海角大神

When Turkish citizens elect a new parliament next Sunday, they won鈥檛 find Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an on the ballot. But for his supporters and opponents alike, the three-time prime minister and now president features front-and-center in the campaign.

Outside a teahouse on a quiet street overlooking the K谋l谋莽 Ali Pasha Mosque in Istanbul鈥檚 Tophane neighborhood, Sever G眉ney doesn鈥檛 hesitate when asked whom he鈥檒l vote for: 鈥淭ayyip,鈥� says the retired printer and self-described devout Muslim. His companions nod in agreement.

Fluttering above the men are the orange and blue flags of Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP). 鈥淗e and the party are the same,鈥� says Mr. G眉ney, pointing to the flags. 鈥淭heir system aligns with my belief and ideology. I support them spiritually, but also for good economic policies.鈥�

Several blocks over in this rapidly gentrifying neighborhood, trendy cafes have replaced traditional teahouses, and women in short skirts outnumber those wearing the traditional Islamic headscarf. Flags belonging to secular opposition parties jostle above the streets.

For young voters like Mert Erg眉der, a university student, the prosperity Turkey has enjoyed under Erdo臒an is overshadowed by his increasingly authoritarian rule.聽鈥淭ayyip must go,鈥� he says. 鈥淗e rules the country for himself and his cruel ideas, and the AKP just does whatever he wants.鈥�

For the country鈥檚 deeply-polarized electorate, the June 7 general election is shaping up as a referendum on its most powerful politician 鈥� one that could determine the fate of this major Muslim democracy and NATO ally. At stake is Erdo臒an鈥檚 dream of rewriting Turkey鈥檚 constitution to change the system of government from parliamentary to presidential.

鈥淭his is going to be the make-or-break elections in terms of Erdo臒an鈥檚 presidential ambitions,鈥� says Sinan Ulgen, a political analyst at the Carnegie Europe think-tank in Brussels. 鈥淎t one extreme, he will be able to eliminate any barriers to his power, to the detriment of the country鈥檚 institutions. At the other extreme, the country ends up with a coalition government, as a consequence of which Erdo臒an鈥檚 power would begin to erode.鈥�

Erdo臒an鈥檚 drive to power

Making no secret of his ambitions, Erdo臒an has pushed the limits of his powers. When he was elected last August, he promised to be a president who 鈥渟weats, runs around, and works hard,鈥� rather than sticking to a ceremonial role. Unlike previous presidents, he has chaired cabinet meetings, lashed out at the central bank on economic policy, and clashed with his own government over the Kurdish peace process, which he initiated as prime minister.

Though he took an oath of political neutrality, Erdo臒an has cast aside any pretense of being the impartial head of state required by Turkey鈥檚 constitution. He has painted the opposition parties as 鈥渦n-Islamic,鈥� accused the leftist People鈥檚 Democratic Party (HDP) of being an 鈥渆xtension of a terrorist organization鈥� over its ties with the Kurdistan Workers鈥� Party, and has brandished a Kurdish-language Quran to win over religious Kurds.

The cameras are often rolling as he stumps across the country: In a single week in May, the country鈥檚 top television watchdog found that Turkish TV stations aired more than 44 hours of live coverage of Erdo臒an鈥檚 rallies.

According to Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at London-based Chatham House, Erdo臒an鈥檚 drive for an executive-style presidency is a mater of political survival.

鈥淎t the moment, Erdo臒an wields de facto power, which is driven by the sheer strength of his personality,鈥� says Mr. Hakura. 鈥淏ut his personality will not be sufficient to maintain his hold on power in the longer term. If Erdo臒an is unsuccessful in transforming Turkey into a presidential system, then he knows that the power struggles between himself, the parliament, and the prime minister will intensify.鈥�

Price of prosperity

Erdo臒an has been credited with ushering in an era of stability and broadening Turkey鈥檚 middle class. From 2002 to 2012, the economy grew five percent a year on average; per capita income nearly tripled. As foreign capital poured into the country, the AKP built hospitals, bridges, roads, and luxury malls. Social policies that previously only benefitted well-off Turks were revamped to address the needs of the poor.

Turkey鈥檚 cultural transformation has been equally dramatic, especially for the religious majority long oppressed by the secular old guard. Under the AKP, Islam ceased to be filtered from public life and a ban was lifted on wearing headscarves in state institutions.

For voters like Nusret Aksoy, an observant Muslim who owns several furniture shops in Istanbul, life under Erdo臒an and the AKP has brought stability, prosperity, and unprecedented religious freedom.

鈥淲e used to be shunned because of our beliefs, but with Erdo臒an, those dark days won鈥檛 return,鈥� Aksoy says. 鈥淢any good things will come if people let the AK party work freely, but it needs more time. Thirteen years is not enough.鈥�

But Erdo臒an鈥檚 opponents worry that an electoral victory for the AKP would further erode democratic freedoms. Among a litany of complaints are his use of laws on terrorism and personal insult to stifle criticism; restrictions on the Internet and media; and the curbed independence of Turkey鈥檚 judiciary.

鈥淚f Erdo臒an gets to change the constitution, it would mean an end to whatever freedoms we have left in Turkey,鈥� says Tugrul Erturk, a teacher in Istanbul. 鈥淚鈥檓 sure the economy will be okay if the AKP wins the election, but I have no doubt that freedom of speech and democracy will get much worse.鈥�

Numbers game

The AKP would need to secure two-thirds of the 550 seats in parliament in order rewrite the constitution unilaterally. With only 312 AKP lawmakers in parliament today, that supermajority of at least 367 deputies is looking out of reach. A more realistic option for Erdo臒an's aspirations would be a referendum, requiring the backing of at least 330 deputies to bring a new constitution to a popular vote.聽

Standing squarely in his path is the HDP, which is counting on newfound support beyond its traditional Kurdish base to propel it into Parliament for the first time.

If it secures at least 10 percent of the national vote, it will deny Erdo臒an鈥檚 party a sufficient majority to change the constitution 鈥� and prevent any one party from being able to form a government alone. But if the HDP fails to enter parliament, the seats in the provinces it wins would go to the runner-up, the AKP, which traditionally draws the support of religious Kurds.

With Turkish opinion polls notoriously unreliable, voters are hedging their bets.

Deniz, a student at Galatasaray University, usually supports the secularist Republican People's Party, formed by Mustafa Kemal Atat眉rk. 鈥淭his year I鈥檓 voting strategically to keep HDP above the threshold,鈥� he says.

Erdo臒an hopes to remain at the country鈥檚 helm until 2023, the 100th anniversary of Atat眉rk鈥檚 founding of the secular Turkish Republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

鈥淛ust as Ataturk shaped generations of Turks in his own secular image, Erdo臒an wants to shape generations of Turks in his own image as a pious conservative Muslim,鈥� says Soner Cagaptay, a Turkey expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 鈥淏ut it comes at the expense of a very split society, in which half of the country loves him and half of the country cannot stand him.鈥�