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After a half century of work, the benefits of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program remain few: It provides less than 2 percent of Iran鈥檚 energy needs and some medical isotopes and has demonstrated scientific prowess.

But the costs of the nuclear project have also been enormous: More than $100 billion in lost oil revenue and foreign investment alone, according to a report released today by two Washington think tanks.

鈥淪anctions have raised the cost of Iran鈥檚 nuclear pursuit. Yes, they are proceeding with their [program], but the cost is going up,鈥� says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation in Washington, a security think tank not involved with the study.

The high cost of Iran鈥檚 nuclear effort 鈥撎齱hich continues to grow, even under a US-engineered global sanctions regime 鈥� have raised questions for years about Iran鈥檚 ultimate intent.听Is it to show, as Iran鈥檚 top officials claim, that the 鈥渞evolutionary鈥� Islamic Republic can听defy听sanctions, and Western and Israeli hostility, proving itself a 鈥渕odel鈥� of independence for other Islamic and developing countries?

Or is the only explanation for such dogged persistence that Iran is determined to achieve nuclear weapons capacity 鈥撎齣f not a weapon itself 鈥撎齬egardless of the cost and despite its own public rejection of nuclear weapons as un-Islamic?

鈥淚ran鈥檚 nuclear program has deep roots. It cannot be 鈥榚nded鈥� or 鈥榖ombed away',鈥� 鈥� making diplomacy the 鈥渙nly long-term solution鈥� to ensure it remains peaceful, conclude report authors Ali Vaez for the Federation of American Scientists, and Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.听

Iran has been 鈥渙verplaying"听the nationalist aspects of its nuclear ambitions,听rendering 鈥渁ny significant nuclear retreat tantamount to an act of capitulation, if not political suicide,鈥� the report says.

Meanwhile, 鈥淲ashington鈥檚 overwhelming focus on coercion and military threats has backed US policymakers into a rhetorical corner," it asserts.

In public and in ongoing nuclear talks, Washington must answer some key questions听in order to persuade Iran and its public to consider a deal,听says the report: 鈥淲hat could Iranians collectively gain by a nuclear compromise, other than a reduction of sanctions and the threat of war? How could a more conciliatory Iranian approach improve the country鈥檚 economy and advance its technological 鈥撎齣ncluding nuclear 鈥撎齪rowess?鈥�

Deterrence

The report is the first to tabulate the cost of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program, and therefore gauge its significance for the Islamic regime.

鈥淚t鈥檚 reasonable to argue that sanctions and pressures and diplomacy, positive and negative inducements 鈥� if you don鈥檛 want to call them 鈥榗arrots and sticks鈥� 鈥� have a bearing on Iran鈥檚 calculations, because it鈥檚 not North Korea,鈥� says Mr. Nader, whose recent work examines Iran鈥檚 motivations for continuing such a high-cost path.

鈥淚t gets lost in this town as to why they are pursuing this [nuclear] capability. It鈥檚 not to nuke Israel; they don鈥檛 want to nuke the US or Saudi Arabia, which makes zero sense,鈥� says Nader. 鈥淚t鈥檚 deterrence, and you don鈥檛 hear US officials talk about their deterrent needs.鈥�

The concerns of negotiators of the P5+1 group (the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) echo those of decades ago, when in the 1970s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a close ally and had carte blanche US military and diplomatic support.

Back then, Iran鈥檚 nuclear program saw a 12-fold increase in the number of nuclear scientists in just three years, the report notes, and the same questions were raised about Iran鈥檚 intentions: issues of sensitive technology, fuel stockpiles, and more safeguards to prevent any push for a bomb.

After the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran鈥檚 nuclear effort was put on ice for years, dismissed听by the new government听as a costly hindrance imposed by the West, and finally听buried when Iran鈥檚 revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said the unfinished power reactor at Bushehr should be used as 鈥渟ilos to store wheat,鈥� according to the report.

Still,听after听Iran鈥檚 nuclear program was resurrected in the mid-1980s, it absorbed Iranian assets. By one count, building the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz beneath 25 feet of concrete at one point consumed Iran鈥檚 entire concrete output.

More to the story

While the report notes that it is 鈥渘early impossible鈥� to calculate the actual costs of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program,听it gives examples of how听some of Iran鈥檚 efforts do not make sense in a traditional cost-benefit analysis.听

Iran has limited quantities of its own natural uranium, for example, such that even under the 鈥渕ost optimistic variants鈥� it would only have enough known supplies to fuel its sole reactor at Bushehr for nine years. If 鈥渢otal known and speculative resources鈥� are counted,听at most听Iran could run seven reactors for听less than听a decade, according to the report.听

And, by some estimates, relying on nuclear fuel enriched domestically could cost Iran $125 million听more听per year than buying fuel on the international market.

According to the report,听Bushehr today provides just 2 percent of Iran鈥檚 electricity needs 鈥� and 15 percent of the electricity that courses through the national grid 鈥渋s lost through old and ill-maintained transmission lines.鈥�

Separately, the report adds, Iran鈥檚 solar energy potential may be 13 times higher than the country鈥檚 鈥渢otal energy needs.鈥� 听听

鈥淚 ask myself the question: Why is the regime in its entirety ready to pay such a high price, and make such great sacrifices, if there is no military component?鈥� asks Ali Alfoneh, an Iran specialist at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington.

Too far along to give in

In the 1970s, France, assisted by the US and others, helped Iran听develop听nuclear technology that might have led eventually to an Iranian bomb.听The prospect did not raise alarms like it would today.听

鈥淭he Shah鈥檚 regime had a responsible foreign and security policy, and 鈥� was not perceived as a threat, despite the fact it was militarily superior to many of the neighbors,鈥� says听Mr.听Alfoneh. But the Islamic Republic 鈥渉as managed in the course of the last 34 years to be perceived as the greatest threat in the region, because of the policy of exporting the revolution, the rhetoric of Iranian leaders, [and] irresponsible measures," he says.

The big investment made by Iran already means it is not likely to be negotiated away, says听Mr. Vaez 鈥� who is now with the International Crisis Group 鈥� and Mr. Sadjadpour, in their report.

鈥淢any members of the US Congress will continue to demand that Iran be left with 鈥榥o capability鈥� to produce nuclear weapons,鈥� including halting all enrichment, the report states.听

But this is 鈥渘ot essential from a nonproliferation standpoint鈥� to limit Iran鈥檚 program, it continues. 鈥淢ore importantly, there is virtually no chance that Iran will abdicate what it and many developing countries now insist is a right 鈥撎齛 right to enrichment.鈥�