clear evidence in order to proceed with extradition. 鈥淲e think the enemy of my friend is my enemy, too.鈥�

Besides any evidence of G眉len鈥檚 role in the coup given by Turkey, US officials must by law weigh up the likelihood of a fair trial, and chances of mistreatment.

Charges of US involvement, analysts say, feed a broader conspiratorial mindset in Turkey that has crystallized since the attempted coup, which was foiled when Erdo臒an called on loyalist supporters to take to the streets and disarm the would-be putschists.

Since then, as Erdo臒an and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) celebrated this 鈥渧ictory for democracy,鈥� they have also let anti-Americanism run wild, fanned by politicians and media apparently bent on blaming outsiders.

At the highest levels, this may not make much difference. The AKP is adept at separating negative popular attitudes from elite-level cooperation. 鈥淭hey compartmentalize,鈥� says Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at the Chatham House think tank in London, calling it a 鈥渄ualist approach.鈥�

Still notes Mr. Hakura, 鈥淓rdo臒an has been 鈥� whipping up this anti-American feeling and the proclivity of Turkish society to [believe] conspiracy theories.鈥� But there is also 鈥渁 tendency among the ruling party 鈥� to attach credence to some of these conspiracies.鈥�

That could have long-term consequences.

鈥淎nti-Americanism in Turkey is at its peak and turning into hate,鈥� Justice Minister Bekir Bozda臒 said on Aug. 9. 鈥淚t is up to the US to stop this by extraditing G眉len.鈥�

Failure to return the aging cleric 鈥撀爓ho has lived in the US since 1999 and holds a green card 鈥撀爓ould mean 鈥渢he US has chosen a terrorist over Turkey,鈥� he said.

G眉len 鈥渄elivered the coup into the hands of the CIA 鈥� there is more than enough evidence in the hands of Turkey,鈥� the minister said on Aug. 19, 聽NTV Haber reported. 鈥淭he CIA knows even the gender of the black flies flying around [G眉len鈥檚] mansion 鈥� to tell us [they] did not know [of this plot] ridicules the 鈥� Turkish nation.鈥�

The street has got the message, and reflected it at post-coup rallies organized by the AKP every night for weeks after July 15. A common poster read: 鈥淎merica = out / People = in.鈥�

鈥淚f anything this big happens, Turks believe someone else was behind it, like the CIA,鈥� says an architect at one rally, who said he did not want to give his name because he was suspicious of a journalist who was American.

Indeed, the perception that Washington and Europe were slow to oppose the coup attempt because of their dislike of Turkey鈥檚 abrasive, democratically elected president,聽has created fertile ground for accusations.

鈥淭he US tried to kill Erdo臒an,鈥� proclaimed 陌brahim Karag眉l, editor of the pro-AKP newspaper Yeni 艦afak, in late July. 鈥淚 repeat: The attack aimed at martyring Erdo臒an was planned by the US, in the US, directly through G眉len鈥檚 terrorists.鈥�

The pro-government Ak艧am joined others in taking up the CIA-team story at the Splendid Palace Hotel, turning a two-day conference to discuss the Middle East one year after the Iran nuclear deal into a lurid tale about a 鈥渉ighly secretive鈥� meeting.

The conference coincided with the coup attempt but was organized last December by the Wilson Center, a well-known Washington think tank, and a Turkish university.

Scores of such conferences take place in Turkey every year, and the 15 or so participants at this one were seasoned foreign policy experts. But Ak艧am labeled each foreign participant a 鈥淐IA agent,鈥� published photographs gleaned from the internet, and claimed 鈥� inaccurately, along with many other demonstrable falsehoods 鈥撀爐hat the delegates all took a private boat to the island 鈥渢o avoid being recorded by security footage.鈥�

The Wilson Center rejects 鈥渃ategorically鈥� any link to the coup attempt, and said in a statement that the island meeting 鈥渨as very much removed from the center of the crisis.鈥�

鈥淧erhaps the most suspicious name in the conference,鈥� Ak艧am reported, was that of this reporter, who was confused with the American death row inmate of the same name who killed his pregnant wife, Laci, in 2002.

One front page showed that Scott Peterson wearing a suit and tie, in court; another wearing an orange prison jumpsuit and handcuffs, superimposed over San Quentin prison.

鈥淗ow such a hardened criminal was removed from America鈥檚 most secure prison arouses big question marks in the mind,鈥� the newspaper wrote. 鈥淚ntelligence authorities 鈥� believe he escaped to Greece via a sea route.鈥�

US Amb. John Bass has repeatedly rejected accusations of any US role, or of advance knowledge of the coup attempt. The US Embassy said a photo circulating of Ambassador Bass supposedly meeting a coup-plotting colonel the day before was fake. One report alleged that the CIA made payments to anti-Erdo臒an putschists for six months from the Nigeria-based United Bank for Africa; another headlined, 鈥淭errorists were entertained at the White House!鈥�

Such allegations would be laughable if their ramifications weren鈥檛 so serious. Pro-government newspapers and politicians alike have suggested that the anti-Americanism may push Turkey鈥檚 foreign policy interests away from the US toward actors whose geopolitical goals differ sharply from those of the US.

Still, says Hakura, military hardware from NATO鈥檚 second-largest army comes from the US and Europe, as does the bulk of foreign investment and most economic ties.

鈥淭urkey has an umbilical cord to the West, and to the US, so it cannot afford to rupture relations with its US and European partners,鈥� says Hakura. 鈥淎nd that limits any attempt by the ruling party to break off relations or limit ties with Washington.鈥�