海角大神

With聽Israel鈥檚聽flag flapping over聽the聽country鈥檚 newest piece of military hardware,聽Prime Minister聽Benjamin Netanyahu descended聽very carefully into the Dolphin-class submarine INS Rahav聽at聽its聽inaugural ceremony this month聽in聽Haifa.

There鈥檚 been little tentative,聽however, about Israel鈥檚 recent push westward into the Mediterranean Sea with a mix of added naval force and energy diplomacy.

Israelis had turned their backs to the water for decades, as聽neighboring armies聽routinely threatened to throw the Jewish state into the sea.聽But in the last five years, Israel has begun聽to see the Mediterranean as聽a聽strategic聽arena, rather than聽merely聽as an apocalyptic graveyard.

That arena hold threats and opportunities: rising instability in the region post Arab Spring; a shift in US priorities and an increased Russian presence; and the need to develop offshore natural gas reserves.

As a result, a navy that was once mainly a coast guard has been bulked up with new vessels to protect Israel's gas fields and defend the mainland from rocket attacks. And Israel is cultivating a military, economic, and diplomatic axis聽with Greece and Cyprus to cooperate on exploiting gas fields聽鈥� while fending off rivals like Turkey and new regional players like Russia.

This聽relatively new axis will be on display聽Jan. 28聽at a three-way summit in Cyprus, highlighting a dramatic improvement in relations between Greece and Israel. The agenda includes discussion of possible joint military exercises and the potential for economic cooperation with Egypt. It's the聽latest in a series of high-level consultations between the countries.

Even as Israel cultivates this new regional alliance, much larger powers are vying for influence聽at a time that the United States has reduced its footprint, observers say.聽Russia has intervened in the Syrian civil war, and China has sent ships amid a growing economic presence around the basin. The two held a joint exercise in the Mediterranean Sea last year.

鈥淲hat we see in the last few years is a rise in significance of the Mediterranean.鈥� These changes, especially the superpower competition, affect Israel whether it likes it or not,鈥� says Ehud Eiran, a political scientist at Haifa University who co-authored聽an assessment聽of the strategic challenges in the region. 鈥淚srael has to find regional solutions.鈥�

Mediterranean identity

Eran Lerman, a former聽international affairs聽deputy聽on Israel鈥檚 National Security Council, argues that聽Israel should think of itself as a Mediterranean rather than a Middle Eastern nation.

鈥淔or years, we allowed ourselves to be locked in by this term 鈥榯he only democracy in the Middle East,鈥� 鈥� says Lerman, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.聽鈥淚t鈥檚 time for us to think Mediterranean.鈥�

With gas fields potentially vulnerable to attack dozens of miles from Israel鈥檚 shores, the navy has convinced the government to purchase four new corvette warships from Germany.

The Jewish state has for years also been modernizing and expanding its fleet of nuclear submarines, which are seen mainly as a deterrent to a long-range Iranian missile strike on Israel, but are also capable of directing firepower at militants around the Mediterranean basin.

鈥淭he weight of the navy in the balance of national security is constantly on the rise,鈥澛燩rime Minister Netanyahu said聽at the submarine ceremony. 鈥淚srael鈥檚 naval force will continue to extend its reach, adding strength and strike power to reach remote and unseen quarters.鈥�

Shift in US focus

The potential challenges from the sea are growing: the disintegration of聽Libya, which has enabled the Islamic State to get a toe-hold there; threats from Hezbollah in Lebanon, with which Israel has a dispute over the location of the maritime border; and muscle-flexing by Turkey, with whom Israel had a falling out five years ago.

Meanwhile, the聽US has downsized its presence in the region聽and shifted its focus toward the Pacific 鈥� creating a potential vacuum in the eastern Mediterranean.

鈥淭he Mediterranean was ignored by Israel because after the end of the Cold War, it was basically an American lake,鈥澛爏ays聽Jonathan Rynhold, a political science professor at Bar Ilan University.聽But 鈥渨ith America being less assertive and less involved; Israel has to come out with its own strategy.鈥�

Offshore gas discoveries, meanwhile, have created an opportunity for a new matrix of cooperation. Israeli energy companies are helping to develop gas production off of Cyprus and are discussing exporting gas to energy-poor Egypt, which already has gas liquefaction plants. Another option is to bring the gas to shore in Greece and thence to European markets.聽

All part of a pattern

The warming toward Israel is a significant shift for Greece, which has historically sided with the Palestinians in their conflict. It also gives Israel an alternative to Turkey after bilateral ties plunged into a freeze over Israel鈥檚 deadly assault on a Turkish ship in 2010 that challenged the blockade of Gaza.

鈥淲e have made big steps in making the relations of the countries better,鈥� Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said during a first-ever visit to Jerusalem last November. 鈥淲e鈥檙e on a route of strategic cooperation.鈥�

Lerman believes the new matrix of alliances in the eastern Mediterranean is connected with Egypt鈥檚 decision to return its ambassador to Israel this month for the first time in more than three years.

And, if recent efforts at Turkish-Israeli reconciliation come to fruition, Lerman says there is room in the alliance for Ankara despite its rivalry with Greece and Egypt.

Wishful thinking?

鈥淭his is all part of a larger pattern,鈥� he says. 鈥淭here is a vital need for all of us who are like minded in the eastern Mediterranean to work together.鈥�

*This story was updated to correct the description of the submarine INS Rahav.